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Preface
Managing and limiting the consequences of global warming is one of the greatest chal-
lenges of the 21st century.1 There is scientific consensus that anthropogenic greenhouse
gas (GHG) emissions are the chief cause of ongoing global warming (e.g., Cook et al.,
2013, 2016). Thus, limiting future emissions at a level that allows for a moderate climate
is crucial to preventing harsh consequences to humankind. The historic development of
GHG emissions is mainly driven by the interplay between the growth of the economy and
energy as well as emissions intensity.2 The vast majority of these emissions stem from
fuel combustion in, especially, power markets for providing firms and households with
electricity.3
The specific characteristics of power markets render their transition towards a low emis-
sion intensity system difficult. This market builds on the utilization of a cost-intensive
infrastructure (e.g., power plants and grid infrastructure), which requires long amortiza-
tion periods. It is also subject to technical constraints, for example, to constantly balance
demand and supply and to keep the grid frequency constant. An additional challenge to
the long-run development of power markets is increasing demand. Apart from providing
existing market participants with electricity that exhibits a low emission intensity, the
supply side of power markets will have to provide new demand sectors with electricity.
Other energy sectors, such as the transportation and heat sector, either exhibit high CO2
abatement costs compared to the power market or their transition faces technical limita-
tions (EC, 2016). Accordingly, the notion of a cost-efficient transformation of all energy
sectors suggests the partial electrification of these sectors.
1 Already now, the changing climate impacts economic activity and humans through, e.g., increased
wildfire activity (Abatzoglou and Williams, 2016) and changing monsoon patterns (Herring et al.,
2019).
2 World annual CO2 emissions evolved, throughout the different development steps of the world’s econ-
omy, from 29 Mt in 1800 to 1,958 Mt in 1900 and were at a level of 36,179 Mt in 2015 (Boden et al.,
2017).
3 The combustion of gaseous, liquid, and solid fuels accounted for 93% of emissions from fuel combustion
world-wide in 2013 (Boden et al., 2017).
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The European Union (EU) is a prime example for the immense impact of fuel combustion
for electricity generation on overall emissions. The share of electricity and heat production
among the EU’s total emissions from fuel combustion has increased steadily over the last
50 years.4 Bearing that in mind, a fundamental yet smooth transformation of energy and
electricity supply to a low emission intensity system, is necessary to limit GHG emissions
and, thus, global warming.
Moreover, the character of the EU makes it of particular interest. First of all, the EU
constitutes a political union between 28 member states. Member states are sovereign.
However, the EU was given exclusive as well shared (with member states) competences
such as the design of policies to combat climate change and to guarantee the secure
supply of energy. Second, the EU was among the first developed regions engaging in
international climate policy and signed the 1997 Kyoto Protocol for its first obligatory
GHG reduction target. For the EU member states of that time, the Kyoto Protocol was
translated into a mandatory reduction target of 8% until 2012 compared to 1990 levels.
This was followed by mid- and long-term targets addressing the years 2020, 2030, and
2050. Finally, in response to the 2° C target of the 2015 Paris Agreement, the EU is
currently revising its 2050 target to reaching a carbon emission-free economy.
These targets have to be translated into implications for all sectors of the economy and
the power market in particular. Concerning the latter, it is crucial to understand the
impact of EU climate policy goals on, among others, the costs for providing electricity,
the mix of generation technologies, and the spatial distribution of electricity generation
among member states. This helps to, for example, introduce required national and EU-
wide legislation and initiate research and development efforts. Having that in mind, there
is a great demand for quantitative assessments of the future development path of power
markets and its sensitivity on numerous framework conditions (e.g., commodity prices).
Models of power markets, which identify the long-run competitive equilibrium, are thus
essential to analyze the implications of international and national climate and energy
policies as well as other framework conditions on market outcomes.
Apart from analyzing general consequences on market outcomes, numerical assessments
allow one to consider and quantify the various challenges to the transition of the European
power market. Due to technical constraints, the set of substitutes for fossil fuel-based
electricity generation technologies is limited with wind and solar power being regarded
as the most promising group of technologies due to the past development and future
prospects of their costs (IRENA, 2016). However, the intermittent supply pattern of
4 The share of emissions from electricity and heat production in the European Union increased over the
last 50 years from 31% in 1960 to 42% in 2014 (IEA, 2017a).
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these renewable energy technologies, due to meteorological conditions, as well as their
spatially varying resource quality is a great challenge to the constant and secure supply
of electricity and hence their broad market integration. Consequently, complementary
technologies, grid infrastructure, as well as conventional generation technologies will con-
tinue to play a crucial role, especially when renewable energies are not available to meet
demand. In the same way, the demand side of the power market has to adjust to the
ambitious decarbonization. An efficient use of electricity and the temporal reallocation of
electricity demand are believed to be crucial to an efficient transformation path. Yet, elec-
tricity tariffs in the past have rarely reflected the temporal scarcity of resources and thus
have not created incentives for the shifting of demand in time. Hence, new technologies
on the demand side that allow for flexibility of electricity demand as well as new tariffs
are required. Likewise, there are challenges from the design of the mandate of the EU.
The EU sets the long-run climate and energy policy goals for all 28 member states. Yet,
the translation of most of these goals into national legislation lies in the responsibility of
member states, where the actual design of national legislation is, in addition to EU reg-
ulation, influenced by national interests. This shared responsibility between the EU and
its member states imposes a political constraint on the translation of climate policies into
actual targets or legislation. Another challenge is the interaction between current energy
and climate policy questions and numerical assessments itself. The long-run transition
of the power market results in various questions to policy makers and dealing with them
requires quantitative assessments. Most questions are very specific and assessing them
adequately requires a numerical model to capture the mechanisms that are of importance
to a specific policy question. At the same time, one can observe single numerical models
addressing a variety of questions. Having the technical limitations with respect to com-
putational power and model tractability in mind, it may be questionable to what extent
numerical assessment do always capture crucial mechanisms. Thus, it remains unclear
whether the provision of adequate advice is a constraint itself.
This dissertation analyzes how the decarbonization goals impact the long-run develop-
ment of power markets and evaluates its cost for the case of the European Union. It
comprises four chapters with each analyzing a particular challenge to the transition of
the European power market. In the following, I will sketch out the relevance and contri-
bution of each chapter. This is followed by a separate, technical summary of all chapters
with each building on a stand-alone article. Chapters 1, 3, and 4 are based on co-authored
papers whereas Chapter 2 is single-authored.
The substitution of fossil fuel-based electricity generation by renewable energies is chal-
lenging due to the intermittency of the latter. This imposes a new role on both renewable
energies, and the remaining supply stack which has to balance the intermittent supply
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of renewable energies. Consequently, finding the optimal mix of generation technologies
that exhibits a low emission intensity and guarantees the secure supply of electricity is
complex. In Chapter 1 of this dissertation, I develop a framework for capturing the long-
run dynamics of the supply side of power markets for the case of the European Union.
The framework puts an emphasis on the detailed representation of the characteristics of
intermittent renewable energies, which are derived from meteorological data, as well as
includes a large set of other renewable energy and conventional generation technologies.
I apply the model to an 80% CO2 emission reduction scenario and derive a path of the
optimal, long-run technology-mix.
In addition to major adjustments to the supply side, EU-wide decarbonization efforts
build on the smooth coordination between the EU and its member states. All member
states following a single, EU-wide CO2 emissions reduction path leads to the cost-efficient
realization of this path, but can result in varying costs of transformation among countries.
Furthermore, the translation of climate policy goals into binding targets requires the
action of each member state. If single countries are worse off with the market outcomes
under the EU-wide transition path, they might announce their own energy and climate
policy targets. Consequently, it is crucial to integrate and understand the consequences of
national interests in power markets. Chapter 2 of this dissertation applies the framework
developed in Chapter 1 in a novel combination with concepts of cooperative game theory
to look into incentives for cooperation among EU member states. My findings allow me
to elaborate on the cost-efficient realization of a decarbonization path while accounting
for national interests.
With respect to the demand side of power markets, the functioning of the firms as well as
the prosperity of households and individuals is closely tied to the constant availability of
electricity. However, the demand side also has potential for flexibility. Hence, short- and
long-run demand adjustments are discussed as another important channel for mitigating
the consequences from climate change. Chapter 3 of this dissertation contributes a novel
framework to depict the dynamic development of short-term demand response and en-
ergy efficiency improvements, which allows for an assessment of the partial equilibrium
of power markets. I apply this framework to look into the role of long-run demand ad-
justment in the form of energy efficiency for the decarbonization of the European power
market. The results reveal that renewable energies, nonetheless, remain the major chan-
nel for avoiding CO2 emissions even under the presence of demand adjustment.
The technical and political challenges to decarbonization also increase the complexity
of providing policy makers with adequate advice. Numerical analyses on the economic
implications of energy policies in power markets have existed for a long time and have
become of increased importance with the liberalization of power markets in Europe. The
Preface 5
number of available models is vast, and respective numerical results exist in large numbers.
However, from the perspective of policy makers and the scientific community itself, there
is little knowledge concerning the overall capability of the existing population of models
and to what extent they actually provide relevant and robust insights for policy makers
and regulators. This serves as the starting point for Chapter 4 of this dissertation, where
I provide a framework for bridging the gap between model capabilities and demand from
the policy side. The framework is used to provide a map of the characteristics of a set
of power market models to current energy policy questions and to derive implications for
the capability of numerical models for decision support.
Chapter 1 The first chapter stems from joint work with Geoffrey Blanford (Weiss-
bart and Blanford, 2019). We develope a computable partial-equilibrium model of the
European power market, the EU-REGEN model, that captures the main determinants
for the supply-side adjustments in response to climate and energy policies. The model
comprises a representative demand side, a perfectly competitive supply side, and a cen-
tral planner and simulates a competitive, long-run market equilibrium over the horizon
of 2015 to 2050. We focus in particular on the detailed depiction of renewable energy
technologies, since the long-run development of power markets will be deeply affected
by the gradual substitution of fossil fuel-based generation technologies by renewable en-
ergy technologies. However, the intermittent supply of renewable energy technologies, in
combination with the temporal non-homogeneity of electricity, limits the competitiveness
of renewable energies (Joskow, 2011). The model developed in this chapter contributes
with a framework for capturing the temporal and spatial variability of wind and solar
resources. Furthermore, we differentiate wind and solar technologies by different quality
classes to account for the limited availability of high-quality resources. For that reason,
we additionally contribute with a routine for using meteorological data to approximate
the temporal availability of renewable energy technologies. The composite of all these
renewable energy features allows then for a detailed representation of their market value
and their implicit substitution elasticity with fossil fuel-based technologies. Our results
for the long-run electricity generation path of the European power market show that, un-
der an 80% CO2 emissions reduction scenario until 2050, renewable energy technologies
become the main technologies that will meet the demand. The 2050 generation-share of
wind and solar power combined is around 40%. However, with the detailed depiction of
their temporal and spatial characteristics, we identify that gas power is necessary as a
complement to compensate for their intermittent supply. Furthermore, this requires in
turn the utilization of carbon capture and storage to adhere to the climate target.
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Chapter 2 In contrast to Chapter 1, this single-authored chapter, which is based on
Weissbart (2019), goes beyond analyzing the first-best market outcome and is concerned
with its stability. The cost-efficient market outcome builds on the notion of coopera-
tion. In the context of power markets, this translates into regions that coordinate to
maximize the overall welfare in the power market with respect to a climate target. Yet,
it is well-known that the maximization of overall welfare through cooperation leads to
redistribution and can result in the reduction of a region’s welfare compared to the situ-
ation without cooperation. Thus, this chapter assesses why cooperation in the European
power market might not be stable due to unequal cost-sharing and identifies cost alloca-
tions that account for national interests. I apply a two-part methodology in this chapter.
First, I use the model developed in Chapter 1 to find the future equilibrium outcome of
the European power market under a cooperative cost-sharing game. More specifically, I
derive the first-best cost allocation for any possible coalition that can be formed among
regions, which amounts in the setting of this chapter to 8, 178 coalitions. Second, I an-
alyze resulting cost allocations by means of cooperative game theory concepts. Apart
from combining a partial equilibrium power market model with concepts of cooperative
game theory, this chapter develops the carbon nucleolus as a measure of the satisfaction
of a coalition with a given cost distribution in relation to its emission reductions. The
results show that the value of cooperation under a tight emission reduction target is a
e 69 billion reduction in discounted system cost over the next 30 years, and rational
behavior of regions can maintain at most 16% of this cost reduction. With the evaluation
of alternative cost allocations, I identify a trade-off between accounting for robustness
against cost changes and individual rationality. I also show that observed transfers within
the European Union Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) are mainly in line with the
results from this chapter. With respect to market outcomes, I find that the cost-efficient
decarbonization path of the European power sector under the grand coalition is char-
acterized by the interplay between wind power, gas power, and biomass with geologic
storage of CO2. However, with singleton coalitions only, the market outcome will shift
to a higher contribution of nuclear power.
Chapter 3 The endogenous adjustment of demand is rarely considered in partial-
equilibrium models of power markets. The third chapter, which is a joint work with
Mathias Mier (Mier and Weissbart, 2018), explores the effect of responsive demand on
the long-run market equilibrium of the European power market. In general, energy effi-
ciency and short-term demand response are key issues in the decarbonization of power
markets. However, their interaction and combined impact on market prices, as well as on
the supply side, is yet to be understood. Thus, we contribute by developing a novel frame-
work to implement investments in energy efficiency and short-term demand response in
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detailed partial equilibrium power market models. We then quantify our results by intro-
ducing this framework in the EU-REGEN model from Chapter 1 and find that, under an
80% emission reduction target, energy efficiency contributes only 11% of carbon emission
reductions. Intermittent renewable energies such as wind and solar power account for
the major share of 53% and fuel switching for 36%. Short-term demand response plays
a crucial role by providing, instead of gas power, flexibility to deal with intermittency of
renewable energies. Interestingly, we find that both energy efficiency and short-term de-
mand response have their merits in reducing marginal abatement costs and additionally
exhibit synergies on abatement costs, at least under an 80% climate policy. Our results
recommend regulators to substantially promote the market penetration of smart devices
and to establish economic incentives for adjusting demand to time-varying electricity
prices.
Chapter 4 In the final chapter, which is joint work with Georgios Savvidis, Kais Siala,
Lukas Schmidt, Frieder Borggrefe, Subhash Kumar, Karen Pittel, Reinhard Madlener,
and Kai Hufendiek (Savvidis et al., 2019), this dissertation takes a step back from its nu-
merical part and looks at the capability of numerical models to support decision-making.
Apart from decarbonization targets, technology-specific policies and computational devel-
opments have led to increases in the complexity and diversity of so-called energy system
models. Moreover, the lack of transparency and standardization has rendered the assess-
ment of model suitability for specific policy questions difficult. This chapter contributes
with a systematical assessment of the ability of energy system models to answer major
energy policy questions. First, we examine the extant literature on model comparison
schemes and then propose a set of criteria to compare a sample of 40 models. In the
second part, a novel, model-oriented approach is developed to cluster energy policy ques-
tions. Finally, the model capabilities and the policy questions are brought together by
quantifying the gap between models and policy questions. We find that some models
are very well able to answer a wide range of energy policy questions, whereas others are
only suitable for a specific area of energy policy. The representation of the distribution
grid, the endogenous adjustment of demand, and the technical flexibility of the energy
system are common features that deserve further research and development to address
current energy policy issues. Our results provide policy makers with guidance on cru-
cial model features with respect to a selection of energy policy questions, and suggest
potential research directions for future numerical assessments.
Chapter 1
A Framework for Modeling the
Dynamics of Power Markets –
The EU-REGEN Model
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1.1 Introduction
Since the beginning of the century, the energy policy of the European Union (EU) was
mainly driven by the decarbonization of the supply side. The power market will be
one of the main leverages to reach the ambitious decarbonization targets. On the one
hand, electrification of other energy sectors and the conversion of power to other energy
commodities (e.g., power-to-gas) will result in increasing demand (EC, 2011a, 2014). On
the other hand, the electricity generation-mix has to reduce its CO2 intensity. Therefore,
renewable energy sources (RES) have to become the major source to meet this load. Their
potential, especially for variable RES, is vast, and future cost estimates suggest economic
viability (e.g., Coppens et al., 2009; Marcel Šúri et al., 2007; IRENA, 2016).1 Yet, variable
RES are spatially dispersed and their quality varies temporally. This means that a cost-
efficient realization of EU decarbonization will require the integration of national power
markets and EU-wide cooperation on climate and energy policy.
In 2008, the European Commission (EC) introduced the “Energy & Climate Package”
with its “20-20-20” targets (EC, 2007). Comprising a 20% share of RES in energy con-
sumption, a 20% reduction of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions compared to 1990 levels,
and a 20% reduction of final energy consumption compared to a business-as-usual sce-
nario. Furthermore, each member state had to translate those EU-wide targets into
national targets. To address the mid- and long-term perspective, the European Commis-
sion released “A roadmap for Moving to a Competitive Low Carbon Economy in 2050”
(EC, 2011a,b), emphasizing a GHG emission reduction target of at least 80% compared
to 1990 levels. In 2014, this decarbonization path was further specified by targets for
2030: a 27% share of RES in energy consumption, a 40% reduction of GHG emissions
compared to 1990 levels, and a 27% decrease of final energy consumption. Currently,
the EC updates its long-term target with now aiming for a carbon-free economy by 2050
(EC, 2018).
Existing models for the European power market already provide insight into the sector’s
future development under current RES and CO2 emission targets. The LIMES-EU+
model is used in Knopf et al. (2015) and Schmid and Knopf (2015) to look into the
impact of the EC’s RES generation targets for 2030 and the relationship between trans-
mission capacity and RES capacity additions. Similarly, Schaber et al. (2012) analyze
the impact of transmission capacity expansion for variable RES integration and quan-
tify advantages and costs by means of the URBS-EU model. Kunz and Zerrahn (2016)
apply the stochastic version of the ELMOD model to address the topic of congestion
1 See, e.g., Huber and Weissbart (2015) for estimates on the variable RES potential in other regions of
the world.
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management between neighboring countries. Also the EMPIRE model considers uncer-
tainty by stochastic optimization. In Brovold et al. (2014), the dispatch of hydro power
is optimized under uncertainty with respect to meteorological circumstances. Moreover,
the future role of nuclear power is examined in Aune et al. (2015). They use the LIBE-
MOD model to calculate the eoconomic costs of a phase-out of nuclear power by 2030.
The economics of variable RES are further analyzed with the EMMA model in Hirth
(2013) by emphasizing their market value. With a different focus, Deane et al. (2012)
link results from the PRIMES energy system model (Mantzos and Capros, 1998) to the
PLEXOS power system modeling tool (Energy Exemplar, 2018) to conduct a detailed
evaluation of different power system components. A broader perspective is taken by
Richter (2011) and Henning and Palzer (2014). The DIMENSION model focuses on the
European power markets’ interaction with the heat and transportation sector (Richter,
2011). A pure German perspective is taken in the REMod model to, however, exam-
ine the impact of different climate targets on endogenous sector coupling (Henning and
Palzer, 2014). The behavior of private investors is researched in Schröder et al. (2013).
They use the EMELIE-ESY model to optimize a long-run generation capacity investment
under the assumption of profit maximizing agents.2
Yet, we still see analysis on the role of RES along the targeted decarbonization path that
allow room for improvements. To provide insights into the role of variable RES technolo-
gies over time, further developments of their depiction in numerical models is required to
analyze the relative costs of different technologies that rely on the same resource. Fur-
thermore, the trade-off between utilizing regional resource qualities versus system-wide
averaging effects of variable RES needs to be analyzed in dynamic models. Concerning
conventional generation technologies, to elaborate on the future role of existing and new
capacities in the European power market remains of great importance, and understanding
their contribution in the coming transition phase is crucial to design relevant policies.
For that purpose, we developed the framework of the EU-REGEN model. The model was
built to generate quantitative scenarios that represent an optimal and consistent decar-
bonization path for the European power system towards 2050. EU-REGEN minimizes
total system costs with respect to conventional and RES generation capacity invest-
ment, generation capacity conversion and retirement, generation dispatch and curtail-
ment, transmission capacity investment, physical electricity exchange, storage capacity
investment and operation, and carbon capture and storage (CCS) capacity investment
and operation. The model is set up as a partial equilibrium model that assumes complete
2 See Chapter 4 and Connolly et al. (2010); Bhattacharyya and Timilsina (2010); Foley et al. (2010);
Teufel et al. (2013) for a more extensive overview of existing power market models and their applica-
tions.
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markets with perfect information and is subject to a wide range of constraints. Moreover,
EU-REGEN is a deterministic and perfect foresight model. Meaning, there is no uncer-
tainty about input parameters, for example, investment cost, fuel prices, and demand.
The model is formulated as a linear optimization problem in GAMS (General Algebraic
Modeling System) and solved with the CPLEX solver.
Among others, the optimization of investment into generation, storage, transmission, and
CCS capacity is driven by costs for capacity additions and upper bounds on capacity addi-
tions and accumulation. Those bounds are derived from political and technical feasibility
as well as geological and geographical potentials. Furthermore, electricity demand, which
is determined exogenously in the model in this chapter, has to be satisfied by the combi-
nation of generation, storage discharge, and electricity exchange at any time. Dispatch of
generation capacity and system operation are driven by marginal costs, availability, and
investment costs of capacities. In addition, EU-REGEN makes use of the duality theo-
rem and derives electricity and CO2 prices from the dual variables of the market-clearing
constraint and the system-wide CO2 market constraint, respectively.
One specific characteristic of the EU-REGEN model is the detailed representation of
the variable RES wind and solar. We apply different resource-quality classes to both
resources, which are reflected in separate temporal availability profiles and capacity po-
tentials for each quality class. Moreover, certain technological progress is assumed by
setting improved technical characteristics of wind and solar technologies in future time
periods.
This chapter provides an overview of the model set-up, the main assumptions, and a
model application. We start with an introduction to the underlying economic rationale
in Section 1.2. Then, Sections 1.3 and 1.4 present the model structure and resolution.
This is followed by a detailed explanation of the methodology for modeling time-profiles
for variable RES, the aggregation of time segments, and showing the major parameter
values in Sections 1.5, 1.6, and 1.7. Finally, the model application to two policy scenarios
with respective results is introduced in Section 1.8. Section 1.9 concludes with a brief
outlook.
1.2 Model structure
In this section, we present the basic structure of the model and relate this to the microe-
conomic concepts underlying power markets. EU-REGEN is a partial equilibrium model
of an electricity system consisting of multiple regions connected via transmission lines. It
comprises consumers, producing firms, and a central planner (or regulator). This results
in a multi-period investment and dispatch model. The model’s main output variables
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are electricity prices, carbon prices, investment and production quantities of generation
technologies, and investment in transmission capacities.
1.2.1 Demand side
Consumers demand electricity and obtain utility from this. We assume that the respective
demand function d(p) is downward-sloped, that is, electricity is a normal good whose
demand decreases in its market price p. Meaning, the lower the price for electricity, the
higher is the market demand. The inverse of the demand function p(q), which indicates
the price, that is, the willingness to pay, as a function of the available quantity q. The
change in demand as a reaction to a change in the price is determined by price elasticity
.3 The absolute value of  indicates the degree of demand adjustment. However, for the
remainder of this chapter, we assume a price elasticity of  ≈ 0 and thus demand is not
reacting to price changes.4
1.2.2 Supply side
We assume a representative firm that invests in electricity generation capacity that is
used to produce q quantities of electricity. Firms are assumed to be price-takers and
hence their objective is profit maximization. Furthermore, the production of electricity
is subject to technical constraints, which limit the feasible production set. This results
in the supply function s(p), which equals the market supply when there is only one
representative producer, as in the case of the EU-REGEN model. The supply function
is then a mapping of quantity q to the minimal costs for the provision of this quantity.
Taking again the inverse of this function p(q) = s(p)−1 results in the relationship between
quantities and prices.
1.2.3 Central planner and social welfare
The central planner invests in transmission infrastructure between regions and maximizes
social welfare. Social welfare in a market is defined as the sum of consumers’ surplus CS
and producers’ surplus PS.5 As shown in Figure 1.1a, the CS is characterized by the
area between the demand curve and the horizontal line along the market-clearing price
and can be interpreted as the overall willingness to pay that is not appropriated by the
producers. The graphical representation of the PS is the area between the horizontal
3 The price elasticity is defined as the percentage change in quantity over the percentage change in price.
This can be written as  = ∆q/q∆p/p .
4 See Chapter 3 for a model set-up with responsive demand.
5 Note that the social welfare is also known as the Marshallian aggregate surplus.
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line along the market-clearing price and the supply curve. It can be interpreted as the
overall revenue above the producers’ costs or their profit. We assume that the assump-
tions of a competitive equilibrium hold and firms are price-takers, have access to perfect
information, are not subject to any uncertainty, and hence obtain zero profit. It has been
shown that the social welfare is maximized under the conditions of a competitive market
and thus the efficient market equilibrium is reached.
As introduced above, we assume that demand is perfectly inelastic, that is, it does not
react to changes in the market price. This market equilibrium setting is depicted in
Figure 1.1b. Under this assumption, the maximization of social welfare does not distort
the consumption choice of consumers. Thus, the minimization of total costs yields the
social welfare maximizing market equilibrium, which is the area below the supply curve
in Figure 1.1b.
We assumed, in this section, for illustration purposes, that producers incur only marginal
costs for producing electricity. In the following, we will point out the economic rationale
of the underlying market equilibrium and the type of costs that are considered in the
EU-REGEN model.
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Figure 1.1: Market equilibrium under different demand elasticities
1.2.4 Market equilibrium
The long-run market equilibrium of the EU-REGEN model is based on the minimization
of total system cost. The market value is the economic rationale underlying the solution
to this problem (see Lamont, 2008; Borenstein, 2008; Hirth, 2013). This concept allows
for a detailed depiction of RES, whose supply pattern is intermittent and exhibits a
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certain temporal correlation with demand.6 This refers to the temporal non-homogeneity
of electricity (Joskow, 2011).7
In brief, investment in capacity of a generation technology is cost-effective when its net
market value is greater than the net market value of alternative generation technologies.
The net market value is defined as the market value minus investment costs. Economic
theory generally defines the market value mv, or marginal value, of a technology as the
difference between the actual market price pt and the variable costs of the technology V C.
In the case of variable RES, the variable costs are close to zero. Hence, the annual market
value of a generation technology is characterized by the sum over the differences between
the market price and the variable costs multiplied by the hourly availability factor AV t.
For variable RES, the hourly availability factor AV t represents the observed availability
profile. In terms of generation technologies that are dispatchable,8 this availability factor
is assumed to be equal to 1 and can be dropped. Hence, the market value equals the
weighted mean of the market price pt that is corrected for the variable costs V C. This
can be expressed with the time-weighted arithmetic mean of the marginal price:
mv =
∑
t
((pricet − V C) · AV t) = A((pricet − V C) · AV t) · T. (1.1)
Focusing on variable RES and thus neglecting the variable costs and keeping the avail-
ability factor, the capability to meet demand is another perspective on the market value.
This means that a generation technology’s long-term value is high when its availability
profile allows for serving the market in times of high prices. In the analogy of Lamont
(2008), the covariance can be used to divide the market value into two components. The
covariance between the price and the hourly availability factor AF t can be expressed as:
covp,AV = A(pt · AF t)− A(pt) · A(AF t). (1.2)
Rearranging Equation (1.2) and substituting covp,AF +A(p) ·A(AF t) into (1.1) brings us
to the following definition of the market value:
mv = A(pt) · A(AF t) · T + covp,AV · T. (1.3)
6 A technology is intermittent when the temporal output variation is driven by exogenous factors.
7 Note that the economic viability of different generation technologies can also be evaluated with a lower
degree of detail, e.g., levelized costs of electricity generation (LCOE) (Kost et al., 2013) or average
cost functions (Stoft, 2002).
8 A technology is dispatchable when there is temporal control over it.
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Equation (1.3) contains both components of the market value. The first term is the
energy value and the second part is the demand-matching capability. The energy value
indicates that, in this case, the market value of an intermittent generation technology
depends, on the one hand, on the amount of energy that can be provided by adding one
unit of capacity. On the other hand, the demand-matching capability comprises the value
of serving the market in times of high prices and hence contributes to a reduction in this
price with the low marginal costs of variable RES.
Correcting the market value for the fixed costs FC and investment costs IC yields the
net market value nmv by:
nmv = mv − IC − FC = A(pt) · A(AF t) · T + covp,AF · T − IC − FC. (1.4)
With respect to the market equilibrium of the EU-REGEN model, this means that the
optimal investment decision in each time period is determined in the order of the net mar-
ket value of technologies and by the set of constraints that defines the feasible production
set. Moreover, it is important to emphasize that market value is a dynamic concept. The
investment decision of previous periods impacts market prices in a period and hence the
market value of technologies.
1.2.5 Elements of system costs
As mentioned above, total costs in a market serve as a measure for global welfare under
the assumption of perfectly inelastic demand. With respect to power markets, these costs
are referred to as total system costs. They comprise the costs for providing electricity to
the market as well as the investment costs for the underlying generation and transmission
infrastructure. Moreover, costs can be differentiated between private and social costs.
Private costs The EU-REGEN model covers all costs that a representative firm in-
curs for generating electricity. However, the composition of private costs for producing
electricity varies with the type of generation technology.9 In general, we can differentiate
technologies along two dimensions: RES-based/fossil fuel-based technologies and inter-
mittent/dispatchable technologies. Costs occurring with the production of electricity can
be differentiated into investment cost, variable cost, and fixed cost.10
9 Private costs are understood as all costs that firms take into account when maximizing their profits.
10Note that investment costs occur only once to create one additional unit of electricity generation
capacity, whereas fixed costs arise in each time period where a respective unit of capacity is active.
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Figure 1.2: Magnitude of cost types by generation technology
Yet, different generation technologies cause each of these costs to a varying extent.
Whereas dispatchable technologies are subject to all three kinds of costs, intermittent
generation technologies induce negligible variable cost. Figure 1.2 indicates the relevance
of investment, variable, and fixed costs for major generation technologies. This is done
by locating each technology in the space of investment costs, variable costs, and fixed
costs. We look at the standard generation technologies: biomass, coal, gas, nuclear, and
wind. The magnitude of each cost component is based on Schröder et al. (2013).
Electricity generation from biomass is subject to relatively high investment cost and
moderate variable and fixed cost. The latter is comparably high for nuclear power, which
also triggers very high investment cost and moderate variable cost. In contrast, gas power
induces low investment cost, yet, causes high variable cost from fuel sourcing. These costs
are comparably lower for coal power, which is subject to low investment and fixed cost
as well. The former type of costs is higher for wind power, which, however, hardly
causes variable and fixed costs. Concerning wind power, its cost is furthermore driven by
geographic circumstances. For example, the composition of total costs for offshore wind
power comprises higher investment and fixed costs.
Note that, as Figure 1.2 depicts, coal power has low costs with respect to all three cost
components. Furthermore, this technology can be dispatched and is hence independent
of meteorological and geographic circumstances. The high competitiveness of coal power,
without considering its external costs and its high abundance, can be seen as the main
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driver for its dominating role across power markets all over the world (Steckel et al.,
2015).
Social costs With respect to social costs, the EU-REGEN framework includes policies
that address the external effect from CO2 emissions only. Yet, further environmental
externalities, such as local air pollution from SO2 as well as feedback effects on the power
market are not considered. The same holds true for non-environmental externalities.
Since the model setting does not represent the interaction between the power market
and the rest of the economy, economic spillovers cannot be valued. Moreover, the EU-
REGEN model yields the inter-temporal equilibrium by relying on perfect expectations.
Consequently, the issue of technology lock-ins cannot be examined due to the perfect-
foresight nature of the model. Similarly, the effects of market failure due to strategic
investment and dispatch behavior cannot be evaluated in this model setting.
In general, externalities from electricity generation that cause social costs,11 can be distin-
guished into environmental externalities and non-environmental externalities (Borenstein,
2012). Considering the social cost from environmental externalities that are not inter-
nalized by private firms can change a classification, as in Figure 1.2. There is scientific
consensus that the emission of CO2 into the atmosphere is one of the main drivers for
the observed increase in global temperature (e.g., Cook et al., 2013, 2016). With power
markets being one of the main emitters of CO2, these emissions are one of the main
environmental externalities from electricity generation.12 If regulators introduce a policy
instrument and hence producers internalize the social cost from CO2 emissions, their
variable cost for fossil fuel-based generation technologies will increase significantly. This
mainly concerns coal power, which is highly competitive due to low private cost, but it
suffers from high social cost due to its high carbon content.13
Note that extant research shows that the impact of power markets on climate change
(mainly from CO2 emissions) yields a feedback effect as well. The impact of climate
change on power markets itself can be distinguished into effects on demand and supply
(Mideksa and Kallbekken, 2010). Power generation could be impacted by reduced water
supply from heat waves and droughts, which would influence hydropower directly and
thermal power plants indirectly through lack of cooling water and the reduced efficiencies
11 Social costs are production-related costs that are not internalized by private firms per se.
12Note that electricity and heat production caused 42% of global CO2 emissions from fuel combustion
in 2016 (IEA, 2018).
13The carbon content is the amount of carbon embedded in the fuel itself. The contained carbon is
released through the combustion of the fuel. Then, it reacts with oxygen, and results in CO2.
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resulting from that (Rübbelke and Vögele, 2011; Golombek et al., 2012).14 Moreover,
increasing mean temperatures from climate change could alter electricity demand through
a stronger correlation with temperatures. An example would be the increased adoption of
air conditioning and, thus, soaring electricity demand (Auffhammer and Mansur, 2014).
However, there are more sources of environmental damage from electricity generation.
Local environmental damages can comprise, for example, environmental degradation
through fossil fuel extraction, loss of biodiversity, and local air pollution from fossil fuel
combustion (e.g., Edenhofer et al., 2013).15 Concerning the latter, pollutants such as
nitrogen oxide (NOx) and sulfur dioxide (SO2) can cause local air pollution and enhance
acid rain and smog (Owen, 2004).
Non-environmental externalities from electricity generation can create negative as well
as positive impacts. One of the most prominent (negative) non-environmental external-
ities are path-dependences. Path-dependences in the power market are understood as
the costs of locking an energy system into a subset of technologies due to, for example,
the underlying infrastructure (Fouquet, 2016). Since investment in production and trans-
mission infrastructure are characterized by long amortization periods, they can lead to
slow adoption in the market and thus create inefficiencies. Moreover, both conventional
generation technologies and RES, exhibit a negative externality on landscape aesthetics
and, hence, property values (Davis, 2011; Gibbons, 2015).16 Especially wind power can
entail an externality through having a negative impact on human well-being (e.g., Krekel
and Zerrahn, 2017).
Though, it is important to emphasize that there exist positive externalities as well such as
employment effects, knowledge spillovers, and learning effects, among others (Edenhofer
et al., 2013; Fouquet, 2016). With respect to employment effects, the large-scale invest-
ment and deployment of a new generation technology, for example, solar power, can lead
to additional jobs in the energy sector and, thus, have a positive impact on the overall
economy.17 Innovation market failures, for example, knowledge spillovers, and learning
effects, occur when since single firms, in the private optimum, do not account for their
14Note that in terms of wind power, changing climatic conditions could alter the temporal and geographic
structure of wind resources. Yet, it cannot be generalized whether this leads to an overall positive or
negative impact (Pryor and Barthelmie, 2010).
15 See Samadi (2017) for a general overview of externalities from electricity generation.
16 See Mattmann et al. (2016a,b); Dröes and Koster (2016); Chiabrando et al. (2009); Gamble and
Downing (1982) for estimates on the impact of single technologies.
17Note that a higher number of workers in this sector is then mainly required due to the installation
of capacities (Frondel et al., 2010). Thus, the nature of investments in RES, which are high up-front
investment costs and low variable costs, questions to what extent this effect still holds in the long run
(Borenstein, 2012).
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impact on the knowledge stock of the economy and the development of future technology
costs via their learning-by-doing (Fischer and Newell, 2008).
In this section, we described the general structure of the EU-REGEN model. Moreover,
we outlined the type of costs that the framework considers for cost-minimization and,
hence, a welfare-maximizing market outcome. In the following chapter, we will depict the
numerical implementation of the cost-minimization problem with its set of constraints.
1.3 Numerical implementation
The EU-REGEN model is a linear program based on the US-REGEN model (Blanford
et al., 2014).18 In the following, we present the algebra of the model and use subscripts to
refer to region r, time period t, time segment s, vintage v, generation technology i, storage
technology j, natural gas supply class n, and biomass supply class b. The nomenclature
of the sets, variables, and parameters used in this section are described in Table A.1 in
Appendix A.1.
System costs The linear and deterministic optimization model minimizes the total dis-
counted system cost ctot (Equation (1.5)) that consists of investment costs for generation
capacity cgcr,t, transmission capacity ctcr,t, storage capacity cscr,t, costs from generation opera-
tion cvcr,t, maintenance costs for generation capacity cfomr,t , and operation and maintenance
costs for transmission ctvor,t and ctfmr,t :
ctot =
∑
r,t
[(cgcr,t + ctcr,t + cscr,t) · tft + cvcr,t + cfomr,t + ctvor,t + ctfmr,t ] ·DFt (1.5)
This includes the investment tax factor tft, which is determined by the investment tax
rate TK and the length of time step t in years YRt as well as the discount factor DFt
(Equation (1.6)):
tft =
(1 + TK)
YRt
∀t ∈ T (1.6)
In Equation (1.7), investment costs for generation capacity investments by firms cgcr,t are
defined as a function of the new generation capacity gcnewi,r,t, its investment costs IC
gc
i,t,
and the technology-specific lifetime factor LFi,v,r,t. The latter one is applied to avoid
end-effects and adjusts investment costs for the share of the technology-specific lifetime
18 See Young et al. (2013) and Blanford et al. (2014) for detailed information on the U.S. Regional
Economy, Greenhouse Gas, and Energy (US-REGEN) model and carried-out analyses. Furthermore,
note that the US-REGEN framework also captures the interaction between the power sector and other
sectors of the economy.
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that lies within the model horizon:
cgcr,t =
∑
i∈Inew
gcnewi,r,t ·
∑
v
ICgci,t · LFi,v,r,t ∀r ∈ R, t ∈ T (1.7)
Costs for new transmission capacity investment between regions undertaken by the central
planner (Equation (1.8)) vary with the new transmission capacity tcnewr,rr,t and the region-
specific investments costs ICtcr,rr that are a function of the distance between the regions’
load centers or other geographic considerations as, for example, overseas connections:
ctcr,t =
∑
rr
tcnewr,rr,t · ICtcr,rr ∀r ∈ R, t ∈ T (1.8)
The last component of investment costs, electricity storage charge and discharge capacity,
is described in Equation (1.9) by the product of the added capacity scnewj,r,t for storage
technology j and the investment costs for storage charge capacity ICscj :
cscr,t =
∑
j
scnewj,r,t · ICscj ∀r ∈ R, t ∈ T (1.9)
Costs from electricity generation operation and maintenance (O&M) by firms are rep-
resented by cvcr,t and cfomr,t , respectively. In Equation (1.10), the variable dispatch costs
are the specific variable operation costs mci,v,r,t times the actual generation gs,i,v,r,t and
the number of hours in each load segment Hs (see Section 1.6). We include costs from
biomass separately by accounting for the cost OCbiob,r from biomass supply bsb,r,t:
cvcr,t =
∑
i,v
(mci,v,r,t ·
∑
s
(gs,i,v,r,t · Hs)) +
∑
b
bsb,r,t ·OCbiob,r r ∈ R,∀t ∈ T (1.10)
A firm’s marginal costs mci,v,r,t comprise variable operation costs OCvomi,v,r, fuel costs, and
costs from CO2 permits (Equation (1.11)). Fuel costs vary with the fuel use coefficient
FCi,f (a binary variable allocating fuel type to generation technology), the technology-
specific heat rate HRi,v,f,r (with a lower heat rate indicating a more efficient combustion
process), as well as time period and region-specific adjustment factors FTf,t and FRf,r
(to account for, e.g., intra-regional fuel distribution costs). Costs from carbon permits
are the product of emission intensity EMi,v,r and the permit price PCt:
mci,v,r,t = OCvomi,v,r +
∑
f
(FCi,f · HRi,v,f,r · (FTf,t + FRf,r))
+ EMi,v,r · PCt ∀i ∈ I, v ∈ V , r ∈ R, t ∈ T
(1.11)
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Moreover, firms incur fixed O&M costs from holding generation capacity, costs charac-
terized by the product of gci,v,r,t and the fixed O&M costs OCfomi,r (Equation (1.12)):
cfomr,t =
∑
i,v
OCfomi,r · gci,v,r,t r ∈ R,∀t ∈ T (1.12)
In analogy, Equation (1.13) accounts for variable and fixed costs from electricity exchange
between regions. With the variable costs ctvor,t being the product of the transaction costs
from physical flows OCtvor,rr, the actual exchange between regions es,r,rr,t, and the number of
hours in each load segment Hs. Fixed maintenance costs for transmission ctfmr,t are derived
from the accumulated transmission capacity tcr,rr,t times the fixed costs for transmission
OCtfmr,rr,t (Equation (1.14)):
ctvor,t =
∑
s,rr
OCtvor,rr · es,r,rr,t · Hs ∀r ∈ R, t ∈ T (1.13)
ctfmr,t =
∑
rr
OCtfmr,rr,t · tcr,rr,t ∀r ∈ R, t ∈ T (1.14)
Dispatch The main equilibrium constraint of a power market is to meet demand at
any point in time. Accordingly, the market-clearing condition (Equation (1.15)) requires
that generation gs,i,v,r,t, plus electricity imports es,rr,r,t, less electricity exports es,r,rr,t, less
electricity netexports to outside regions Eints,r, plus storage discharge sds,j,r,t, less storage
charge ss,j,r,t, and less self-consumption of hydro pump storage PSs,r has to meet demand
Ds,r,t.19 Moreover, flat loss factors are applied to account for losses from storage discharge
 and intra-regional distribution δ.20 However, a region-specific loss factor is used for
exchange between regions with PENtrr,rr being again a function of the distance between
19Note that this constraint does not allow for the curtailment of demand. An alternative approach
would be allowing for demand curtailment by valuing unserved load at the price cap in the market,
the value of lost load (VOLL) (e.g., Newbery, 2016). A too low set VOLL can trigger the so-called
missing money problem where revenues do not fully cover cost (Joskow, 2013). Hence, the set-up of
the EU-REGEN model excludes from the possibility of encountering the missing money problem.
20Note that the storage loss factor  is applied only to the storage charge and consequently captures the
losses occurring in the whole storage cycle.
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the regions’ load centers:21
(
∑
i,v
gs,i,v,r,t +
∑
rr
es,rr,r,t −
∑
rr
es,r,rr,t · PENtrr,rr
− Eints,r +
∑
j
(sds,j,r,t − ss,j,r,t · (1− ))
− PSs,r) · Hs
= Ds,r,t · Hs ∗ (1 + δ) ∀s ∈ S, r ∈ R, t ∈ T
(1.15)
To account for physical constraints, generation of controllable generation units gs,i,v,r,t,
that are comprised in the set Ictr, is limited by the installed capacity gci,v,r,t.22 The latter
is again constrained by an availability factor for each load segment AFs,i,r (representing
monthly availability patterns of dispatchable generation technologies) or a capacity factor
CFs,i,r for intermittent generation technologies (Equation (1.16)):
gs,i,v,r,t ≤ gci,v,r,t · AFs,i,r · CFs,i,r ∀s ∈ S, i ∈ Ictr, v ∈ V , r ∈ R, t ∈ T (1.16)
To approximate observed generation patterns, we define certain must-run capacity by
fixing generation at the average capacity factor for the set of non-dispatched generation
technologies Ifix, that comprises, for example, geothermal power plants (Equation (1.17)):
gs,i,v,r,t = gci,v,r,t · AFs,i,r · CFs,i,r ∀s ∈ S, i ∈ Ifix, v ∈ V , r ∈ R, t ∈ T (1.17)
With the same rationale we apply a lower bound to generation from nuclear power in
Equation (1.18). We set the minimum nuclear generation to the dispatch factor DFs of
its available generation capacity:
gs,i,v,r,t ≥ gci,v,r,t · AFs,i,r ·DFs ∀s ∈ S, i ∈ {nuclear}, v ∈ V , r ∈ R, t ∈ T (1.18)
Finally, we define, for notification purposes, total generation over all load segments in
Equation (1.19) as
tgi,v,r,t =
∑
s
gs,i,v,r,t · Hs ∀i ∈ I, v ∈ V , r ∈ R, t ∈ T . (1.19)
21Note that the transmission loss factor PENtrr,rr is applied only to exports and hence captures the losses
that occur in the exporting as well as the importing region.
22Note that the set of controllable generation units also comprises RES. However, the set excludes
generation technologies that operate in multiple energy sectors such as combined heat and power
(CHP) power plants.
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Generation capacity With respect to the development of generation capacity over
time, its accumulated capacity gci,r,t is determined in Equation (1.20) as the sum of new
generation capacity gcnewi,r,t in a specific period and the existing endowment in the previous
period gci,v,r,t−1:
gci,v,r,t = gcnewi,r,t + gci,v,r,t−1 ∀i ∈ Inew, v ∈ Vnew, r ∈ R, t ∈ T (1.20)
There are upper bounds to investment into new vintage technologies. A limit can be
set to each region CAPgci,r,t and an additional one CAP
geu
i,t to the system-wide investment
in each technology, which approximates technical limits from the market for generation
technologies (Equations (1.21) and (1.22)):
gcnewi,r,t ≤ CAPgci,r,t ∀i ∈ Inew, r ∈ R, t ∈ T (1.21)
∑
r
gcnewi,r,t ≤ CAPgeui,t ∀i ∈ Inew, t ∈ T (1.22)
Retirement of generation capacity by firms is endogenous to the EU-REGEN model. New
generation capacity has to be retired before its expected lifetime Li,v,r,t, which is a binary
variable with a positive number for each period before the time period of retirement at
the latest (Equation (1.23)):
gci,v,r,t ≤ gcnewi,r,t · Li,v,r,t ∀i ∈ Inew, v ∈ Vnew, r ∈ R, t ∈ T (1.23)
For existing capacity, in addition to retirement, there is the option of conversion and
retrofits, which means allowing for the use of different fuels (e.g., biomass instead of
coal) or the addition of a carbon capture facility to, for example, a coal power plant, re-
spectively. We set upper bounds to conventional capacity that can be retrofitted (Equa-
tion (1.24)). Here, the amount of retrofitted capacity, which is determined by gci,v,r,t and
the retrofit factor RFi, representing the capacity added through the retrofit, has to be
below the capacity limit CAPreti,r (approximating technical limits) for the set of possible
retrofit technologies Iret:
gci,v,r,t · RFi < CAPreti,r ∀i ∈ Iret, v ∈ V , r ∈ R, t ∈ T (1.24)
With respect to conversions, existing coal or lignite capacity can be used in conventional
mode or converted to using different fuels. Hence, for the retirement of old capacity
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gci,v,r,t,23 the sum of old and converted capacity, which is scaled by the conversion fac-
tor CRi (again representing the capacity added through the conversion), cannot exceed
the amount of capacity that can still be operated based on the technical lifetime con-
straint(Equation (1.25)):
gci,v,r,t +
∑
i∈Icr
gci,v,r,t · CRi ≤ GColdi,v,r · Li,v,r,t ∀i ∈ Icr, v ∈ Vold, r ∈ R, t ∈ T (1.25)
Finally, as indicated in Equation (1.26), we make sure that generation capacity in each
vintage retires monotonically decreasing:
gci,v,r,t+1 ≤ gci,v,r,t ∀i ∈ I, v ∈ V , r ∈ R, t ∈ T (1.26)
Storage The operation of electricity storage is constrained by the available storage and
charge capacity. The former is determined by the sum of new capacity scnewj,r,t and existing
capacity from the previous period scj,r,t−1 (Equation (1.27)):
scs,r,t = scnewj,r,t + scj,r,t−1 ∀j ∈ J , r ∈ R, t ∈ T (1.27)
This charge capacity scj,r,t is then the upper limit to the dispatch of storage charge ss,j,r,t
and discharge sds,j,r,t, as depicted in Equations (1.28) and (1.29):
ss,j,r,t ≤ scj,r,t ∀s ∈ S, j ∈ J , r ∈ R, t ∈ T (1.28)
sds,j,r,t ≤ scj,r,t ∀s ∈ S, j ∈ J , r ∈ R, t ∈ T (1.29)
Furthermore, Equation (1.30) limits the accumulated amount of stored electricity sbs,j,r,t
to the storage capacity, which is determined by a fixed size SHj (≥ 1) in relation to the
charge capacity scj,r,t:
sbs,j,r,t ≤ SHj · scj,r,t ∀s ∈ S, j ∈ J , r ∈ R, t ∈ T (1.30)
The dynamic accumulation of sbs,j,r,t is defined in Equation (1.31) as the amount of
stored electricity in the previous time segment sbs−1,j,r,t plus the net charge, which is the
difference between the storage charge ss,j,r,t and the storage discharge sds,j,r,t:
sbs,j,r,t ≤ sbs−1,j,r,t +Hs · (ss,j,r,t − sds,j,r,t) ∀s ∈ S, j ∈ J , r ∈ R, t ∈ T (1.31)
23The parameter gci,v,r,t captures all units operated in the base year.
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Transmission As introduced in Section 1.2, the representation of electricity transmis-
sion in the EU-REGEN model is limited to exchange between regions. Its available
capacity is the sum of new transmission capacity tcnewi,r,t and the capacity in the previous
period gci,r,t−1 as shown in Equation (1.32):
tcr,rr,t = tcnewr,rr,t + tcr,rr,t−1 ∀r ∈ R, t ∈ T (1.32)
To account for the political and technical feasibility of additions to transmission capacity,
we set upper limits to it. For each time period, bounds can be applied to each individual
connection between regions CAPtcr,rr,t (Equation (1.33)) as well as to system-wide additions
CAPteut in a specific time period (Equation (1.33)):
tcnewr,rr,t < CAPtcr,rr,t ∀r ∈ R, t ∈ T (1.33)∑
r
tcnewr,rr,t · TLr,rr < CAPteut ∀t ∈ T (1.34)
Geologic storage of carbon The EU-REGEN framework allows for the geologic stor-
age of CO2 captured from electricity generation facilities.24 For that purpose, the physical
accumulation of the stored CO2 is determined, as shown in Equation (1.35), by the prod-
uct of capture rate CRi, fuel coefficient FCi, heat rate HRi,f,r, fuel-specific carbon content
CCf , and generation tgi,v,r,t
csr,t =
∑
i,v,f
CRi · FCi · HRi,f,r · CCf · tgi,v,r,t ∀r ∈ R, t ∈ T (1.35)
with its dynamic accumulation being constrained in Equation (1.36) by the geological
storage capacity CAPccsr : ∑
r
csr,t < CAPccsr ∀r ∈ R (1.36)
Resource constraints Furthermore, the dispatch and investment of generation tech-
nologies is limited by the availability of resources. With respect to wind and solar tech-
nologies, the limited availability of land area as well as competition with alternative land
use types leads to limited potential within each resource class (see Section 1.5). As shown
in Equations (1.37) and (1.38), for both groups of technologies, accumulated capacity ad-
ditions and initial capacity gci,v,r,t in each quality class, with QCi,r allocating existing
capacities to quality classes, must not exceed the capacity limits CAPwindi,r and CAPsolari,r
24Note that we only consider the storage of CO2 and abstract from the depiction of the CO2 transporta-
tion infrastructure.
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(see Section 1.7):
∑
v
gci,v,r,t + QCi,r ·
∑
v∈Vold
gci,v,r,t < CAPwindi,r ∀i ∈ Iwind, r ∈ R, t ∈ T (1.37)
∑
v
gci,v,r,t + QCi,r ·
∑
v∈Vold
gci,v,r,t < CAPsolari,r ∀i ∈ Isolar, r ∈ R, t ∈ T (1.38)
Concerning biomass and gas, their availability is bounded by regional supply. As depicted
in Equation (1.39), regional exogenous biomass supply BSb,r,t is differentiated between
supply classes b, which constrain biomass fuel use that is determined by the fuel use
coefficient FCi,f , heat rate HRi,f,r, and annual generation tgi,v,r,t (see also Section 1.7):
∑
b
BSb,r,t ≥
∑
i,v
∑
f∈{bio}
FCi,f ·HRi,f,r · tgi,v,r,t ∀r ∈ R, t ∈ T (1.39)
By analogy, gas demand is constrained in Equation (1.40) by exogenous gas supply GSg,r,t
over all gas supply classes g:
∑
g
GSg,r,t ≥
∑
i,v
∑
f∈{gas}
FCi,f · HRi,f,r · tgi,v,r,t ∀r ∈ R, t ∈ T (1.40)
The CO2 permit market As outlined in Section 1.2, the EU-REGEN framework ad-
dresses the environmental externality from fuel combustion by limiting the total amount
of emissions and thus includes a market for CO2 emissions from electricity generation.25
In the default setting, the market for CO2 permits does not allow for banking, that is,
CO2 emissions have to be offset in the period of occurrence. In that case, the amount of
net banked credits nbct is set to zero. Meaning, in each period the amount of emitted
carbon, which is characterized by the emission rate EMi,r and total generation tgi,v,r,t,
cannot be above the CO2 emission cap CAPco2t (Equation (1.41)):26
CAPco2t − nbct ≥
∑
i,v,r
EMi,r · tgi,v,r,t t ∈ T (1.41)
However, banking of permits can be allowed by introducing a banking market. Then, the
banking market is modeled by the cumulative banked credits cbct, through the arithmetic
25Note that the model as well allows for introducing a carbon tax or exogenous carbon permit price (see
Equation (1.11)).
26The magnitude of the CO2 cap depends on the scenario of interest.
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series indicated in Equation (1.42),
cbct =
∑
t′<t
nbct′ ∀t ∈ T (1.42)
including the constraint that accumulated banked credits balance by the model horizon
(Equation (1.43)): ∑
t<2050
nbct = 0 (1.43)
1.4 Model resolution
Spatial The EU-REGEN model represents the European power market. Its geographic
scope includes all countries of the European Union (EU28), except for the island coun-
tries Malta and Cyprus. Additionally, the model includes Switzerland and Norway, which
have a central position in the European system or are endowed with great resource po-
tentials. To reduce the size of the model, those 28 countries are grouped into 13 model
regions.27 The aggregation is based on geographic characteristics and current config-
urations of the European power markets. However, Germany is disaggregated into a
northern and southern region to reflect existing transmission limitations between the two
regions—which triggered the current public debate on two pricing zones within Germany
(e.g., Egerer et al., 2015, 2016). Figure 1.3 shows the EU-REGEN model regions.
Temporal The model horizon in the default model setting is 2050. We start with the
base year 2015 (with given capacity) and optimize dispatch and investment in 5-year time
steps up to 2050, which amounts to eight steps. Simulating dispatch on an hourly basis,
or an even higher temporal resolution, offers the most accurate representation of power
system operation. Yet, similar to the spatial aggregation described above, the number
of time segments is reduced within each period for computational reasons. The default
version of the model uses 121 intra-annual time segments. More information on the choice
of representative hours can be found in Section 1.6. However, this reduced form approach
means loss of the chronological order of hours and, thereby, compromises the modeling
quality of, for example, electricity storage. Thus, electricity storage is only considered
when looking at a single time period, where an hourly resolution is again feasible.
Technology The model includes 25 different types of generation capacity (see Table A.3
in Appendix A.2). To account for different characteristics of power plants of the same
type or varying resource quality of variable RES, each type is further distinguished into
27 See Table A.2 in Appendix A.2 for an overview of the composition of model regions.
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Figure 1.3: EU-REGEN model regions and transmission links in the base year
generation blocks. This results in 73 different generation blocks by region with, for ex-
ample, wind power making up for six blocks due to six different wind resource classes
(see Section 1.5). Moreover, existing generation units are grouped into vintages to allow
for different heat rates among generation blocks. Each vintage covers a period of five
years and includes all units that went online in this period. New capacity can be added
to each technology block through investment. Similar to existing installations, additions
in different model periods are grouped into vintages to assign specific technological char-
acteristics to each. As depicted in Section 1.3, generation capacity can be subject to
upper bounds on additions or on accumulated capacity. Limits on additions are applied
to nuclear power and accumulated capacity of each variable RES technology. Finally, the
set of non-dispatchable technologies comprises geothermal and combined heat and power
(CHP), and the set of technologies eligible for retrofit or conversion consists of hard coal,
lignite, and gas power.
With respect to CCS, there is no commercially operated power plant in Europe as of now
(EC, 2013b). In the model, new CCS generation technology can be added in combination
with new generation capacity for lignite, coal, natural gas, or biomass power. Retrofits of
existing conventional generation capacity is as well enabled for lignite, coal, and biomass
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power plants. Furthermore, the amount of captured CO2 is subject to limited geological
storage capacity.
As indicated in Section 1.3, we abstract from intra-regional electricity distribution and
model electricity exchange between regions only. We assume one generic type of trans-
mission technology, whose investment costs, however, vary among regions to account for,
for example, oversees connections. Existing transmission capacities between regions serve
as starting values. In each time period, new transmission capacity can be added between
neighboring regions or regions with an already existing transmission link. However, those
additions are subject to upper bounds.
1.5 Modeling wind and solar technologies
The importance of a detailed representation of the intermittency of RES has been em-
phasized in, for example, Joskow (2011). The modeling of variable RES has to incorpo-
rate both components of the market value (see Section 1.2), the energy value and the
demand-matching capability (Lamont, 2008). Yet, so far, little effort has been put into
methodologies to capture the temporal, inter-, and intra-regional variations in a dynamic
investment model. Our modeling approach accounts, on the one hand, for varying annual
electricity generation from variable RES between and within regions. On the other hand,
differences in the temporal profiles are captured. Therefore, the characteristics of the
resources, wind speed, and solar irradiation, and their different technologies are captured
in our modeling approach. In the following, we will outline the methodology for the
detailed representation of variable RES in the EU-REGEN framework.
1.5.1 Resource data-base
To fully account for the intermittency and spatial variability of resources, the underlying
data on wind and solar resources is required to be at a high temporal and spatial res-
olution. Similar to other studies (e.g., Cannon et al., 2015; Juruš et al., 2013; Olauson
and Bergkvist, 2015), we use the MERRA (Modern-Era Retrospective analysis for Re-
search and Applications) reanalysis data for both resources, which is provided by NASA
(Rienecker et al., 2011). Parameters are available for the time interval between 1979 and
today with a temporal resolution of 1 hour. The spatial resolution is 12 and
1
3 degree in lat-
itude and longitude, respectively. Meaning, EU REGEN’s geographic scope is covered by
2,704 locations, each one representing an area of 12 × 13 degree. Figure 1.4a illustrates the
spatial resolution of the MERRA data set with different colors representing each model
region and gray-colored grid cells indicating offshore area. For wind resources, we extract
variables on eastward and northward wind speed at 50 meters above the surface (U50M
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and V50M), displacement height (DISPH), and roughness length (Z0M). Modeling solar
power technologies is based on MERRA’s surface incident shortwave flux (SWGDN) and
the temperature 2 meters above displacement height (T2M) (NASA, 2010):
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Figure 1.4: Wind resource data-base
1.5.2 Resource classes
As mentioned above, the EU-REGEN model captures the varying quality of variable
RES through different generation blocks. The generation blocks of new variable RES
vintages represent the different resource classes for each resource type. Concerning wind,
we introduce six resource classes Cwind based on the wind speed at 100 m above ground.
Classes are defined as shown in Table 1.1:
Table 1.1: Wind resource classes based on average wind speed at 100 m [m/s]
Wind 6 Wind 5 Wind 4 Wind 3 Wind 2 Wind 1
< 4 4 – 5 5 – 6 6 – 7 7 – 8 > 9
To determine the resource quality in each of the 2,704 locations, we calculate the average
wind speed over the time period 1982 to 2013. By means of that measure, we allocate each
location to one resource class within its region. An overview of the spatial distribution
of resource classes is indicated in Figure 1.4b.
The same approach is applied to solar resources. Here, resource classes Csolar are based
on the mean global horizontal irradiation from 1982 to 2013 (Table 1.2). Assigning a
solar resource class to each location lead to the distribution shown in Figure A.1a in
Appendix A.3.
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Table 1.2: Solar resource classes based on average solar irradiation [kWh/m2]
Solar 6 Solar 5 Solar 4 Solar 3 Solar 2 Solar 1
< 1,000 1,000 – 1,200 1,200 – 1,400 1,400 – 1,600 1,600 – 1,800 > 1,800
Due to its high investment costs, we assume concentrated solar power (CSP) to be suitable
only for locations with high resource quality. Therefore, CSP is limited to locations within
solar classes 1 and 2, as shown in Figure A.1b in Appendix A.3.
1.5.3 Wind power
In terms of wind power, we consider wind onshore and offshore as separate technologies.
As of the end of 2016, 154 GW of cumulative wind power capacity was installed in the EU.
A majority of 141 GW was installed onshore compared to 13 GW of offshore installations
(Wind Europe, 2017). Moreover, cost and performance estimates of both technologies
differ. Therefore, it is crucial to differentiate between them to capture the technological
traits and economics of wind power.
Estimating the generation profile of wind power, which captures the availability of a
wind power technology in each time segment, requires data on wind speed, displacement
height, and surface roughness. The translation of these three input parameters into power
output is based on three steps. First, the combination of wind speeds from two directions.
Then, the extrapolation of wind speeds to hub heights. Finally, the translation of wind
speeds for combinations of different hub heights and wind turbines to a normalized power
output. We provdide a detailed elaboration of these steps in Section A.5 in Appendix A.5.
Moreover, the nomenclature of the sets, variables, and parameters used in this section is
described in Table A.4 in Appendix A.4.
However, the purpose of EU-REGEN requires region-wide profiles for existing and new
vintages by resource class and, furthermore, profiles separated into onshore and offshore
installations. In the following, we will outline the aggregation of profiles by locations to
region-wide profiles for existing and new vintages.
Existing vintages For existing onshore vintages, we extrapolate wind speeds (see
Equation (A.2) in Appendix A.5) to a hub height of 100 m and calculate the mean
wind speed sml over the time period from 1982 to 2013. This is used to assign locations l
within each region to different site qualities Q = {low,medium, high}. Each site quality
q is determined by upper limits supq and lower limits slowq (Equation (1.44)):
Lq = {(sml ≥ slowq ) ∨ (sml łsupq )} ∀l ∈ Lon, q ∈ Q (1.44)
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Based on that, we calculate a weighted-average of the normalized wind power output
wptrbs,l,h,g in a region over all turbine types and locations wphubs,h,q,r (see Appendix A.5). This
aims at approximating the current average configuration of an installed wind turbine in
each region. Hence, we use, on the one hand, weights on the existing capacity distribution
among sites within a region Wwcl,r . On the other hand, we apply a weighting for the
assumed existing technology-mix of hub heights and turbines within site qualities in each
region Wwth,g,q,r:
wphubs,h,q,r =
∑
g
∑
l∈Lon W
wc
l,r ·Wwth,g,q,r · wptrbs,l,h,g∑
g
∑
l∈Lon W
wc
l,r ·Wwth,g,q,r
∀s ∈ S, h ∈ Hex, q ∈ Q, r ∈ R (1.45)
In a second step, we calculate the weighted average across hub heights and quality classes:
(W hubh,q,r and W
q
h,r) to get a single region-wide profile (Equation (1.46)). Furthermore, the
turbine output is subject to loss factors σu and σps that represent a general loss and
seasonal maintenance factor, respectively. So, we finally arrive at the normalized power
output for each region and resource class:
wpons,r = σu · σps ·
∑
h,qW
q
h,r ·W hubh,q,r · wphubs,h,q,r∑
h,qW
q
h,r ·W hubh,q,r
∀s ∈ S, r ∈ R (1.46)
We follow an analog approach for offshore applications. However, we abstract from
different site qualities:
wphub-oss,h,r =
∑
g
∑
l∈Los W
wc
l,r ·Wwtoh,g,r · wptrbs,l,h,g∑
g
∑
l∈Los W
wc
l,r ·Wwtoh,g,r
∀s ∈ S, h ∈ Hex, r ∈ R (1.47)
wposs,r = σu · σps ·
∑
hW
hub-os
h,r · wphubs,h,r∑
hW
hub-os
h,r
∀s ∈ S, r ∈ R (1.48)
New vintages Concerning new on- and offshore vintages, we aggregate the output
wptrbs,l,h,g for each location to a single profile comprising all locations within each quality
class Cwind in a region. The binary parameter Cwindr,l,c allocates each location to its resource
class as depicted in Equation (1.49):
wpregs,r,c,h,g =
∑
l wp
trb
s,l,h,g · Cwindr,l,c∑
l C
wind
r,l,c
∀s ∈ S, r ∈ R, c ∈ Cwind, h ∈ Hnew, g ∈ G (1.49)
The final profile by region, quality class, and vintage is calculated by assuming a spe-
cific combination of hub-height and turbine type to each vintage year Wwindr,h,g,v (Equa-
tion (1.50)). We apply this approach to approximate technological progress. In analogy
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to existing installations, the loss factors σu and σps apply:
wps,r,c = σu · σps ·
∑
h,g wp
reg
s,r,c,h,g ·Wwindr,h,g,v∑
h,gW
wind
r,h,g,v
∀s ∈ S, r ∈ R, c ∈ Cwind (1.50)
Note that values of wps,r,c directly yield into the capacity factor CFs,i,r introduced in
Equation (1.16) in Section 1.3. Moreover, we approximate values for the parameters σu,
σps , W hub-osh,r , Wwcl,r , and W tec-osh,g,r from the model calibration.
1.5.4 Solar power
With respect to solar power, we differentiate between three different types of solar power
technologies: stationary photovoltaic (PV), tracking photovoltaic (PV-TK), and CSP.
Currently, only PV is widely applied in Europe with 100 GW of installed capacity in 2016
(Eurostat, 2018). Yet, especially a long-term model on decarbonization paths, which is
driven by the economics of generation technologies, should incorporate a great variety
of solar power technologies. On the one hand, this allows for analyzing the impact of
different relative costs among solar power technologies. On the other hand, PV, PV-TK,
and CSP differ in their output profiles. This is due to the higher flexibility of PV-TK
and CSP in terms of tracking and storage, respectively (Huld et al., 2008).
We can estimate generation profiles for solar power technologies by using direct and diffuse
irradiance and ground temperature as input parameters. For all three technologies, the
two main components of solar irradiation, direct and diffuse radiation flux, affect the
output differently. Yet, solar irradiation data on a high spatial and temporal resolution
is only reported for global horizontal irradiation (GHI). Hence, we have to separate the
GHI into its direct and diffuse components before being able to estimate the power
output. The methodology for separating solar irradiation in its components is explained
in Appendix A.7. Moreover, the nomenclature of the sets, variables, and parameters used
in this section is described in Table A.5 in Appendix A.6.
The conversion of the two components of solar irradiation and temperature to normalized
output requires four main steps. We start by calculating the hourly angle of the sun’s
rays. This allows, in a second step, for calculating the overall solar irradiation at the
module. Then, this has to be corrected for the panel efficiency and in a final step for the
inverter efficiency. These steps result in the normalized solar power feed-in profile sps,l,o,p
by location and for different orientations o and tilts p. We provide a detailed description
of these steps in Appendix A.8. In analogy to wind power, we derive different profiles for
varying vintages and technologies of solar power in the following.
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Existing vintages In a first step, profiles for existing PV installations are approxi-
mated in Equation (1.51) by weight W scl,r for the existing capacity distribution among
locations within a region on the normalized solar power output sps,l,o,p:28
spregs,r,o,p =
∑
l sps,l,o,p ·W scl,r∑
lW
sc
l,r
∀s ∈ S, r ∈ R, o ∈ O, p ∈ P (1.51)
Thereafter, we apply a distribution W sto,p for combinations of orientation and panel tilt to
get a single profile by region (Equation (1.52)):
sppvs,r =
∑
o,p sp
reg
s,r,o,p ·W sto,p∑
o,pW sto,p
∀s ∈ S, r ∈ R (1.52)
New vintages For new static PV vintages, we assume a south-facing module with an
optimal panel tilt based on Masters (2004). We aggregate the normalized solar power
output sps,l,o,p from Equation (A.26) in Appendix A.8 for each location to a single profile
comprising all locations within quality classes Csolar and for each region as depicted in
Equation (1.53). The binary parameter Csolarr,l,c allocates each location to its resource class:
sppvs,i,r =
∑
o∈{south}
∑
p∈{opt}
∑
l sps,l,o,p · Csolarr,l,c∑
l C
solar
l,c
∀s ∈ S, i ∈ {pv}, r ∈ R (1.53)
New vintages of tracking PV are supposed to be single-axis, horizontally tracking systems
with optimal tilting.29 Thus, the output profile being calculated by
sppvs,i,r =
∑
p∈{opt}
∑
l sps,l,o,p · Csolarr,l,c∑
l C
solar
l,c
∀s ∈ S, i ∈ {pvtk}, r ∈ R. (1.54)
Again, sppvs,r, sp
npv
s,i,r, spntks,i,r directly yields into the capacity factor CFs,i,r of the model
framework and values forW scl,r,W sto,p, and Csolarr,l,c are derived from model calibration results.
Model for CSP power generation In contrast to PV technologies, CSP utilizes only
direct normal irradiation dnis,l and includes a storage system. Due to the latter point,
besides incoming radiation, the operation of a CSP system is influenced by electricity
prices. For that purpose, we simulate the optimal dispatch of CSP based on prices
from a static model run of the base year 2015 and derive a generation profile from that
28Note that we assume existing PV installations to be stationary only.
29Note that this means that the modules orientation α2o constantly equals the sun’s azimuth angle α1s,l
with Equation (A.17) in Appendix A.8 resolving to θs,l,p = sin(β1s,l) · cos(β2l,p).
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optimization exercise, as done in Young et al. (2013). Moreover, the nomenclature of
the sets, variables, and parameters used in this paragraph is described in Table A.6 in
Appendix A.9.
We define the objective function (Equation (1.55)) as the revenue rev from CSP dispatch
gs,i,r at prices Ps,r:
rev =
∑
s,i,r
gs,i,r · Ps,r (1.55)
Dispatch is constrained by the incoming irradiation dnis,i,r, CSP storage charge scsps,i,r, and
discharge sdcsps,i,r (Equation (1.56)) with the solar multiple SM being the relative size of
the solar capacity to the CSP turbine capacity:
gs,i,r ≤ SM · dnis,i,r + sdcsps,i,r − scsps,i,r ∀s ∈ S, i ∈ Icsp, r ∈ R (1.56)
Furthermore, the amount of stored electricity sbcsps,i,r is limited by the storage capacity
SHcsp in hours of turbine capacity (Equation (1.57))
sbcsps,i,r < SH
csp ∀s ∈ S, i ∈ Icsp, r ∈ R (1.57)
and its dynamic accumulation is defined as in Equation (1.58):
sbcsps,i,r = (1− csp) · sbcsps−1,i,r + scsps,i,r − sdcsps,i,r ∀s ∈ S, i ∈ Icsp, r ∈ R (1.58)
We assume a storage loss of csp = 0.05, a solar multiple of SM = 2.5, and a storage
capacity of SHcsp = 6 (Young et al., 2013).
1.6 Aggregation of time segments
Due to computational limitations, it is not feasible to run a dynamic dispatch and in-
vestment model with all 8,760 hours in each time period. Therefore, the number of time
segments has to be reduced from 8,760 to a couple of hundred by choosing a subset of
hours and weighting those. For that purpose we use a two-stage methodology developed
for the US-REGEN model.30
First, the choice of representative hours is based on identifying the extreme values of the
three dimensions per model region: normalized hourly electricity demand, wind, and solar
30 See Blanford et al. (2018) for detailed information.
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feed-in.31 We identify the extreme values in all possible one-, two-, and three-dimensional
spaces of wind, solar, and load. This means, for the one-dimensional spaces, we select the
hours with minimum and maximum wind, solar, and load values (6 per region). With
respect to the two-dimensional spaces, we select hours representing the vertices of all
possible two-dimensional combinations of wind, solar, and load (12 per region). Finally,
we select the eight vertices of the three-dimensional wind, solar, and load space (8 per
region). With respect to the 16 regions used for the identification of representative hours,
this would result in 26 · 16 = 416 extreme hours. However, some representative hours
are an extreme in multiple regions, which reduces the number of hours already to 211.
Furthermore, the algorithm is designed in such a way that it does not have to pick the
hour with the most extreme values. Instead, it sets this particular hour as the vertex (in
the three-dimensional space) and allows for choosing an hour that has a certain distance
from the vertex. This allows us to reduce the number of required time segments to 121
when allowing for a distance of 1%.
Second, a weighting of representative hours is crucial to maintain the distribution of the
hourly demand, wind, and solar profiles. Weights for each segment are chosen to minimize
the sum of squared errors between the aggregated averages and the hourly averages across
model regions for demand, wind, and solar profiles (Young et al., 2013).
1.7 Input data
Section 1.5 depicted how the input parameters for wind and solar power availability are
derived. In the following, we provide an overview of the values of other main input
parameters.
Generation technologies As mentioned in Section 1.4, we differentiate between 25
general types of generation technologies (Table A.3 in Appendix A.2). We use the UDI
World Electric Power Plants Data-Base (Platts, 2013) to compile an inventory of each
existing generation technology by vintage for each region. Estimates for heat rate by
technology and vintage are based on model calibration and observed values. For the
annual discount rate and investment tax rate, the model assumes rates of 7% and 30%,
respectively. Availability factors for dispatchable generation technologies are derived from
observed seasonal generation patterns (Eurostat, 2014) and the model calibration for the
year 2012, which was chosen due to data availability reasons.
31We include an additional region for each of the model regions Britain, Iberia, and Scandinavia. For
Iberia, we further include the existing feed-in from CSP. Concerning Britain and Iberia, we consider
feed-in profils for future wind installations as well. Hence, we end up with 16 regions for the choice of
representative hours.
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The assumed lifetime is based on assumptions in IEA (2013) and holds for existing vin-
tages as well as capacity additions within the model horizon. The same holds true for flat
variable and fixed O&M cost with values taken from Schröder et al. (2013) (see Table A.7
in Appendix A.10 for both).
Assumptions on investment cost for vintages of new generation capacity (Table A.8 in
Appendix A.10) are based on Schröder et al. (2013). We assume flat cost-curves for most
conventional generation technologies. Costs for new RES and CCS capacity decrease
over time, assuming cost-reductions through learning and economies of scale (Table A.8
Appendix A.10). The costs for tracking photovoltaic installations are derived from those
of static photovoltaic by adding a 25% mark-up.
Concerning investment into dispatchable generation technologies, we set specific public
attitudes and capacity limits for nuclear power in each region as a default. In general,
capacity additions of nuclear power are not allowed in the following regions in any time
period: Benelux, Germany-N, Germany-S, Iberia, Alpine, and Italy. Moreover, based on
projected commissioning dates of current units under construction from World Nuclear
Association (2014), nuclear power plant capacities of 1.75 GW for France, 1.7 GW for
Scandinavia, and 0.94 GW for Eastern Europe-NW are assumed to be complete by 2020.
After 2020, capacity additions are unconstrained in regions eligible for nuclear power
additions.
Table 1.3: Overview of fuel prices and carbon contents
Fuel type Fuel price [e/MWh] Carbon content [tCO2/GJ]
Lignite 3.5 0.099
Coal 14 0.094
Natural gas 33.5 0.056
Oil 64 0.074
Biomass 17 – 36 0.099
Fuel-powered generation technologies in the EU-REGEN model either require lignite,
coal, natural gas, oil, or biomass. We apply system-wide and flat fuel prices that are
subject to regional adjustment factors (IEA, 2012). For biomass, cost varies for different
biomass supply classes to approximate an upward-sloped supply curve (Section 1.7). The
fuel-specific carbon content and basic fuel prices are indicated in Table 1.3.
Wind and solar potentials In addition to the resource class specific time-profiles
described in Section 1.5, the detailed representation of variable RES requires data on the
capacity potentials in each of those classes, that is, the maximum amount of accumulated
capacity. The potential capacity by resource class depends on a variety of factors, for
example, exclusion areas, siting constraints, and local topography. Therefore, we use data
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provided by AWS Truepower (AWS). AWS uses a two-stage approach to provide separate
potential values for wind onshore, wind offshore, utility-scale solar, and distributed solar
applications. In a first step, an extended geographic-information-system (GIS) analysis
is carried out to determine the area that is actually available to the deployment of wind
power. This is followed by estimating the capacity of power plants that could be installed
in this area by assuming a certain capacity density by area of available land. Values are
calculated for each of the above-mentioned applications, resource classes, and model
regions. An overview of the sum of capacity potential over resource classes by variable
RES and region is presented in Table 1.4.
Table 1.4: Upper limits on variable RES ca-
pacities [GW]
Region Wind-on Wind-os PV
Britain 238 74 366
France 203 2 653
Benelux 15 32 94
Germany-N 69 11 236
Germany-S 61 - 217
Scandinavia 673 26 677
Iberia 190 - 556
Alpine 30 - 77
Italy 133 - 254
Eastern Europe-NW 276 - 512
Eastern Europe-NE 93 - 196
Eastern Europe-SW 78 - 218
Eastern Europe-SE 134 - 437
Note: We show aggregated values for property right
reasons.
Biomass potentials As indicated above, we approximate the limited supply of biomass
for electricity generation with four biomass supply classes. The biomass energy potential
for each country and each of these classes is estimated based on numbers from Elbersen
et al. (2012). Similar to Bruninx et al. (2015), we group different kinds of biomass to each
supply class: ranging from class 1, which comprises cheap and local resources, to class 4
with industrially grown energy crops. Table 1.5 shows an overview of the composition of
biomass supply classes. Moreover, as done in Nahmmacher et al. (2014), we assume 50%
of biomass energy potential to be available for the power market.
Demand We introduced in Section 1.2 that EU-REGEN’s demand side is modeled
exogenously. We assume the 2012 hourly electricity demand pattern (ENTSO-E, 2014c)
to be valid for future time periods as well. Moreover, we use 2012 values since it can
be assumed that these include little shifting and shedding of demand by consumers (see
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Table 1.5: Overview of biomass supply classes
Class Biomass resources
Class 1 Tertiary waste residues
Class 2 Secondary agricultural and forestry residues
Class 3 Primary agricultural, forestry, and waste residues
Class 4 Forestry biomass and energy crops
also Chapter 3). The estimates for country-specific annual electricity demand levels are
taken from projections from the e-HIGHWAY 2050 Project (Bruninx et al., 2015) with a
system-wide demand level of 4,324 TWh for 2050. This is consistent with the 4,300 TWh
in the EC’s “Trends to 2050” reference scenario (EC, 2013a) and translates into a demand
growth of 34% compared to 2015 with 3,223 TWh. Regional growth rates are subject to
great differences, ranging from a 25% reduction for Norway to a 311% increase in the case
of Lithuania. Moreover, growth patterns between 2015 and 2050 are assumed to follow
a linear path. An overview of 2015 and 2050 demand levels with growth rates is given
in Table A.9 in Appendix A.10. However, due to the electrification of other sectors, it
can be assumed that electricity demand increases even stronger. The EC assumes in his
impact assessment on the “[...] policy framework for climate and energy in the period
from 2020 up to 2030” that electricity generation reaches a level of 5,050 TWh in 2050
(EC, 2014). Thus, we scale growth rates from Bruninx et al. (2015) to reach this demand
level and use this electricity demand path as an alternative.
Transmission For variable costs of electricity exchange between regions, we assume
costs of 0.5 e/MWh. Similar to Schaber et al. (2012), region-specific costs for capacity
additions are calculated based on investment costs of 2.4 mio. e/km for a capacity of
6.4 GW and scaled to the distance of population centroids of two regions. Furthermore,
we use a loss factor of 0.04 per 1000 km for trade flows between regions. Loss factors
from intra-regional distribution are approximated from reported losses (Eurostat, 2014).
Values for existing transmission capacities, or net transfer capacities (NTC), between
regions are based on the ENTSO-E NTC values (ENTSO-E, 2014b) and are shown in
Table A.10 in Appendix A.10. The 16 GW of existing transfer capacity between both
German regions are based on Bundesnetzagentur (2012, 2015). Moroever, as mentioned in
Section 1.3, we assume upper bounds on new transmission capacity in each time period.
Values are based on estimations from the ENTSO-E “10-Year Network Development
Plan” ENTSO-E (2014a) and results of the SUSPLAN Project (de Joode et al., 2011) and
extrapolated to future periods. As an example, Tables A.11 and A.12 in Appendix A.10
show the investment limits for 2030 and 2050.
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Carbon capture and storage Upper bounds for the geologic storage of CO2 are
estimated from work done within the EU GeoCapacity Project (Vangkilde-Pedersen et al.,
2009). We accumulate storage capacities of different geologic formations and countries
into a single value for each model region (Table 1.6).
Table 1.6: Overview of limits for geologic storage of CO2 [Gt CO2]
Britain France Benelux Ger-N Ger-S Scanda Iberia
14.4 8.69 2.54 9.14 7.94 31.94 1.58
Alpine Italy EE-NW EE-NE EE-SW EE-SE -
- 6.55 5.51 0.44 3.61 11.37 -
1.8 Model application
The EU-REGEN model is able to implement policies addressing the various components
of the power market. Based on the scenario-specific set-up, additional constraints on
generation technologies, transmission infrastructure, the CO2 emission budget, and CCS,
among others, can be introduced. In the following, we present the set-up of a market-wide
80% and 95% CO2 emission reduction scenario and show results for the development of
system-wide generation-mixes and generation capacities.
1.8.1 Scenario set-up
The 80% CO2 emission reduction scenario is based on the energy and climate policy
brought forward by the EC. The long-run targets were specified by an 80% CO2 emission
reduction for the entire economy overall in 2050 (EC, 2011a,b). In the mid-run, a 40%
reduction of CO2 emissions is aimed for 2030 (EC, 2014). We implement these targets
through annual CO2 emission budgets. For the time-steps in between, we assume a
linearly decreasing CO2 emission budget. Furthermore, we assume electricity demand to
increase linearly to 5,050 TWh in 2050 (see Section 1.7).
However, the EC showed in its impact assessments, that the power market has to over-
reach the 80% CO2 emission reduction target due to higher marginal abatement costs in
other sectors (EC, 2014). Hence, we additionally present a 95% CO2 emission reduction
scenario. Again, we implement this target by annual CO2 emission budgets. We assume
annual CO2 emission budgets that decrease linearly from the 2015 level to a 95% CO2
emission reduction in 2050.32
32All CO2 emission reduction targets are related to 1990 levels.
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1.8.2 Results
Results for the cost-efficient generation path in the 80% CO2 emissions reduction scenario
are depicted in Figure 1.5a. The future generation-mix for the European power market
is driven by the interplay between wind and gas power. Wind power becomes the main
generation technology with a generation-share above 20% by 2030 and above 30% by 2050.
The intermittency of its generation profile is compensated for by the increasing market
penetration by flexible gas power generation technologies. Hence, gas power reaches a
generation-share above 25% by 2050. Other RES—biomass and photovoltaic power—play
a minor role in this scenario. Only photovoltaic power gains a higher generation-share
by the end of the scenario horizon. The market-share of the currently main dispatchable
generation technologies, that is, coal, lignite, and nuclear power, decreases significantly.
For coal and lignite power, this is driven by the high carbon content of the fuel, which
contradicts the CO2 emissions target in this scenario. However, both technologies still
contribute to meeting demand in 2050. In terms of nuclear power, high investment
costs do not allow for new investments in a cost-efficient path. Interestingly, biomass in
combination with CCS (BECCS) already plays a role in this 80% scenario. The high
generation-share of gas power that compensates for the intermittence of RES comes at
the cost of CO2 emissions. Hence, the negative emissions from BECCS are still necessary
to meet the climate target.
1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050
0
1000
2000
3000
4000
5000
6000
G
en
er
at
io
n 
[TW
h]
(a) 80% CO2 emission target
1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050
0
1000
2000
3000
4000
5000
6000
G
en
er
at
io
n 
[TW
h]
(b) 95% CO2 emission target
Hydro CHP Bio BECCS Nuclear Lignite Hard Coal Gas Wind PV CSP
Figure 1.5: Long-run generation path with 80% and 95% CO2 emission reduction target
Note: Both Figures further include the historic generation-mix from 1990 to 2015.
The generation path in the 95% CO2 emissions reduction scenario is shown in Figure 1.5b.
Comparing the generation paths in both scenarios shows that there is one major channel,
the substitution of gas power by BECCS, to reach the more ambitious target. The
generation from gas power is reduced to a level below 22% by 2050. This is compensated
for by the increased contribution of BECCS. In terms of emissions, the higher target is
reached by reduced emissions from gas power, on the one hand, and the high negative
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emissions from BECCS, on the other hand. The generation from all other technologies
does not change significantly between the two scenarios.33
1.9 Outlook
The EU REGEN provides a long-run dispatch and investment model for the European
power market. The model contributes with a detailed representations of wind and solar
electricity generation technologies, which are characterized by a spatially varying, inter-
mittent supply pattern. This is implemented by introducing different quality classes for
wind and solar resources in the competitive equilibrium setting of a partial-equilibrium
power market model. Moreover, we provide in this chapter a routine for processing me-
teorological parameters to capture the intermittency of RES.
Our results for the long-run market equilibrium show that, under an 80% CO2 emis-
sions reduction scenario until 2050, RES become the major group of technologies. Wind
and photovoltaic power together reach a 2050 market-share of approximately 40%. The
intermittency of RES comes at the cost of an increasing market-share of gas-powered tech-
nologies, which in turn results in emitting CO2. Thus, the market entrance of biomass in
combination with CCS is necessary to reach the CO2 constraint in this scenario. Com-
paring this to a 95% CO2 emissions reduction scenario, we find that BECCS, which has
a negative emission intensity, substitutes CO2-emitting gas power.
All in all, our findings suggest that even though accounting for the temporal and spa-
tial characteristics of RES, the projected growth of RES is cost-efficient. The detailed
depiction of their characteristics rather impacts the composition of the remaining supply
stack, which mainly provides flexibility. However, our results should also be analyzed in
view of the social phenomena connected to wind power. We showed in Section 1.2 that
there is empirical evidence for the existence of a negative externality from the physical
presence of wind turbines. Accordingly, apart from its cost prospects and meteorological
characteristics, the dominating role of wind power crucially depends on to what extent
regulators can manage its negative externalities, and resulting social acceptance issues.
33 See Figures A.3a and A.3b in Appendix A.11 for the cost-efficient capacity investment path for both
scenarios.
Chapter 2
Decarbonization of Power Markets
under Stability and Fairness: Do
They Influence Efficiency?
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2.1 Introduction
The creation of a decarbonized economy with a fully integrated energy market is one of
the main goals of the European Commission’s (EC) Energy Union, which purpose is to
coordinate the transformation of the European energy supply (EC, 2015). In terms of
power markets, this means the creation of a single European market to keep the cost
of transformation at a bearable level. This corresponds to the first-best solution from
economic theory. If a group of players is subject to a market-wide and binding constraint,
coordination allows them to reach the cost-effective allocation. Meaning, if players can
coordinate and share information, they are able to reach the first-best outcome (see
Montgomery, 1972). In the context of power markets this translates into regions that
try to maximize their welfare in the power market with respect to a climate (carbon)
target. Regions coordinate their abatement efforts until marginal abatement cost across
all regions are equal. If regions fail to coordinate, average abatement cost increase, which
results in a welfare loss.
Yet, EU member countries started to announce additional national climate and energy
targets.1 For instance, Germany aims at a reduction of the economy-wide CO2 emis-
sions of at least 80% by 2050 (BMWi, 2010). Similarly, France introduced a law on the
transition of its power sector limiting the share of generation from nuclear power to 50%
from 2025 on and targeting a CO2 emission reduction of 50% by 2030 and 80% by 2050
(Assemblée Nationale, 2015).2 These national climate targets indicate a certain degree of
self-interest and are an additional source of disturbance. This shows that single regions
or countries pursue power market-specific objectives that go beyond economic efficiency
in general. It is assumed that competitive markets yield the cost-effective supply of elec-
tricity. Yet, the private optimum does not consider social costs that evolve from power
market externalities. In addition to environmental issues, regulators want to address fur-
ther objectives with respect to energy markets (Gillingham and Sweeney, 2010). These
can comprise energy independence (Gillingham and Sweeney, 2010), resource adequacy
(Paulus et al., 2011), energy security (Guivarch and Monjon, 2017), employment effects
(Roques, 2008), technological innovation (Frondel et al., 2010), and redistributive effects
(Egerer et al., 2016).
Redistributive effects lead to the phenomenon that cooperation is not always rational from
the perspective of a single region. The maximization of overall welfare through coopera-
1 See, e.g., the IEA/IRENA Global Renewable Energy Policies and Measures Database for an
overview of existing national climate targets (of EU member countries). It can be accessed under
https://www.iea.org/policiesandmeasures/renewableenergy/.
2 All CO2 emissions reduction targets stated in this paragraph refer to 1990 levels.
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tion leads to redistribution and can result in a reduction of a region’s welfare compared to
the case without cooperation. This reflects the trade-off between economic efficiency and
redistribution that is often referred to in climate and energy economics (Edenhofer et al.,
2013). Here, redistribution can be examined between geographic regions or producers
and consumers, among others. In general, it is important to discuss distributional effects
to promote broad acceptance for climate policies and to avoid lock-ins into inefficient
paths (Strunz et al., 2016).
So far, the perspective on redistributive issues in power markets has focused on the
market power of individual firms. For example, Hirth and Ueckerdt (2013) analysis on
the effect of renewable energy sources (RES) support schemes and CO2 emission pricing
on redistributive flows between producers and consumers in power markets. Similarly,
Joskow and Tirole (2000) investigation of the presence of market power of generators and
consumers in the context of transmission rights, while Borenstein et al. (1999) analyzing
to what degree market power is exercised in the Californian power market at plant level.
The behavior of countries or regions has, to the best of the authors knowledge, only been
researched by Gately (1974), Nylund (2014), Schlachtberger et al. (2017), and Huppmann
and Egerer (2015). Gately (1974) looks at the distribution of gains from regional coop-
eration in the case of the Indian power market. This analysis is based on the theory of
cooperative games. In analogy, Nylund (2014) elaborates on the regional effects of co-
operation in the northern European power market. The authors in Schlachtberger et al.
(2017) analyze the importance of cooperation by setting different levels of cross-boarder
transmission capacity. A more advanced approach is implemented by Huppmann and
Egerer (2015), which endeavors to find the Nash equilibrium between zonal planners that
maximize their welfare from transmission capacity investments.
The chapter at hand adds to this by an extended application of cooperative game theory
and hence tries to apply a bottom-up model in a framework that looks beyond a single
market-wide optimum.3 The aim of the analysis is to quantify the impact of fairness
considerations on the equilibrium path of the EU power market.4 Therefore, the following
research questions will be answered: First, how does the first-best outcome manifest in
quantities and prices? Second, why is it not rational from the perspective of individual
countries to cooperate with respect to a common carbon budget? Third, how would an
equilibrium look if regions refuse to enter coalitions that are not rational? Finally, how
3 A similar research approach has been taken in other fields, e.g., by Bréchet et al. (2011) and Massol
and Tchung-Ming (2010).
4 The analysis in this chapter exclusively focuses on cooperation within the European power market and
does not consider other markets or regions outside of Europe as in, e.g., Carraro and Siniscalco (1992).
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can fairness be improved if it is derived from rational behavior or the relative importance
of each region?
In general, power markets allow for (at least) two channels of cooperation between re-
gions. First, the utilization of cooperative advantages with respect to abatement cost.
Regions, that form a coalition, can shift emission reductions among them and hence
individual regions (within a coalition) can exceed or fall below their emission budget
(compared to the case of national emission budgets). This is closely related to the con-
cept of international environmental agreements (IEAs) (see Carraro and Siniscalco, 1993;
Barrett, 1994), where regions form coalitions to jointly set a carbon target. Yet, in the
case of IEAs, regions outside a coalition maximize their welfare without setting a climate
target. Thus, there exists the possibility of side payments to create economic incentives
for regions outside a coalition to reduce emissions (Hoel and Schneider, 1997).
Second, regions cooperate for the sake of providing electricity at low marginal cost (ex-
cluding cost for emission certificates) and thus engage in cross-boarder electricity trade.
This mainly refers to the utilization of comparative advantage and is in line with the
market efficiency rationale of trade agreements in general (e.g., Baier and Bergstrand,
2004) and power market integration in particular (e.g., Jamasb and Pollitt, 2005).5 In
general, the economic motive for trade agreements assumes that the exchange of goods
and services is mutually beneficial. Nonetheless, economic incentives for international
trade can be set, for example, in the form of foreign direct investments or counter trade
(Marin and Schnitzer, 1998).
The extent of cooperation in this chapter primarily aims at the sharing of emission
budgets. Regions form coalitions to utilize the most efficient abatement sources under a
common CO2 emissions reduction target. This is equal to the introduction of a single
market price for emissions and leads to a shift in the distribution of costs among regions.
Hence, cooperation does not have to be rational per se. These distributional consequences
with respect to benefits and costs of the introduction of such a uniform price signal are
well-known from environmental economics. Moreover, this chapter assumes that regions
outside the coalition of interest set their own carbon target, which can be well motivated
by the national climate policies that are already existing and were mentioned for the
case of Germany and France above. However, it is assumed that the market under
consideration, nonetheless, fulfills the properties of a perfect market and regions engage
in cross-boarder electricity trade.
5 Apart from utilizing differences in marginal cost of generating electricity, cross-boarder electricity trade
is also a consequence of balancing demand and supply of electricity, which can be stored under high
cost only (Abrell and Rausch, 2016).
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Having these assumptions in mind, the framework of cooperative game theory is suitable
for analyzing this type of cooperation for two reasons: First, the relevant concepts of
gain-sharing can still be applied while maintaining the efficient solution approach of a
bottom-up power market model. Second, the equilibrium outcome for different coalitions
can be compared with respect to a variety of market variables, for example, capacity
investment path, and the approach can thus go beyond a pure cost perspective.
For this analysis, the EU-REGEN model is applied to find the long-run equilibrium
for the European power market under a tight climate policy. Results indicate, that in
the absence of transfer payments only a small share of the gains from full cooperation
can be maintained. Hence, this chapter shows that the phenomenon of only small-sized
coalitions being stable, also holds for the power market. Moreover, the analysis indicates
that accounting for fairness goes in hand with balancing robustness against cost changes
and individual rationality or core stability, respectively. This implies for the policy setting
of the EU that future regulation should include transparent transfer schemes to facilitate
the efficient implementation of a transformation path.
The chapter is organized in the following way. To begin, Section 2.2 provides an overview
of the game theoretic framework and the quantification of costs in this chapter. Then,
Section 2.3 presents the respective results. Finally, the chapter closes with a discussion
of the applied methodology and a conclusion in Section 2.4.
2.2 Methodology
This section presents the game theoretic framework, the relevant solution concepts, and
the quantification of costs used in this analysis.
2.2.1 Framework
This chapter assumes a cooperative game framework,6 which generally describes the
bargaining problem of coalitions with a focus on identifying feasible and stable coalitions
6 In general, the interaction between players can be distinguished into cooperative and non-cooperative
games. Cooperative games focus on payoffs from cooperation, whereas the latter mainly addresses the
strategic actions of players. Non-cooperative games capture the strategic interaction of players, which
aim at optimizing their payoff function. Each player’s strategy of the choice variable is a function
of the available information. One prominent solution concept to non-cooperative games is the Nash
equilibrium. It is based on the notion of best responses. Each player chooses his choice variable under
the belief that the choice of the other players is given. Accordingly, a solution is stable if no player has
the incentive to deviate from her action under the assumption that all other players keep their choice
constant.
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and distributing the gains from cooperation (Ray and Vohra, 2015).7 The coalition game
is characterized by the player set N := {1, ..., n} and the function v : 2n → R that assigns
a value v(S) to each coalition. Coalitions are the non-empty subsets S ⊆ N with N being
the grand coalition and {i} the singleton coalitions.
In the context of this chapter, the regions of the European power market are regarded as
the set of players N . The analysis looks at 2n−1−n possible coalitions,8 which comprise
the grand coalition N that represents the first-best outcome with full cooperation and,
thus, the cost-efficient market equilibrium.
Moreover, the permutation c ∈ Rn assigns cost ci(S) to each player. The cost of player
i with being in a coalition and if the initial cost allocation is realized is ci(S). On the
contrary, ci({i}) is the cost of i under singleton coalitions only. The cooperative cost-
sharing game is assumed to still meet the properties of a perfect market. Hence, even
though coalitions S ⊂ N are in place, finding the market-wide cost minimum is regarded
as a valid solution approach and when two neighboring regions are not comprised in a
coalition, cross-boarder flows of electricity are still feasible. Consequently, a respective
(climate) coalition can have minor impacts on regions that are not comprised. However,
for the sake of simplicity and to be in line with the formalism of cooperative games,
the remainder of this chapter assumes that regions outside a coalition are confronted
with the cost under the singleton coalitions only case ci({i}). Hence, this chapter works
with the (N, v) characteristic function (von Neumann et al., 1944), which maps coalition
structures to individual cost for all players i ∈ S.9 Moreover, the game can be transfered
into a cost-saving game by defining the value of a coalition v(S) as the sum over the
cost-savings from all members of a coalition:
v(S) =
∑
i∈S
(ci({i})− ci(S)) ∀ S ⊆ N
Furthermore, this chapter distinguishes between transferable utility (TU) games and non-
transferable utility (NTU) games. In terms of TU games, the total gain from cooperation
v(S) can be transfered between players. This is based on the assumptions that utilities
are expressed in units of a common numeraire good and utility functions are quasilinear.
In this case, coalitional games aim at maximizing the worth of the coalition v(S). In
7 The same rationale applies to games where players share payoffs instead of costs.
8 In general, n players can form 2n−1 non-empty coalitions. Yet, this number also comprises n singleton
coalitions of cardinality |S| = 1. Consequently, the number of 2n − 1 coalitions is corrected for the n
singleton coalitions.
9 An alternative concept is the partition function (Thrall and Lucas, 1963), which considers the cost to
all players i ∈ N .
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contrast to that, NTU games do not allow for transfer payments between players. Hence,
it is the goal of the game to find the coalitional setting with the Pareto-optimal cost
distribution.
This chapter assumes TU games to be superadditive.10 So, the sum of the value of two
disjoint coalitions is strictly smaller than the value of the grand coalition, which comprises
the players of both coalitions (Rothe and Rothe, 2015):
v(s1 ∪ s2) > v(s1) + v(s2)
2.2.2 Solution concepts
Solution concepts to cooperative games can be distinguished with respect to the underly-
ing requirements on cooperation. This analysis focuses on concepts addressing stability
and fairness.
2.2.2.1 Stability concepts
Concepts of stability rather look at the stability of each individual coalition S than just
at the grand coalition N . For that purpose, the cost distribution xˆi(S) of the total cost
is defined as the first-best cost incurred by a given player i if coalition S is formed.
Internal and external stability The notion of internal and external stability was
introduced in d’Aspremont et al. (1983) and d’Aspremont and Gabszewicz (1986) and
further applied in, for example, Barrett (1994). Accordingly, a coalition S is stable if
the cost distribution meets the criteria of internal and external stability. Concerning the
former one, a coalition is stable if no member of a coalition has the incentive to stay
outside the coalition:11
xˆi(S) ≤ ci(S \ {i}) ∀ i ∈ S
For the latter one, no player outside the coalition prefers to join the coalition, which can
be formalized as
ci(S) ≤ xˆi(S ∪ {i}) ∀ i /∈ S.
Individual rationality and core stability The individual rationality constraint (Nash,
1953), or Nash solution, imposes a condition on stability according to which no player
10Note that this is analog to the subadditivity assumption for a cost-sharing game.
11The notion of internal stability has been extended by Eyckmans and Finus (2009) to the potentially
internally stable coalition, which reads as follows: xˆi(S) ≤
∑
i∈S ci(S \ {i}).
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can be better off by deviating from the assigned strategy with constituting a singleton
coalition, which can be formalized by
xˆi(S) ≤ ci({i}) ∀ i ∈ S.
For the remainder, it is assumed that all individual rational allocations are comprised in
the set I(v):
I(v) = {xˆ ∈ Rn : xˆi(S) ≤ ci({i}) ∀ i ∈ S}
The individual rationality property is also implied by the concept of core stability (Chan-
der and Tulkens, 1995). Yet, whereas individual rationality and internal/external stability
evaluates the stability of coalitions of any cardinality, the concept of the core looks in par-
ticular at the stability of the grand coalition. The core aims at finding the vector y ∈ Rn,
the distribution of the value of a coalition with yi being the allocation towards player
i, which fulfills the characteristics of efficiency and coalitional rationality (see Gillies,
1959). For efficiency, the total gain of a respective coalition must be distributed among
all players, which can be formalized by
∑
i∈N
yi = v(N).
Concerning coalitional rationality, the sum of gains of members of a coalition must not
be smaller than the value of the coalition
∑
i∈S
yi ≥ v(S) ∀S ⊆ N.
Hence, the set of all core stable allocations is defined as
C(v) = {y ∈ Rn : ∑
i∈N
yi = v(N) and
∑
i∈S
yi ≥ v(S) ∀ S ⊆ N}.
2.2.2.2 Allocation concepts
TU games include the possibility of transfer payments where the exact design of transfers
can impose a higher degree of fairness on coalitions. There exists a big strand of literature
that focuses on allocation concepts for gain-sharing. These concepts assign a unique
allocation vector x∗i ∈ R to each game.
Existing methods are based on different views on fairness. One strand looks at the fair
selection from the subset of cores C(v) and is represented by, for example, the core cen-
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ter (e.g., González-Díaz and Sánchez-Rodríguez, 2007) and the least core. Alternatively,
concepts can be based on the power or contribution of individual players. Here, very
basic methods propose an equal or production-dependent distribution. More elaborate
mechanisms, like the kernel (see Davis and Maschler, 1965), Shapley value, and nucleo-
lus, are based on game theoretical considerations.12 Within this analysis the least core,
Shapley value, and nucleolus will be used to elaborate on the fair allocation of cost.
Least core The concept of the least core xLCi was introduced by Maschler et al. (1979).
It is the cost allocation that minimizes the maximum satisfaction ε for any coalition.
Thus, it is assumed to be the cost allocation that players object the least (Schulz and
Uhan, 2013). The implementation in this chapter is taken from Drechsel and Kimms
(2010) and can be described by the following linear program:
min
xLCi
ε (2.1)
subject to: ∑
i∈N
xLCi = xˆi(N) (2.2)
∑
i∈S
xLCi ≤
∑
i∈S
xˆi(S) + ε ∀S ⊂ N, S 6= ∅ (2.3)
Shapely value In the field of game theoretical approaches, the average contribution
of each player to the formation of the coalition underlies the formulation of the Shapley
value (Shapley, 1953). The average is taken over all possible permutations in which the
coalition can be set up. Hence, it can be interpreted as the marginal benefit from one
player joining a coalition if all orderings of players are equally likely (Roth and Verrecchia,
1979). The Shapley value can be formalized as
xSHPi =
∑
S⊂N
|S|! (N − |S| − 1)!
N ! (v(S)− v(S \ {i})).
Nucleolus Finally, the nucleolus is a sharing mechanism that builds on the notion of
the “unhappiness” of the coalition, which is measured by the excess of a coalition ε(S, x)
with ε(S, x) = v(S)−∑i∈S(ci({i})−xˆi(S)) (Schmeidler, 1969). This can be interpreted as
the part of the value of a coalition that the members of the coalition cannot appropriate
under a given allocation. The values of ε(S, x) for different coalitions and allocations can
then be comprised in the vector e(x) ∈ R2n−2 and sorted in non-increasing order. Hence,
12A more extensive overview of gain-sharing mechanisms can be found in, e.g., Tijs and Driessen (1986);
Peleg and Sudhölter (2007); Lozano et al. (2013).
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the element ε1(x) represents the maximal unhappiness from allocation x. This allows for
comparing two allocations x and y by applying the following rule: x is preferred to y if
it is lexicographic smaller with ε(x) lx ε(y). The nucleolus of the (N, v) game is then
characterized by the following set
NC(N, v) = {x ∈ X(N, v) : ε(x) lx ε(y) ∀y ∈ X(N, v)}.
The computational implementation the nucleolus in this analysis is based on the approach
proposed in Fromen (1997) and Guajardo and Jörnsten (2015). It can be computed by
solving the sequence of linear programs outlined in Appendix B.1.
The very general concept of the nucleolus, which is based on the total excess, resulted
in alternative definitions. Grotte (1970) introduced the per capita nucleolus as a relative
measure, which looks at the per capita excess and aims at minimizing the per capita
dissatisfaction. Its formally defined as13
εPC(S, x) = v(S)−
∑
i∈S(ci({i})− xˆi(S))
|S| .
Other authors adjusted the concept of the per capita nucleolus to the research design of
their analysis (e.g., Lejano and Davos, 1995). The same line of reasoning can be applied
to the context of this chapter by introducing a relative measure for the excess that is,
however, based on the joint carbon emission reductions of a coalition. For the remainder of
the chapter, this measure is called carbon nucleolus. Instead of dividing by the cardinality
of a coalition |S|, the carbon nucleolus uses the total amount of reduced emissions in 2050
(compared to 2015 levels) ∑i∈S(CO22015i − CO22050i ). It aims at prioritizing coalitions
that contribute high emission reductions and thus minimizes the dissatisfaction per units
of emission reductions.
2.2.3 Quantification of costs
This chapter applies the EU-REGEN model to quantify the first-best cost distribution
xˆi(S) of the future equilibrium outcome of the European power market under a coopera-
tive, subadditive cost-sharing game for each coalition S.14 The model minimizes the total
discounted system cost with respect to a set of constraints. For this analysis, the system
13Note that the concept of the nucleolus was not only developed further towards the per capita nucleolus.
Other variants are the propensity to disrupt (Gately, 1974) or its generalized concept, the disruption
nucleolus (Littlechild and Vaidya, 1976).
14The minimization of overall system cost is regarded as an appropriate solution approach since this
chapter aims at comparing the efficient market outcome under different coalitions.
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cost of the EU-REGEN equilibrium outcome that arises from capacity investment and
electricity generation (among others) in a specific region are interpreted as the costs of
a region xˆi(S) under coalitions S. These regional costs underly the individual gain from
cooperation, which is understood as the saving in system cost compared to the case when
each region constitutes a singleton coalition ci({i}). Hence, the value of each coalition is
approximated by v(S) = ∑i∈S(ci({i})− xˆi(S)).
The EU-REGEN model The EU-REGEN model (see Chapter 1) is a long-term
dispatch and investment model for the European power sector.15 The model generates
quantitative scenarios that represent a cost-effective and consistent decarbonization path
for the European power market towards 2050 for regions i, time periods t, and intra-
annual time steps s.16 The linear, deterministic optimization model minimizes the total
discounted system cost ctot that comprise investment cost for generation capacity cgci,t,
transmission capacity ctci,t,17 cost from generation operation cvci,t,18 maintenance cost for
generation capacity cfomi,t , and operation and maintenance cost for transmission ctvoi,t and
ctfmi,t . The factor DFt accounts for the period-specific discounting of cost:
ctot =
∑
i
ctoti =
∑
t
(cgci,t + ctci,t + cvci,t + cfomi,t + ctvoi,t + ctfmi,t ) ·DFt
The model is set-up as a partial equilibrium model that assumes complete markets with
perfect information. The main equilibrium constraint is that the market clears in each
time segment.19 Accordingly, the (simplified) market-clearing condition below requires
that generation gs,i,t, plus electricity imports ims,ii,i,t, less electricity exports exs,i,ii,t has
to meet demand Ds,i,t.
gs,i,t +
∑
ii
ims,ii,i,t −
∑
ii
exs,i,ii,t ≥ Ds,i,t ∀s ∈ S, i ∈ I, t ∈ T
15The notation in this chapter has been adjusted, compared to Chapter 1, to be consistent with Sec-
tion 2.2.
16Note that the presentation of the EU-REGEN model in this chapter abstracts from the existence of
different generation technologies and their vintages.
17The cost that occur in one region from investing in one additional unit of transmission capacity only
represent the investment cost for one direction. The neighboring region must undertake the same
investment separately to be able to export. This assumption tries to guarantee consistency with
empirical estimates for upper bounds on transmission capacity investments.
18The variable generation cost do not comprise the cost for emission certificates. This is based on the
assumption that revenues from the auctioning of certificates are distributed in proportion to emissions
as it is currently done in the EU ETS (EC, 2017).
19The version of the EU-REGEN model used in this chapter does not allow for the endogenous adjust-
ment of demand, for example, by setting a short- or long-run price-elasticity of demand (see Chapter 3
for an example).
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Derivation of cost allocations by coalition To elaborate on the impact of consider-
ations of fairness on the market equilibrium and thus derive the first-best cost allocation
xˆi(S) for any given coalition S, this chapter analyzes the equilibrium market outcome
under perfect information for a wide number of coalitions. The solution under perfect
information is found by solving the cost-minimization problem of the EU-REGEN model
for all decision variables simultaneously. Here, transmission capacity investment, gen-
eration capacity additions, and dispatch are optimized. Depending on the coalition S
under scrutiny, different carbon market constraints are applied. This solution approach
is solved for two groups of coalitions:
Concerning the first one, the first-best scenario applies a market-wide carbon budget
by assuming full cooperation and is interpreted as the grand coalition. Meaning, all
regions share a common (time period-specific) carbon budget Bt. Hence, to solve the
EU-REGEN model for the grand coalition, the following carbon market constraint is
added to the program:
∑
s,i
gs,i,t · CO2 ≤ Bt ∀i ∈ N, t ∈ T
with CO2 being the average emission factor. Of course, the grand coalition is closely
related to the existing EU Emissions Trading System (EU ETS). Here, all participating
countries try to reach a joint emission budget.20 The EU ETS considers all CO2, N2O,
and Perfluorocarbons (PFCs) emissions from more than 10 sectors of the economy.21 As
with the grand coalition in this analysis, the rationale of the EU ETS is about market
participants that coordinate their abatement efforts (by trading emission allowances) to
use abatement sources in the ascending order with respect to their marginal abatement
cost.
The quantification of the market-wide carbon budget Bt is taken from the energy and
climate policies set by the EC. These targets indicate a 40% and 80% (compared to
1990 levels) reduction of economy-wide GHG emissions by 2030 and 2050, respectively.
This chapter uses the European Commission’s impact assessment on the “[...] policy
framework for climate and energy in the period from 2020 up to 2030” (EC, 2014) for
the translation into a power sector-specific target. According to this assessment, the
level of CO2 emissions has to reach a 56% reduction by 2030 and a 98% decrease of
20The EU ETS comprises the countries of EU28, Iceland, Liechtenstein, and Norway.
21The current version of the EU ETS comprises the power and heat generation, oil refineries, steel works
and production of iron, aluminum, metals, cement, lime, glass, ceramics, pulp, paper, cardboard, acids,
bulk organic chemicals, and civil aviation sector.
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emissions by 2050.22 Furthermore, the EC’s assessment assumes that annual electricity
generation in 2050 amounts to 5,050 TWh. For the time-steps in between, this chapter
assumes a linearly decreasing CO2 emission budget and increasing electricity demand.
The framework in this chapter assumes no energy and climate policy apart from CO2
prices through CO2 emission control.
The second group of coalitions comprises each possible coalition S ⊂ N . Based on
Section 2.2 and the framework of the EU-REGEN model with n = 13 model regions, this
results in 2n − 1 − n = 8, 178 possible coalitions between regions.23 For this group of
coalitions, shared carbon budgets are assumed for regions constituting a coalition i ∈ S.
Each region outside the coalition i /∈ S is subject to its own carbon budget.24 These
regional carbon budgets Bi,t assume a 98% reduction target for each region by 2050. The
shared carbon budget for coalitions is the sum of regional carbon budgets Bi,t for regions
in a coalition. To solve the EU-REGEN model for this group of coalitions, the following
two carbon market constraints are included in the program
∑
s,i
gs,i,t · CO2 ≤
∑
i
Bi,t ∀i ∈ S, t ∈ T ,
∑
s
gs,i,t · CO2 ≤ Bi,t ∀i /∈ S, t ∈ T .
Adjustment of cost allocations To fully capture the incentives for electricity ex-
change, the regional system costs have to be adjusted for electricity exports and imports.
Hence, total regional system costs, obtained from solving the linear program of the EU-
REGEN model, are adjusted for the value of these quantities. Total regional system cost
ctoti are understood as the sum of discounted cost that arise from capacity investment,
electricity generation, and distribution in a certain region. Yet, to consider the benefits
of trade, cost from electricity generation should be assigned to the region that actually
consumes the generated quantities. The final total regional system cost xˆi for a respective
coalition are the initial system cost ctoti adjusted for the value of imported and exported
quantities and can be written as
xˆi = ctoti +
∑
s,ii,t
(ims,ii,i,t · pims,ii,t − exs,i,ii,t · pexs,i,t) ·DFt.
22The carbon price resulting from this constraint represent only the marginal abatement cost in the
power market.
23Note that this number also includes the grand coalition, which falls under the first group of coalitions.
24This means that regions outside the coalition cannot utilize geographic differences in marginal abate-
ment cost.
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The market-clearing prices in exporting and importing regions, pexs,i,t and pims,ii,t, are derived
from the dual variable of the regional market-clearing constraints.
Note again that the cost for the case of singleton coalitions only ci({i}) are obtained by
assuming that all regions i ∈ N are subject to an own carbon budget. Moreover, the
resulting first-best cost allocations xˆi(S) are assumed to be the cost that members of a
coalition i ∈ S incur if joining the coalition S under scrutiny. Both, ci({i}) and xˆi(S),
will be analyzed in the subsequent Section 2.3.
2.3 Results
The presentation of results starts with characterizing the underlying fist-best cost dis-
tribution, results on the stability and fairness of allocations and, finally, an evaluation
of these allocations. This is followed by a comparison of the market outcome under the
grand coalition and singleton coalitions only.
2.3.1 The cost-sharing game
Characterization of costs The first-best cost distribution of this cost-sharing (cooper-
ative) game is quantified by obtaining the total regional system cost from the EU-REGEN
model for all 2n − (n− 1) scenarios.
The value of forming the grand coalition N shows to be a e 69 billion reduction in total
discounted system cost (until 2050) compared to the case of singleton coalitions only. This
represents a 4% reduction. 73% of this reduction goes to capital cost and the remaining
27% to operational cost. These values equal the share of capital and operational cost,
respectively, in total cost in the case of singleton coalitions {i} only. Hence, cooperation
equally impacts both cost types.
Yet, the value of N to each individual region is highly heterogeneous. It ranges from
a e 20 billion (11%) cost decrease in the case of South Germany to a e 9 billion (4%)
increase for the North-West of Eastern Europe. The different directions of changes reveal
that, from the perspective of single regions, it is not rational to enter N . Table 2.1 shows
the cost allocation for {i} and N , as well as the relative change between both for each
model region (∆).
The change in regional system cost, when moving from {i} to N , can then be explained
by changes in the cost structure of the technology-mix. In the case of Scandinavia,
higher investment in capital-intensive RES substitutes investment in gas power, which is
subject to high fuel cost. Due to the high penetration level of variable RES, the marginal
generator in the Scandinavian market is a RES technology with low marginal cost for
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most time segments. Hence, exported quantities are valued at low prices and do not fully
recover the investment cost. Moreover, imported quantities from neighboring regions
compensate for the intermittency of RES, which are hence mostly valued at the high
marginal cost of flexible gas power.
A first approach towards fair cost-sharing is the marginal contribution vi of a region to N .
This can be calculated by contrasting the value of the grand coalition v(N) with the value
of a coalition that comprises all regions except for the region of interest, which can be
formulated as vi = v(N)− v(N \ {i}). Results are depicted in Table 2.1. Values indicate
that the contribution of all regions is in the same range. However, Britain, Iberia, and
South-East Eastern Europe show to have a slightly increased value to N .
Table 2.1: Characterization of cost-sharing game and stable cost distributions [e billion]
Ci({i}) xˆi(N) ∆ vi xˆi(sR) xˆi(sIS) xˆi(sES)
Britain 260 257 −0.01 40 260 258 260
France 293 286 −0.03 35 293 293 293
Benelux 140 125 −0.11 38 140 140 128
Germany-N 149 146 −0.02 34 149 149 147
Germany-S 196 176 −0.11 37 196 196 176
Scandinavia 70 71 +0.01 39 70 70 77
Iberia 290 274 −0.06 42 279 290 275
Alpine 39 31 −0.02 35 39 39 39
Italy 233 225 −0.03 35 233 225 227
Eastern Europe-NW 210 219 +0.04 38 210 210 222
Eastern Europe-NE 13 14 +0.12 38 13 13 14
Eastern Europe-SW 44 45 +0.04 35 44 44 44
Eastern Europe-SE 94 94 −0.01 40 94 93 95
The small difference between the individual values of each region can also be obtained
from looking at the value of a coalition as a function of its cardinality. Figure B.1
(see Appendix B.2) shows the maximum and minimum saving (in total system cost) for
all coalition cardinalities, which is the number of members. The conclusion from the
previous paragraph is verified by the minor difference in the maximum and minimum
coalition value for coalitions of cardinality |N | = 12. Furthermore, it can be seen that
coalitions with a cardinality ranging from 4 to 9 are subject to greater differences between
minimum and maximum value. Consequently, the composition of coalitions matters the
most for medium size cooperations.
Stability of coalitions The concepts for identifying stable coalitions were introduced
in Section 2.2.2.1. In the following, stability will be analyzed based on the core, individual
rationality, and internal and external stability.
Testing the first-best cost allocation of the grand coalition xˆi(N) with respect to the
core, reveals that the allocation is not core-stable. There are 946 coalitions of smaller
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size whose members would be confronted with lower cost if they form. Thus, the grand
coalition N cannot be reached without the implementation of transfers.
Now solely focusing on the individual rationality constraint, or Nash solution, aims at
identifying individual disincentives for cooperation. Results show that only 15 coalitions
(out of 8, 178) fulfill the individual rationality constraint. The set of coalitions comprises
only small-sized coalitions with a maximum cardinality of 4 coalition members. Conse-
quently, the grand coalition cannot be reached under the stability criteria of individual
rationality. The coalition with the highest value sR, out of these 15, comprises the follow-
ing regions: {Britain, Iberia}. The coalition sR leads to a cost reduction of e 11 billion.
This represents 16% of the gains of N . The cost distribution of sR is shown in Table 2.1.
Finally, testing the coalitions in this cost-sharing game with respect to internal and
external stability further indicates the strong impact of a stability criteria. Concerning
internal stability, few coalitions (8 out of 8, 178) fulfill this criteria. Again, only small-sized
coalitions with up to 4 coalition members pass the test. The internal stable coalition with
the highest value, sIS (see Table 2.1), saves e 10.8 billion, which accounts for 16% of the
gains of N . The coalition comprises {Britain, France, Italy, South East Eastern Europe}.
The external stability criteria is met by 442 coalitions. By definition of the concept, this
excludes the grand coalition. Yet, the set of external stable coalitions comprises coalitions
with a cardinality of up to 12. For this criteria, the external stable coalition with the
highest reduction in system cost, sES (see Table 2.1), has a value of e 34.2 billion (49%
of v(N)) and consists of all regions except for France and South-West Eastern Europe.
However, applying both criteria reveals that none of the coalitions are internally and
externally stable at the same time. As indicated by Bréchet et al. (2011), the result that
no or only small-sized coalitions are internally and externally stable is in line with the
theoretical findings on internal and external stability in Carraro and Siniscalco (1993)
and Barrett (1994).
It is important to emphasize that the concepts of core and internal/external stability build
on different views on stability. Whereas the core assumes that the coalition under scrutiny
does not form at all if one or multiple players deviate, the internal/external stability
concept implies that coalitions form nonetheless (Bréchet et al., 2011). Furthermore,
this paragraph revealed that under all concepts of stability (in this chapter) the grand
coalition cannot form. For the concepts looking at all coalitions S ⊆ N , the individual
rationality concept reveals that, if regions act solely rational, at most 16% of the full
gains of cooperation can be reached. According to internal and external stability, no
coalition is stable. Consequently, only small efficiency improvements can be realized in
the absence of transfer payments, which will be analyzed in the subsequent paragraph.
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Fair cost-sharing Section 2.2.2.2 introduced concepts for fair cost-sharing under the
assumption of a TU game. In the following, results from the application of the least core,
Shapley value, nucleolus, and carbon nucleolus will be discussed.
Fair cost-sharing based on the least core xLCi builds on the notion of coalitional satis-
faction. The values for the least core are shown in Table 2.2. However, the solution to
the linear program is not unique. Hence, it should not be interpreted as an optimal cost
allocation and will thus be neglected for the remainder of this chapter.
In terms of the group of unique cost allocations, the Shapley value builds on the notion of
fairness only. Yet, by definition, the nucleolus combines the underlying fairness concept
with stability. The carbon nucleolus goes one step further and considers the absolute
emission reduction by coalition for a fair and stable cost distribution. The respective cost
allocations xSHPi , xNUCi , and xCNUCi are again displayed in Table 2.2.
This paragraph shows cost allocations based on the least core, Shapley value, nucleolus,
and carbon nucleolus. Though, the absolute values of these allocations offer little in-
sight for an evaluation and comparison of these concepts. Thus, the following paragraph
analyzes the general implications of the underlying methods with respect to robustness
against cost changes, non-bindingness of commitments, and core stability.
Table 2.2: Cost allocations [e billion]
xLCi x
SHP
i x
NUC
i x
CNUC
i
Britain 252 249 251 250
France 290 294 290 292
Benelux 135 134 135 136
Germany-N 146 149 146 142
Germany-S 188 189 189 190
Scandinavia 65 64 65 67
Iberia 282 277 282 281
Alpine 37 38 37 39
Italy 230 232 230 230
Eastern Europe-NW 204 204 204 200
Eastern Europe-NE 6 7 5 9
Eastern Europe-SW 40 42 41 42
Eastern Europe-SE 88 84 88 85
Evaluation of allocations Investment decisions in the power market have long-run
implications for system cost and generation potentials. While economic agents base
their contemporary decisions on information available at the time, future cost might
deviate from these preconceived paths. To assess whether allocations (under different
coalitions) are robust with respect to future cost changes, this chapter takes a look at the
monotonicity property (Young et al., 1979). In this context, the monotonicity property
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is understood as the change of a cost allocation with a change of the worth of a coalition
v(S). Thus, it is another major criterion for fair cost-sharing. In the field of cooperative
game theory, it can be differentiated between coalitional monotonicity, weak coalitional
monotonicity, and aggregate monotonicity (González-Díaz and Sánchez-Rodríguez, 2007).
A cost allocation rule satisfies coalitional monotonicity if for an increase in total cost from
v(S) to v(S)′ each member suffers higher cost and vice versa, which can be written as
xi < x
′
i ∀ i ∈ S.
Weak coalitional monotonicity means that the same applies to the members of a coalition
on the aggregate: ∑
i∈S
xi <
∑
i∈S
x
′
i
Finally, a method satisfies aggregate monotonicity if the same holds for all players of the
game on the aggregate: ∑
i∈N
xi <
∑
i∈N
x
′
i
Concerning the nucleolus, Zhou (1991) showed that it satisfies weak coalitional mono-
tonicity. The Shapley value is the only strongly coalitional monotonic allocation among
the methods in this chapter (Young, 1985). At last, Grotte (1970) verified the coalitional
monotonicity of the per capita nucleolus. Since the carbon nucleolus is an analog con-
cept, it satisfies this property as well. Table 2.3 summarizes the monotonic property of
allocation methods.
In general, it is difficult to make the commitment to the grand coalition N binding.
Under this assumption, an allocation x∗i also has to be evaluated with respect to all strict
subsets of N . Meaning, the excess of a permutation under S ⊆ N determines its quality.
The coalitional satisfaction F (S) under an allocation captures this property. It is defined
as the excess of allocated cost x∗i of players from N over the total cost if coalition S acts
independently and can be written as (Lozano et al., 2013)
F (S) =
∑
i∈S
(xi(S)− x∗i ) ∀ S 6= ∅, S ⊆ N.
Taking the mean over all coalitions S results then in the average satisfaction FAV :
FAV =
∑
S F (S)
|S|
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The average coalitional satisfaction values FAV for all three methods are shown in Ta-
ble 2.3. However, the absolute values for FAV should not be interpreted directly. The
minor difference between all three methods shows that none of them is superior concerning
that criterion.
Section 2.2.2.1 introduced core stability, which implies individual rationality, as one cri-
terion for stability of coalitions. Since it captures individual incentives for cooperation, it
should also be a criterion for a general evaluation of cost-sharing methods. The nucleolus
and carbon nucleolus satisfy the individual rationality criterion by construction. Testing
the Shapley value for this criterion reveals that it is not in the core.
Table 2.3: Overview of evaluation of allocations
Monoton. FAV Core Stability
Shapley Strong coal. e 18.2 B No
Nucleolus Weak coal. e 18.3 B Yes
Carbon Nucleolus Coal. e 18.3 B Yes
Table 2.3 summarizes the results for all three evaluation criteria. Since the average
coalitional satisfaction shows little differences between methods, an overall comparison
should be based on the monotonicity and individual rationality property. A positive
characteristic of the Shapley value is its strong coalitional monotonicity property. At the
same time, the nucleolus and carbon nucleolus proves to exhibit a core stable allocation.
Consequently, choosing an allocation method would mean balancing robustness against
cost changes and core stability and, thus, individual rationality.
2.3.2 Comparison of market outcomes
The previous Section 2.3.1 focused on the general differences within the set of all possible
coalitions. In the following, this chapter will add to this by analyzing the differences
between the two most extreme cases, full cooperation under N and no cooperation under
singleton coalitions {i}.
Generation path The development of the future generation path under a 98% CO2
reduction target and full cooperation is depicted in Figure 2.1a. Accordingly, wind power
is the dominating technology for the EU decarbonization path. Its generation increases
more than fivefold until 2050. The attractiveness of wind power can be explained by an
expected reduction of investment costs, increasing availability factors, and its positive
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correlation with load.25 The latter reflects the seasonal correlation of its availability
factors with demand. Both, maximum generation from wind power and demand peak,
appear during winter times. Moreover, the bulk of generation is from onshore capacity.
Generation from offshore installations proves to be hardly economically viable with its
accumulated annual generation constantly staying below 40 TWh.
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Figure 2.1: Long-run generation path under grand coalition and singleton coalitions
The generation-share of variable RES increases over the model horizon from 12% in 2015
to 40% in 2050. Yet, this is mainly driven by wind power. The generation-share of
all solar power technologies increases from 5% to 8% in 2050 only. This weak market
penetration can be explained in analogy to the attractiveness of wind power. Although,
solar power technologies have in general lower availability factors, lower investment costs
are not able to compensate for that. Additionally, there is a negative seasonal correlation
between generation from solar technologies and demand in most model regions.26
In economic terms, the difference in the market penetration between wind and solar power
represents each technologies’ substitution elasticity with dispatchable technologies. The
time-profile of wind power leads to its higher substitution elasticity with dispatchable
technologies.
The development of dispatchable technologies in the full cooperation scenario is char-
acterized by investment in gas power technologies and divestment from coal-fired tech-
nologies.27 The former one almost triples its generation-share to 21% and functions as
25 Increasing availability factors are assumed due to a higher expected conversion-efficiency at lower wind
speeds.
26Only the Iberian model region shows a positive seasonal correlation between demand and solar irradi-
ation.
27The extensive market penetration of gas power has to be interpreted with respect to the framework
of the EU-REGEN model. Due to the missing consideration of storage technologies, gas power, as the
most flexible generation technology, is a natural complement to intermittent wind power. Consequently,
in a framework with detailed modeling of storage, the market penetration of gas power could be lower
due to utilization of electricity storage.
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complementary technology to wind power. The contribution of coal-fired technologies is
monotonically decreasing and falls from 25% in 2015 to 0.05% in 2050.
The increasing generation share of gas-powered technologies in this low CO2 emission
scenario is only feasible due to the market entrance of carbon capture and storage (CCS)
with bioenergy (BECCS), which is characterized by a negative carbon intensity. Invest-
ments in BECCS arise from 2040 on and allow for a generation-share of 6% in 2050.28
The overall generation path in the no cooperation scenario shows little differences (see
Figure 2.1b). The generation paths between N and the singleton coalitions {i} differ with
respect to the utilization of low-carbon generation technologies. Moving from N to {i}
increases, on the one hand, the generation from nuclear power and PV and reduces the
contribution of wind power, gas power, BECCS, and concentrated solar power (CSP), on
the other hand. This can be seen in more detail when looking at the regional generation
patterns.
The respective development of regional generation paths can be found in Figures B.2, B.3,
B.4, and B.5 in Appendix B.3. Under the grand coalition, the quality of wind and solar
resources shows to be the main driver for the geographic distribution of wind and solar
power generation. This is in contrast to other contributions that emphasize the benefit of
a geographic distribution, which utilizes a geographic averaging effect to smooth overall
wind power generation (e.g., Huber et al., 2014). The model region Britain becomes
dominating in wind power application by reaching an annual generation of 400 TWh by
2050, accounting for approximately 25% of 2050 total wind power generation. Moreover,
also France and Scandinavia experience a significant increase in generation from wind
power. Generation from solar resources is mainly added in the southern regions, namely
Iberia, France, and Italy.29
Comparing that to the results for the singleton coalitions, two patterns can be observed.
On the one hand, with singleton coalitions, there is a switch from wind power to nuclear
power. The generation path for France indicates this development clearly. On the other
hand, there is also a geographic shift of generation from gas power. This becomes obvious
when comparing Germany and North-Western Eastern Europe in both scenarios.
28The carbon intensity of BECCS is negative due to the removal of CO2 from the atmosphere in the
biomass growing phase in combination with the geologic storage of CO2 emissions from the biomass
combustion. The general importance of BECCS in low CO2 emission scenarios has been emphasized
in, e.g., Klein et al. (2014).
29The market penetration of solar power in these countries can be explained by regional resource quality,
which strongly correlates with latitude.
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Capacity investment path The development of the long-run generation path is re-
flected in capacity investment. Figure 2.2a shows the underlying capacity path for the
grand coalition. The strong build-up of solar and, especially, wind power capacity is
necessary because of the low substitution elasticity with dispatchable generation tech-
nologies. Due to the lower availability factors and intermittency of variable RES, greater
amounts of capacity are required to substitute dispatchable and CO2-emitting generation
technologies.
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Figure 2.2: Long-run capacity path under grand coalition and singleton coalitions
Furthermore, a look at the timing of solar power investments reveals the importance
of its decreasing investment costs. The majority of new capacity is added in the mid-
and long-run, where assumed investment costs experience a strong decrease. In terms of
technology, only photovoltaic power proofs to be an economically attractive technology.
CSP hardly penetrates the market. Meaning, its higher availability factors and flexibility
through storage does not compensate for higher investment costs.
Moreover, Figure 2.2a indicates the gradual phase-out of coal-powered technologies. By
2050 only 15 GW of coal power capacity remains active, which corresponds to 9% of the
capacity installed in 2015. The stock of nuclear power capacity decreases by one-third.30
In contrast to that, the capacity investment path under singleton coalitions (see Fig-
ure 2.2b) shows an almost stable capacity level of nuclear power. This goes in hand with
a reduction in the wind power capacity. Furthermore, results show that, even though,
the generation from gas power is lower in the singleton coalition scenario, the level of
installed capacity in 2050 increases. This reveals a lower utilization of the capacity and,
hence, a loss in economic efficiency.
30The gradual decrease of the nuclear power capacity is driven by the exogenous technical lifetime of
generation technologies (60 years for nuclear power) and the absence of new investments in the cost-
efficient market outcome.
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Prices In addition to the market-clearing condition, the carbon budget is another main
equilibrium constraint in the context of this analysis. The duel variable of the market-
clearing and carbon budget constraint provides insight in the energy-only prices and
marginal abatement cost, respectively. Table 2.4 shows the development of both prices.
The relative market-wide energy-only price (compared to the level of 2015) experiences
an increase in, mainly, the mid-run (until 2040) (see Table 2.4). Prices rise to 1.14 in 2030
and balance out around 1.30 by the end of the model horizon. This can be interpreted
as a 30% price increase compared to 2015 due to the low-emission target in this chapter.
The underlying regional energy-only prices are depicted in Table B.1 (see Appendix B.3),
which indicate a heterogeneous development of regional energy-only prices. Relative
regional prices by 2030 range from a decrease to 0.99 in the case of Britain to an increase
to 1.38 in South-East Eastern Europe. For 2050, prices in Britain are at a level of 1.13
and the South-East of Eastern Europe reaches a level of 1.44. The differences between
regions are, on the one hand, driven by varying growth patterns of future electricity
demand and, on the other hand, by regional variable RES availability and quality, among
others.
The relative market-wide energy-only price under singleton coalitions is characterized by
a lower increase then in the case of the grand coalition (see Table 2.4). Values are at
a level of 1.08 by 2030 and reach 1.23 in 2050. Thus, the marginal cost for generating
electricity even decrease under no cooperation. Consequently, the economic consequences
from singleton coalitions mainly translate into an increase of capacity costs, which is
also indicated by the increase of overall generation capacity (see Figures 2.2a and 2.2b).
Moreover, the regional energy-only prices (see Table B.2 in Appendix B.3) follow the
same pattern as under the grand coalition.
Table 2.4: Relative energy-only (compared to 2015) and CO2 prices
Grand Coalition 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050
Relative energy-only price 1.05 1.13 1.14 1.18 1.26 1.29 1.30
CO2 prices [e/tCO2] 7.4 19.6 24.5 35.6 57 84.5 95.5
Singleton Coalitions 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050
Relative energy-only price 1.04 1.10 1.08 1.14 1.19 1.22 1.23
CO2 prices [e/tCO2] 11.8 21.5 28.5 39.8 59.7 84.4 103.5
Note: The market-wide energy-only price is calculated as the generation-weighted av-
erage of all regional market-clearing prices.
The marginal abatement cost in the European power market under the grand coalition
increase constantly to 24 e/tCO2 in 2030 and reach 95 e/tCO2 in 2050. Usually it is
assumed that these abatement cost are recovered in the economy. Yet, from the perspec-
tive of consumers, there is empirical evidence that emission cost are passed-through to
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electricity prices (see Fabra and Reguant, 2014; Hintermann, 2016). This would translate
into an even stronger increase of energy-only prices.
As pointed out in Section 2.1, non-cooperation leads to regional differences in marginal
abatement cost. In the case of singleton coalitions, there is a band of regional abatement
costs that varies from 39 e/tCO2 to 162 e/tCO2 in 2050. A region like Alpine, that does
not have access to low abatement cost through high quality RES, ends up with marginal
abatement cost of 162 e/tCO2. On the contrary, the wind resource rich region Scandi-
navia reaches a level of 69 e/tCO2 by 2050. Finally, the average marginal abatement
cost in this scenario reach a level of 104 e/tCO2 by the model horizon and, hence, further
indicate the loss in economic efficiency from singleton coalitions.31
Geographic distribution of CO2 abatement The access to CO2 abatement at low
marginal cost, for example, variable RES, is one of the main drivers for differences in
regional CO2 emission reductions. Neglecting regional differences in abatement costs
and not utilizing those would mean, in this scenario, that each region reduces its CO2
emissions by 98%. Yet, the cost-efficient partial equilibrium from the EU-REGEN model
proves the regional emission-reduction paths shown in Table 2.5 to be optimal.
Table 2.5: Development of regional CO2 emissions (compared to 1990)
2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050
Britain 0.72 0.46 0.23 0.19 0.20 0.21 0.20 0.16
France 0.71 0.38 0.28 0.37 0.51 0.43 0.38 −0.09
Benelux 0.59 0.61 0.60 0.70 0.73 0.76 0.73 0.74
Germany-N 0.78 0.71 0.58 0.51 0.36 0.14 0.08 0.06
Germany-S 0.79 0.74 1.20 1.13 1.14 1.20 0.95 0.69
Scandinavia 0.41 0.31 0.20 0.18 0.20 0.13 −0.44 −1.02
Iberia 1.18 1.04 0.98 0.95 0.86 0.54 0.30 0.02
Alpine 0.85 0.81 0.72 0.80 0.97 1.18 1.04 0.93
Italy 0.68 0.69 0.63 0.50 0.37 0.27 0.18 0.06
Eastern Europe-NW 0.69 0.62 0.53 0.33 0.14 0.05 −0.04 −0.08
Eastern Europe-NE 0.36 0.29 0.11 0.04 0.01 0.00 −0.08 −0.16
Eastern Europe-SW 0.84 0.67 0.46 0.35 0.04 0.00 −0.27 −0.41
Eastern Europe-SE 0.86 0.91 0.72 0.43 0.17 0.03 −0.13 −0.20
Note: CO2 emission values are normalized to 1990 levels.
The presented values show that Iberia is the only region for which it is optimal to reach
a 2050 level that is equal to the market-wide target as it reaches an emission level of 2%
compared to 1990 levels. All other regions either over- or under-fulfill the 98% reduction
target. Scandinavia, France, and the Eastern European regions even reach negative
31The abatement cost are calculated as the emission-weighted average of all regional marginal abatement
costs.
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emission levels.32 Especially Scandinavia shows a high reduction of relative emissions by
reaching with −1.02 a negative emission level of the same magnitude as the 1990 positive
emission level. This is, on the one hand, driven by the strong market penetration of
variable RES and, on the other hand, by the application of BECCS. The regions with
the highest remaining emission levels are Benelux, South Germany, and Alpine.
By design of the singleton coalitions scenario with a carbon budget for each region,
regional emissions follow the assumed 98% reduction target. Hence, emissions in each
region end up at a level of 2% compared to 1990 levels.
2.4 Discussion and conclusion
In this chapter, two scenario groups were analyzed. First, cooperative game theory was
applied to investigate effects of cooperation. The total system cost under the grand
coalition decrease by 4% compared to the case with singleton coalitions. Looking at the
stability of all possible coalitions reveals that only small-sized cooperations pass the test
for individual rationality and none fulfills the criteria of internal and external stability
at the same time. Finally, the identification of fair cost allocations indicates a trade-off
between considering robustness against cost changes and individual rationality.
Second, in case of the grand coalition (the first-best), the interplay between wind power,
gas power, and BECCS is shown to be the cost-effective equilibrium for the decarboniza-
tion of Europe’s power sector. Onshore wind power shows to be the most crucial gen-
eration technology with a generation-share of over 30% by 2050. The flexible dispatch
pattern of gas power backs up this strong market penetration. Moreover, the market-
wide marginal abatement costs in 2050 end up at 95 e/tCO2. Under singleton coalitions,
the generation and capacity investment paths show a greater contribution of nuclear
power, which substitutes generation from wind power. Hence, this analysis finds differ-
ent technology lock-ins under the grand coalition and singleton coalitions, respectively.
For the regional marginal abatement costs, the average of these costs reaches a level of
104 e/tCO2 by 2050 under singleton coalitions.
Finding the equilibrium market outcome by means of a bottom-up power market model
offers great insights into the underlying investments and capacity utilization. Yet, using
such a model for analyzing coalitions and also the concepts of cooperative game theory
themselves, implies a variety of limitations. Three of these issues are addressed in the
32Negative emissions arise from the application of BECCS.
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following.33 First, results show that differences in the main variables between the grand
coalitionN and the singleton coalition {i} are minor. With respect to that, it is important
to emphasize the low-emission path that is underlying this analysis. The system-wide 98%
reduction target is a tight constraint that deeply limits the solution space. Conducting
the same analysis with an 80% reduction target instead, validates the great impact of
the tighter reduction target. With an 80% reduction target, the total system cost under
{i} increases by 7% (compared to 4% in Section 2.3.1). Yet, it is not clear whether
that can be interpreted, such that a tight climate target is one way to limit inefficient
behavior of individual countries or regions. This should be subject to further analysis.
Second, the question of the explanatory power of total system cost is closely related to
that. The analysis in this chapter shows that even under the grand coalition N and
singleton coalitions {i}, the difference in total system cost is minor. This has been
emphasized by, for example, Trutnevyte (2016) and DeCarolis (2011). They show that a
great number of near-optimal scenarios can represent observed market developments as
well. Furthermore, it is shown in the literature, that equilibria with similar total system
cost can represent very different transition paths. Insights from this analysis indicate that
the marginal abatement costs are a more suitable indicator. Yet, the adjustment of total
cost for imported and exported quantities in this chapter already tries to address this
point of criticism. Third, one general weakness of this approach is the one-dimensionality
of coalitions. The framework assumes that while one coalition is formed, all the other
regions constitute singleton coalitions. Yet, this leaves out the possibility of alternative
cooperations that could be formed in parallel. The main reason for sticking to this one-
dimensional perspective is computational capacity. The setting in this chapter requires
8, 178 model runs to quantify the full cost-space for the cost-sharing (cooperative) game.
Looking into a second round of coalition formation would not allow for quantifying the
cost-sharing game anymore.
The analysis in this chapter provides general implications with respect to the EU ETS.
The research design in this study allows to gain insight in the direction of potential trans-
fer payments to reach the grand coalition and the cost-effective equilibrium. However,
this raises the question of how to implement a system of transfer payments and which
institutions would be required. As mentioned in Section 2.2.3, the concept of cooperation
in this chapter exhibits a close relationship to the one of the EU ETS. With respect to
the EU ETS, one channel of reallocation is the sharing of auctioning revenues. This real-
location scheme should consider the economic rationality of single countries as discussed
in this chapter. Looking at the data for the allocation of revenues from the auctioning of
33The topics addressed in this section should be understood as a selection of critical issues. Of course,
there are further issues connected to the methodology in this chapter.
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emission allowances for the years 2013–2015 shows that national revenues are distributed
(roughly) in proportion to the amount of national emissions (for auctioned allowances).
Thus, Germany received 22% of revenues, followed by Italy and the United Kingdom with
12% each. Moreover, the available data from EC (2017) shows to which extent countries
spend revenues on international uses related to climate purposes. The cost allocations
in Section 2.3.1 revealed that (based on the carbon nucleolus) South Germany, Benelux,
Iberia, Alpine, and Italy would be the main contributors to a transfer scheme. So, these
countries should also have significant spendings (of allocations of revenues) for interna-
tional purposes.34 The observed numbers show that the two Iberian countries Spain and
Portugal dedicate less than one percent to international climate uses. However, Germany
allocates 8%, Austria 13%, and Italy 50% of its revenues to international purposes.35
Another source of transfer in the current EU ETS is the free allocation of allowances
for the modernization of electricity generation. For the years 2013–2015, these free al-
lowances were given to Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Lithuania,
Poland, and Romania (EEA, 2018). According to the proposed cost allocation (based on
the carbon nucleolus) all Eastern European regions would receive transfers. Hence, the
existing allocation of transfers through free allowances for the modernization of electricity
generation and the observed reallocation of auctioning revenues is mainly in line with the
results obtained from the analysis in this chapter.
However, the present analysis addresses only the European power sector, which is in
contrast to the more than 10 sectors of the EU ETS. Since it can be assumed that more
and more ETS sectors will move from freely allocated allowances to auctioning in the
future, a similar analysis, that comprise all of these sectors, should be conducted to fully
capture the implications for the EU ETS. Related to that, there is also the necessity for
analyses that look at alternative ways for setting economic incentives, which could be
derived from the literature on international trade agreements. For instance, the concept
of foreign direct investments could be used to think of cross-border capacity payments.
Finally, as highlighted in the course of this chapter, the EU already laid the ground for
transforming its power sector by setting long-run decarbonization goals. However, it is
important to emphasize that the EU has shared competences with its member states and
still has to rely on them for the translation of its climate policy goals into actual targets or
national legislation. As long as this is the case, the EU should set appropriate incentives
such that member states implement targets, which serve the efficient implementation of
34Note that these numbers do, unfortunately, not reveal which European country receives these transfers.
35Due to incomplete data availability, the share of auctioning revenues that goes to international climate
uses cannot be evaluated for the countries of the Benelux region.
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goals. Consequently, new EU policies that are currently under way or still to come should
include more comprehensive transfer schemes as proposed in this paper.
In general, the EU’s Energy Union is a first step towards this process. The EC makes the
benefits of each member state transparent by highlighting them explicitly.36 Nonetheless,
a clear reallocation scheme remains missing. In 2018, the EU passed new regulation on
the governance of its Energy Union and climate action plans. However, also this new
piece of legislation lacks explicit transfers, which indicates that accounting for distribu-
tive effects of legislation related to the Energy Union is still the exception. Having the
results of this chapter in mind, following through with this approach could lead to pro-
found dissatisfaction of single EU member states and thus opposition towards the efficient
implementation of a transformation path.
36The benefits of the Energy Union for each EU member state are listed under
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/publications/benefits-energy-union-country-factsheets.
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3.1 Introduction
To keep global warming below 2° C, 195 countries committed to counteract their cur-
rent trend of CO2 emissions in the 2015 Paris Agreement. To limit the probability of
warming above 2° C, cumulative CO2 emissions in the period 2000–2050 should not ex-
ceed 1,000,000 megatons (Mt), that is, approximately 20,000 Mt each year (Meinshausen
et al., 2009). In 2017, just two years after the Paris Agreement, annual carbon emission
peaked at 36,790 Mt, which is almost double the approximate annual emission budget
and, moreover, means that almost half the 1,000,000 Mt budget has already been emitted.
Thus, there is doubt as to whether the temperature target can be met.1
One driving factor behind this development is the annual emissions from electricity gen-
eration, which increased from 6,300 Mt to 11,700 Mt in the period 1990–2013 (Ang
and Su, 2016) and thus accounts for around one-third of total emissions. Electricity
demand increased by 94% in the same period and is expected to increase further due
to rising household incomes (preference for using electricity), electrification (heating,
transportation, power-to-gas), digitization (e.g., cryptocurrencies), and increased use of
air-conditioning. To date, the power sector’s decarbonization efforts have mainly focused
on its supply side. Policymakers introduced cap-and-trade systems (e.g., the European
emission trading system (EU ETS)) or initiated support schemes for renewable energies
(e.g., feed-in tariffs).
Concerning renewables, their intermittent supply pattern is a challenge to decarboniza-
tion. Complementing technologies, that can react to fast changes in the supply of renew-
ables and provide the necessary flexibility on the supply side, are either carbon-emitting
(gas power), scarce regarding suitable sites (pumped hydro, biomass), still too expen-
sive (batteries, power-to-gas), or difficult to incentivize (short-term demand response)2.
Thus, there is an increasingly strong focus on long-term demand response measures such
as energy efficiency, which reduces the overall electricity demand that has to be satis-
fied. For example, the International Energy Agency (IEA) calculates that improvements
in energy efficiency reduced carbon emissions by 12.5% in the period 2000–2016 (IEA,
2017b, p. 27) and predicts that further improvements will provide 44% (renewables 36%,
1 Note that even a warming of 2° C comes at enormous cost. Supposing social costs of carbon of
100 US$/tCO2 (see Tol (2011) for a survey and Anthoff and Tol (2013); Nordhaus (2014); Pindyck
(2016); van den Bijgaart et al. (2016); Ricke et al. (2018) for estimates that vary between 10 and
805 US$/tCO2) and future emissions of 500,000 Mt, leads to economic costs of US$ 50 trillion, which
is 2.5 times the 2017 US GDP.
2 Smart meters would make short-term demand response feasible, but the actual response is still behav-
iorally biased.
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fuel switching 2%) of the abatement necessary to meet the Paris Agreement targets (IEA,
2018, p. 28).3
In this chapter, we develop a framework to integrate short-term demand response and
long-term demand response (energy efficiency improvements) in detailed dispatch and
investment models of power markets. We implement this framework in the EU-REGEN
model to find the welfare maximizing level of investments in energy efficiency, quantify
its impact for decarbonizing the European power sector, and elaborate on the role of
short-term demand response and its interaction with the supply side.4 It is well-known
that improvements in energy efficiency reduce the price of electricity and thus have a
rebound effect, the magnitude of which depends, among others, on the short-term de-
mand response; that is, consumers’ abilities to adapt their demand in the current period
(demand shedding) and reschedule demand intertemporally (demand shifting).
To account for European decarbonization goals, we implement a carbon constraint of 80%
emission reduction in the period 1990–2050. We assume perfectly competitive firms that
decide on production and capacity investments in the face of carbon prices. Consumer
behavior is reflected by a downward sloping inverse demand function that accounts for
demand shedding and shifting. The framework is set up from the perspective of a welfare-
maximizing central planner. The central planer can invest in the level of energy efficiency
and thus reduce the amount of electricity necessary to provide the same amount of en-
ergy services. A performance parameter translates the investments into actual savings.
This parameter is assumed to increase over time to account for exogenous technological
progress in energy efficiency on the demand side.5
We calculate that, under short-term demand response and optimal energy efficiency in-
vestments, there will be a need for 180 GW less gas turbine capacity until 2050 compared
to a scenario that neglects responsive demand, but 52 GW more solar PV and 28 GW
more wind turbines would be installed. Nuclear, lignite, and coal power are hardly af-
fected. Smart devices and tariffs with time-varying prices incentivize consumers to adapt
their demand in response to supply scarcity in the short term. This increases system
flexibility and thus reduces the general need for flexibility on the supply side, which is
3 Fuel switching is the change in the emission intensity of fossil fuel-based generation technologies due
to switching to fuels with a lower carbon content (either natural gas instead of coal or biomass instead
of natural gas) or power plants with a higher conversion efficiency.
4 The EU-REGEN model is a dynamic partial equilibrium model of the European power market with
multiple regions that are linked via transmission lines (see Chapter 1).
5 Exogenous technological progress on the supply side is covered by technology-specific developments
over time.
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mainly offered by gas power.6 Additionally, short-term demand response leads to more
(less) consumption when wind and solar power generators have plenty (little) to sell.
This reduces the temporal variability of prices, which fosters the competitiveness of so-
lar power but decreases gas power revenues. Wind power benefits less than solar power
because its intermittency is less pronounced. For nuclear, lignite, and coal power, less
prices variability translates into an intertemporal shifting of profits and thus does not
affect their capacity in the long run.
We find that energy efficiency reduces electricity demand by 10% in 2050. In contrast,
the EU 2012 energy efficiency directive and its 2016 update set a target of 20% reduc-
tion in energy demand by 2020 and a 30% reduction target for 2030. Energy efficiency
contributes 11% to the decarbonization of the European power market. Wind turbines,
solar PV, and gas power are the chief means of meeting the emission target (intermittent
renewables 53%, fuel switching 36%), which is in sharp contrast to IEA (2018). Keeping
our framework in mind, other studies seem to overestimate the economic attractiveness
of energy efficiency, for two reasons. First, the interplay between short-term demand
response and energy efficiency improvements leads to a rebound and thus diminishes the
projected savings. However, we calculate that the rebound effect is 9% and hence does not
play a crucial role. Second, on the supply side of the market, short-term demand response
partly balances the intermittent supply pattern of renewable energies and increases their
economic viability.
The literature on energy efficiency is mainly concerned with two phenomena: the re-
bound effect and the energy efficiency gap.7 The rebound effect refers to the loss in
energy efficiency savings due to economic response (Gillingham et al., 2016). The energy
efficiency gap is understood as an energy efficiency level lower than the socially optimal
level (Jaffe and Stavins, 1994). The existence of a rebound effect is widely accepted and
has been long discussed in the literature (e.g., Jevons, 1865; Khazzoom, 1980; Lovins,
1988). In our partial equilibrium setting, we capture the effect on energy consumption
of improved energy efficiency due to income and substitution effects (direct or partial
equilibrium rebound effect) and abstract from income and substitution effects on all other
goods (indirect or general equilibrium rebound effect).8
Regarding the energy efficiency gap, Gillingham and Palmer (2014) recently wrote that
“[d]espite more than thirty years of research on the energy efficiency gap, the issue of its
6 Must-run generators such a nuclear, lignite, and coal power are not as flexible as gas power due to
ramping times.
7 See Borenstein (2015); Chan and Gillingham (2015); Lemoine (2016) for theoretical contributions and
Greening et al. (2000); Jenkins et al. (2011); Sorrell (2009) for literature reviews.
8 See Fullerton and Ta (2018); Böhringer et al. (2018) for a more detailed decomposition.
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size remains unresolved.” Two other publications have shed new light on this issue. Using
evidence from an energy efficiency program for 30,000 low-income households, Fowlie
et al. (2018) find realized savings at roughly 30% of the projected ones. On the basis
of a 100,000-household field experiment, Allcott and Greenstone (2017) estimate savings
of 58% in comparison to engineering projections. Moreover, they find no evidence for
the informational or behavioral explanations that are often discussed in the literature,
and conclude that modeling flaws such as hidden costs, exaggerated energy savings from
engineering projections, and consumer heterogeneity contribute to the size of the observed
energy efficiency gap.9
We use existing estimates for price elasticities to calculate the rebound effect. Regarding
the energy efficiency gap, we account for the fact that engineering estimates on the impact
of energy efficiency might be wrong. Fowlie et al. (2018) and Allcott and Greenstone
(2017) suggest that actual performance might be only half of our default guess. Under
such a scenario, the economic attractiveness of substitutes (wind turbines, solar PV, gas
power) results in negligible energy efficiency investment.
Stylized, partial equilibrium models of power markets usually assume that consumer’s
utility maximization leads to a generic downward-sloping demand curve (e.g., Fischer
and Newell, 2008; Green and Leautier, 2015). This setting is especially used in the
classical peak-load pricing literature (see Crew et al., 1995), where consumers are able
to adapt to expected prices (e.g., day-ahead or flat prices) but cannot react after the
uncertainty has been resolved (e.g., real-time price) due to the lack of smart meters and
suitable tariffs.
Detailed power market models consider the temporal variability of demand either through
short-term demand response or exogenously given temporal demand profiles. An example
for the latter is the model introduced in Chapter 1. Concerning short-term demand
response, Zerrahn and Schill (2015) represent short-term demand response by a system
of equations, which limits the amount of demand and number of periods over which
demand can be shifted. This approach keeps the problem linear and their objective
is to minimize costs.10 In contrast, Su and Kirschen (2009) and Jonghe et al. (2011)
take a welfare-maximizing approach. Su and Kirschen (2009) maximize welfare as the
difference between the gross surplus and cost, where gross surplus is approximated by
the product of consumers’ marginal benefits and the quantity consumed. Jonghe et al.
(2011) maximize welfare by using a first-order Taylor linearization of demand and thereby
9 Note that exaggerated savings lead to higher estimates for the rebound effect and are one explanation
for empirical observations of rebound effects above 100%.
10 See Göransson et al. (2014); Richter (2011) for similar studies.
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account for demand shedding, shifting, and the level of energy efficiency, which can be
varied exogenously. Even though Jonghe et al. (2011) explore a novel approach, the still
exogenous level of energy efficiency and the lack of differentiation between demand for
electricity and energy services limit its applicability. We borrow from them to depict
demand shedding but develop our own, more intuitive approach for demand shifting and
energy efficiency.
Other representations of energy efficiency in detailed partial equilibrium power market
models are sparse and limited to cost-minimizing models (see Chapter 4).11 Like us, Lind
et al. (2013) model energy efficiency as an investment option with different cost classes
and respective potentials.12 EPRI (2014) use the US-REGEN model (see Blanford et al.,
2014) and integrate, similar to our model, energy efficiency as a separate technology in
the market-clearing condition. For subsequent years, the performance of the energy effi-
ciency measure depreciates. In our model, the performance of energy efficiency increases
exogenously due to technological progress but the endogenous determined capacity of
energy efficiency depreciates. However, we go beyond the approach in EPRI (2014) and
additionally consider the current level of energy efficiency and the general interaction of
energy efficiency with short-term demand response.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows: Section 3.2 describes the model and
the underlying optimization problem. Then, in Section 3.3, we develop the framework to
implement short-term demand response and energy efficiency improvements in detailed
power market models. Section 3.4 describes the calibration and Section 3.5 the results.
Section 3.6 close the chapter with discussions and a conclusion.
3.2 The model
Consider a dynamic partial equilibrium model of a multi-region electricity system. Our
model comprises firms, consumers, and a central planer. The overall objective is to
maximize welfare taking into account the behavior of firms and consumers. The market
consists of regions r and consumption sectors i. We consider dispatchable and inter-
mittent technologies j. The time horizon of the model is split into periods t and each
period consists of segments s. We use y for production, q for new installed capacity,
Q for aggregated capacity, and C (·) is for cost functions. The absolute level of the cost
functions varies among regions and their shape depends on the technology j. We use sub-
11 See Baldini and Trivella (2018) for an approach that emphasizes the technological heterogeneity of
energy efficiency measures.
12 For quantification they use the TIMES-Norway model (see Loulou et al., 2005).
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scripts i, j, r, and parentheses (t) , (s, t) to denote variables, for example, yjr (s, t) refers
to technology type j, region r, segment s, and period t.
At the beginning of each period, firms invest Cjr (qjr (t)) to install qjr (t). Each technol-
ogy’s capacity has a certain lifetime. Thus, Qjr (t) is reduced by the amount of capacity
that reached the end of its lifetime in period t. Holding capacity costs Cjr (Qjr (t)) and
makes it potentially beneficial to take some vintages out of operation before they reached
the end of their lifetimes. In each time segment, firms decide on production, yjr (s, t),
at private costs Cjr (yjr (s, t)). Production leads to emissions, denoted by ejr (s, t), and
is restricted by available capacity, that is, yjr (s, t) ≤ αjr (s)Qjr (t), where αjr (s) is the
availability of technology j.
We assume that firms are perfectly competitive and emissions cause environmental dam-
age by burning fossil fuels to generate electricity. Abstracting from any uncertainty and
assuming price-responsive consumers, firms obtain zero profits in each period. Addition-
ally, neglecting from dynamic market failures such as R&D spillovers, it is straightforward
to show that firms would act efficiently if environmental externalities are perfectly inter-
nalized (e.g., Golosov et al., 2014).13 We abstract from representing policies addressing
environmental externalities other than the carbon externality from burning fossil fuels.
There are various policy instruments for limiting CO2 emissions, for example, a carbon
tax, direct control instruments to ban certain fossil fuel burning technologies, or certifi-
cates to limit emission quantities. We impose a quantity restriction path—E (t) denotes
the emission target and E (t) = ∑r∑s∑j ejr (s, t) is the actual emission level—which
leads to an 80% emission reduction in the European power market in 2050.14 For parsi-
mony, we assume that the resulting certificate price internalizes all damages so that firms
act efficiently.
Consumers obtain utility from the consumption of energy services. Energy service de-
mand is denoted by xr (s, t), the resulting electricity demand by dr (s, t), and pr (s, t) is
the time-varying wholesale electricity price. We denote by si < 0 the ability to shed
demand15 in segment s and by s,s
′
i ≤ 0 the ability to shift demand from s to s′. Taking
this into account and noting that xr (s, t) =
∑
i xir (s, t) is the energy service demand
of all sectors, consumers maximize their utility by responding to time-varying electric-
ity prices. This leads to the inverse demand function, denoted by pr (xr (s, t)), so that∫ xr(s,t)
0 pr (x˜) dx˜ is the “gross surplus” from consuming energy services. Subtracting costs
13Externalities from R&D spillovers would require subsidies (e.g., Acemoglu et al., 2012).
14 See Chapter 1 for more information on this scenario.
15Note that the ability to shed is defined as the percentage change in quantity over the percentage change
in price.
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of purchasing electricity, yields consumer surplus
CSr (s, t) =
∫ xr(s,t)
0
pr (x˜) dx˜− pr (s, t) dr (s, t) . (3.1)
Each region can trade electricity with other regions. IMr,r′ (s, t) and EXr,r′ (s, t) de-
note the import or export volume, respectively, between two regions r and r′. Then,
imports to a specific region r are defined by IMr (s, t) :=
∑
r′ 6=r IMr,r′ (s, t) and exports
by EXr (s, t) :=
∑
r′ 6=r EXr,r′ (s, t), where r′ 6= r defines a subset of regions that does not
contain the specific region r. Net imports are TRr (s, t) = IMr (s, t) − EXr (s, t) and
restricted by transmission line capacity. To alleviate this constraint, the central planer
invests Ctrr,r′
(
qtrr,r′ (t)
)
to install transmission line capacity, qtrr,r′ (t), between regions r and
r′.
The transformation of electricity into energy services is determined by the level of energy
efficiency. The central planer invests Ceeir (qeeir (t)) in each region to improve the energy
efficiency of sector i by qeeir (t). The aggregated energy efficiency capacity, Qeeir (t), depre-
ciates at rate δee. Using the introduced investment costs and assuming that all variables
are non-negative, we can formulate the central planner’s objective as
max
q,y
W =
∑
t
∑
r
∑
s
CSr (s, t) +
∑
j
pijr (t)−
∑
i
Ceeir (·)−
∑
r′ 6=r
Ctrr,r′ (·)
 (3.2)
such that 0 =
∑
j
yjr (s, t) + TRr (s, t)− dr (s, t) , (3.3)
Qtrr,r′ (t) ≥ IMr,r′ (s, t) , EXr,r′ (s, t) (3.4)
0 ≤ E (t)− E (t) , (3.5)
pijr (t) denotes technology-specific profits of firms in a specific region. The central planner
maximizes welfare as the sum of consumer surplus and producer surplus, minus costs of
energy efficiency improvements and costs of transmission line capacity expansion. q is
the vector that contains capacity decisions (generation, energy efficiency, and transmis-
sion line capacity) for all periods in each region, and y is the vector of all production
decisions. Constraint (3.3) is the market-clearing condition, where∑j yjr (s, t) is the total
production of firms.16 Constraint (3.4) ensures that imports and exports do not exceed
transmission line capacity. Constraint (3.5) ensures that the emission reduction target is
met.
16 It is straightforward to show that price-responsive consumers increase consumption up to the level of
electricity offered so that the market-clearing condition always binds.
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3.3 Implementation in the numerical model
We quantify the long-run equilibrium of the European power market by using the model
framework introduced in Section 3.2 and implementing short-term (demand shedding and
shifting) and long-term demand response (endogenous investments in energy efficiency
and exogenous technical progress in energy efficiency) in the combined dispatch and
investment EU-REGEN model (see Chapter 1).1718
The problem solved by the EU-REGEN model, which is finding a market equilibrium
under the assumption of perfectly competitive markets and without demand response, is
a cost-minimization problem and thus can be solved as a linear program. Adding short-
term demand response to this model changes the structure of the underlying algebraic
problem in regard to the new objective of maximizing welfare. The objective function
can become quadratic or exhibit other kinds of nonlinearities. The most general way of
solving such a problem is complementary programming. Karush-Kuhn-Tucker conditions
are derived as the necessary first-order conditions for finding an optimum. The respective
complementary variables are defined for each equilibrium condition (e.g., Takayama and
Hashimoto, 1984). However, solving a detailed (i.e., large number of constraints) problem
through complementary programming is not feasible given that a complementary variable
has to be defined for each equilibrium constraint. Takayama and Uri (1983) emphasize
that under certain conditions, a market equilibrium can be found by using quadratic
programming, which requires (among other things) that the underlying problem be convex
and the resulting market matrix positive semidefinite and, thus, symmetric (Jonghe et al.,
2011). If these conditions are fulfilled, the market equilibrium can be found by solving
the problem as an equivalent quadratic program by means of efficient algorithms that are
tailored to solving convex problems (e.g., CPLEX). However, these conditions seriously
constrain an extensive analysis of the impact of short-term demand response. Hence, in
this chapter, the formulation of demand response in the numerical implementation must
be adjusted with regard to those technical constraints.
17 For parsimony, we introduced only the most important constraints in Section 3.2. More detailed
information about the EU-REGENmodel structure, the underlying data set, and additional constraints
can be found in Chapter 1.
18Note that for the purpose of this chapter, time segments are weighted by mapping them to original
hours based on minimizing the Euclidean distance, which allows us to still capture the temporal
sequence of hours. This weighting algorithm differs from the one in Chapter 1, where time segments
are weighted so as to minimize the sum of squared errors between the aggregated averages and the
hourly averages for wind, solar, and demand profiles.
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3.3.1 Short-term demand response
As a benchmark market outcome, we abstract from short-term demand response and
investments in energy efficiency by taking a cost-minimizing approach and obtain ref-
erence values (denoted by subscript 0) for energy service demand, electricity demand,
and electricity prices. The latter is derived from the dual variable of the market-clearing
constraint. Energy service demand and electricity demand are exogenously given since
there are no adjustments to energy efficiency in this benchmark. These reference values
account for production decisions and investments in generation and transmission capac-
ity. Under the specified emission target, we use these reference values as fixed points to
specify demand shedding and demand shifting in our model.
Demand shedding leads to more (or less) consumption, whereas demand shifting is just
the intertemporal reallocation of demand, that is, all shifts equalize over the respective
period. Shedding accounts for the response to changing prices in a specific segment in
comparison to a benchmark, that is, consumers decide to consume more (less) if the
price is lower (higher). Shifting accounts for the response to changing prices in specific
segments in comparison to prices in other segments, that is, consumers decide to shift
some of their demand from segments with high prices to segments with low prices (and
the other way around).19 Note that shifting is temporarily limited and demand cannot
be shifted for longer than a couple of time segments.
Demand Shedding As benchmark for demand shedding, we use the reference values
determined from the benchmark market outcome described above. Remembering that
si < 0 is the ability to shed, we obtain
xir (pr (s, t)) = xir,0 (s, t) + si
xir,0 (s, t)
pr,0 (s, t)
(pr (s, t)− pr,0 (s, t)) . (3.6)
Here, xir,0 (s, t) is the reference demand of a specific sector that serves as fixed point and
the second term is shed demand. The difference between the actual and the reference
price, pr (s, t)− pr,0 (s, t), is the willingness to shed. The fraction determines the overall
level and si constrains the total amount shed. Observe from Equation (3.6) that si is
defined as an own-price elasticity of demand. Thus, the magnitude of the increase is
19Regarding shedding, households might decide to switch on lights or the television when actual prices
are low (or switch off when prices are high). Regarding shifting, households might decide not to use
the dishwasher right now, but instead wait for a couple of time segments until the price is lower.
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determined by an exogenously given price elasticity, which is obtained from empirical
studies (e.g., Labandeira et al., 2017).20
Demand Shifting Figure 3.1 illustrates the effect of demand shifting between the
specific segment s and another segment s′. Superscript sh denotes outcomes after the
shifting process. Demand (gray curves show inverse demand, p (x (·))) is the same in both
segments, but supply (black curves show inverse supply, p (y (·))) is lower in s than in
s′, which leads to higher prices in s. Consumers exploit the price difference p (s)− p (s′)
and shift demand from s to s′, yielding lower prices in s but higher ones in s′ so that
the price difference becomes smaller. This process is illustrated by the arrows and the
parallel shifted demand curves (dotted gray curves show inverse demand after shifting,
psh (x (·))). There are two countervailing effects. First, demand is reduced in s (and
increased in s′) by ∆x, which is the total amount of demand shifted. Second, demand is
increased in s by ∆r (s) (and reduced in s′ by ∆r (s′)) due to consumer response (demand
shedding) to lower prices in s (and higher prices in s′).
Figure 3.1: Demand shifting from periods with low supply to periods with high supply
In the numerical model, we determine the change in demand due to shifting by us-
ing the ability to shift (s,s
′
i ) and defining average reference demand of two segments s
and s′ by x¯ir,0 (s, s′, t) := 12 (xir,0 (s, t) + xir,0 (s
′, t)) and the average reference price by
p¯r,0 (s, s′, t) := 12 (pr,0 (s, t) + pr,0 (s
′, t)). Using this, we obtain
xir (pr (s, t)) = xir,0 (s, t) + si
xir,0 (s, t)
pr,0 (s, t)
(pr (s, t)− pr,0 (s, t))
+
∑
s′ 6=s
s,s
′
i
x¯ir,0 (s, s′, t)
p¯r,0 (s, s′, t)
(pr (s, t)− pr (s′, t)) , (3.7)
20 For illustration, assume si = −0.1, xir,0 (s, t) = 50 GW, pr,0 (s, t) = 50 e/MWh. If the current price
is lower than the reference price, e.g., pr (s, t) = 40 e/MWh, the consumer increases consumption by
1 GW. The relative price difference is −20% and thus the consumed quantity increases by 2%.
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where s′ 6= s defines a subset of segments that does not contain segment s. The first
line is identical to the specification of demand shedding in Equation (3.6) and the second
line reflects demand shifting. pr (s, t) − pr (s′, t) is the price difference that determines
the willingness to shift. The fraction ensures that shifts equalize over the entire period
t, that is, the whole second line would vanish when summing up over all time segments.
Finally, s,s
′
i constrains the total amount that can be shifted.21
Setting up the objective of welfare-maximization by using the specification of energy ser-
vice demand in Equation (3.7) results in a complementary programming problem, which,
as argued above, is numerically not tractable for the large number of constraints that
are necessary to describe a multi-region electricity system. To be able to use a solu-
tion algorithm tailored to solving convex problems, we need to derive inverse (energy
service) demand for each segment that depends only on the demand in this segment.
Note that (from Equation (3.7)) energy service demand depends on the price in segment
s but also on the prices in all segments with s,s
′
i 6= 0. Given that we have one equa-
tion for each segment and the same number of unknown variables, this is, in principle,
possible. However, the resulting objective function violates the necessary convexity (the
market matrix is not positive semidefinite anymore) so that the problem is numerically
not tractable. We avoid this problem by using an approximation of energy service de-
mand. We use pr,0 (s′, t) instead of pr (s′, t) because the best guess for prices in other
segments is the reference price. Using xr (s, t) =
∑
i xir (s, t), xr,0 (s, t) =
∑
i xir,0 (s, t),
and defining Γ (s, t) := −∑i si xir,0(s,t)pr,0(s,t) and Γ (s, s′ , t) := −∑i s,s′i x¯ir,0(s,s′,t)p¯r,0(s,s′,t) for clarity, we
obtain the (approximated) inverse demand by
pr (xr (s, t)) =
(xr,0 (s, t)− xr (s, t)) + Γ (s, t) pr,0 (s, t) +∑s′ 6=s Γ (s, s′, t) pr,0 (s′, t)
Γ (s, t) +∑s′ 6=s Γ (s, s′, t) ,
(3.8)
which is a linear function of xr (s, t). Furthermore, we need to impose the constraint∑
s
∑
s′ 6=s Γ (s, s′, t) (pr (s, t)− pr,0 (s′, t)) = 0 to ensure that demand shifts—even under
the approximation—still equalize over all segments.
21 For illustration, suppose that shifting is possible between segments 1 and 2. Prices are 100 e/MWh
in segment 1 and 0 e/MWh in segment 2. Moreover, suppose that 1,2i = −0.01, p¯r,0 (1, 2, t) =
50 e/MWh, x¯ir,0 (1, 2, t) = 50 GW. The total amount shifted from segment 1 to segment 2 is 1 GW,
which accounts for 2% of the average reference demand between these two segments.
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3.3.2 Energy efficiency
Consumers obtain utility from energy services but need to buy electricity. These can be
treated as equivalent as long as there is a fixed transformation ratio from electricity into
energy services. Energy efficiency improvements increase that ratio so that less electricity
is required to consume the same amount of energy services.
This is illustrated by Figure 3.2. The demand for electricity, d, and energy services, x,
are depicted on the x-axis; the price of electricity is shown on the y-axis. The black
curve depicts inverse supply of electricity, p (y), and the solid gray curve inverse energy
service demand, p (x), which are both time independent. Initially, demand for electricity
(dashed gray curve, p (d (0))), is slightly lower than energy service demand. Improve-
ments in energy efficiency does not change demand for energy services but electricity
demand is reduced by ∆Qee (see the arrow and the dotted gray curve, p (d (t))). This
reduces the equilibrium price and consumers reduce the effect of energy efficiency im-
provements by consuming more energy services and, thus, more electricity. We call
∆ree = ∆Qee − (d (0)− d (t)) = x (t) − x (0) the rebound of energy efficiency improve-
ments and ∆ree/∆Qee is the corresponding rebound effect. By including the rebound
effect, the price finally drops from p (0) to p (t).22 Finally, observe that energy efficiency
improvements increase welfare due to lower production costs (gray area on the left) and
due to the rebound, that is, increased energy service consumption (gray area on the
right).
Figure 3.2: Rebound effect of energy efficiency improvements
We assume that energy efficiency is measured in absolute terms. First of all, this formu-
lation accounts for the sparse availability of energy efficiency investment costs, which are
only available per unit of energy efficiency (see Section 3.4). Moreover, an additive term
22The magnitude of this rebound critically depends on the shape of (inverse) demand and supply. How-
ever, in a partial equilibrium setting, the rebound never overcompensates the initial savings and thus
never leads to “backfire” (see Lemoine, 2016).
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allows to avoid a non-linear constraint and to keep the model tractable. However, under
the assumption of constant costs for energy efficiency, this formulation would result in
one unit of energy efficiency relative to the level of electricity demand becoming cheaper
over time. We counteract this effect by assuming an increasing marginal cost curve for
energy efficiency, which is also proposed in the literature (see Section 3.4).
We specify sector-specific electricity demand by
dir (s, t) = xir (s, t)− γ (t)Qeeir (t) . (3.9)
Qeeir (t) is the aggregated capacity of energy efficiency improvements that obtains endoge-
nously from investments. γ (t) is the performance factor of the respective energy efficiency
measure. The development of γ (t) over time reflects exogenous technological progress
in energy efficiency. We take this approach so as to account for the fact that exogenous
progress depends on endogenous investments in energy efficiency.
3.4 Calibration of the numerical model
In the following we describe the quantification of parameters relevant for depicting de-
mand response in the EU-REGEN model.23 We differentiate the demand side into the
industry, residential, commercial, and transport sectors. Regarding the abilities to shed
(si ) and shift demand (
s,s
′
i ), we use existing estimates that vary widely depending on the
specific sector, country, sample period, and estimation method (e.g., Labandeira et al.,
2017; Jamil and Ahmad, 2011; Huntington et al., 2017). The overview in Huntington
et al. (2017) indicates that the residential sector generally has better ability to shed de-
mand than industry, transport, or commercial sectors. This analysis uses estimates from
the meta-analysis conducted by Labandeira et al. (2017). As a default assumption, we
set the ability to shed demand to the values shown in Table 3.1. Moreover, as indicated
in Huntington et al. (2017) and Taylor et al. (2005), the ability to shift (called cross-price
elasticity in those works) seems to be moderate in comparison to the ability to shed.
Thus, we assume that the abilities to shift occurs in the four previous and subsequent
time segments and is 10% of the ability to shed (see Table 3.1).24
23 See Chapter 1 for the general calibration of the EU-REGEN model and the underlying data set for
the supply side. Remember that the base year is 2015 and the time horizon is 2050. Dispatch and
investment decisions are optimized in five-year steps, whereas 121 intra-annual segments are used for
computational reasons.
24This assumption ensures that the symmetry and positive semi-definite requirements (see Section 3.3)
are satisfied.
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Table 3.1: Abilities to shed and shift demand
Ind Res Com Tra
s,s −0.15 −0.2 −0.1 −0.1
s,ss −0.015 −0.02 −0.01 −0.01
To approximate the existing level of energy efficiency, we assume that each region’s current
level is represented by a relative measure (denoted by ζr) reported in the Odyssee Database
(see Enerdata, 2018). We assume that demand for electricity and energy services is the
same in 1990 and all differences after 1990 reflect energy efficiency improvements. We
obtain the initial level of energy efficiency from EEr (2015) = ζr dr (1990), where dr (1990)
is the annual electricity demand in 1990. Table C.1 in Appendix C.1 shows the resulting
2015 energy efficiency capacities and the values for ζr and dr (1990).
We assume that the performance factor increases by 5% with every new vintage. For
parsimony, we assume a default performance of γ (2015) = 1. Moreover, the depreciation
rate for energy efficiency investments δee is set to 10% for all sectors and regions. Both
assumptions, will be varied in Section 3.5 to test the sensitivity of our results to these
assumptions.
For demand growth projections by country, we use numbers from the e-HIGHWAY 2050
Project (see Bruninx et al. (2015) and Chapter 1), which expects an EU-wide demand
growth of 34% in the period 2015–2050. We apply the country-specific growth rates
to energy service demand and obtain the resulting electricity demand from endogenous
energy efficiency improvements (Table C.1 in Appendix C.1). Moreover, we take each
sectors’ share in the 2015 electricity demand from Enerdata (2018) and assume these
shares to remain constant over time.
Data availability is less than optimal when it comes to the costs of energy efficiency in-
vestment. We use Germany as the reference and approximate the costs function by a
stepwise function that is characterized by five classes with each of them being character-
ized by different investment costs. Each class has an upper size limit, which represents
the limited potential for energy efficiency in a class. We base our assumptions on the
costs proposed by Steurer (2016) and Huntington (2011a,b). For the industrial sector,
we use the energy efficiency supply curve for the German industrial sector from Steurer
(2016). Huntington (2011a,b) shows that the opportunity costs of energy efficiency are
lower in the residential sector than in the industry sector. Hence, we scale costs for in-
dustry energy efficiency investments by 0.5 to approximate the costs for the residential
sector. Furthermore, we adjust class sizes in proportion to the 2015 German residential
electricity demand relative to the electricity demand of the German industrial sector.
We use the same approach (scaling by a factor of 0.5 and proportional class sizes) for
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transport and commercial. Table 3.2 shows class sizes as well as costs for Germany.25 We
assume the same costs for all other regions and determine the size of each class by using
the sector-specific demand of the other regions relative to the sector-specific demand in
Germany.
Table 3.2: Energy efficiency supply classes for Germany
Class Ind Res Com Tra Res, Com, TraSize [GW] Costs [e/kW] Size [GW] Costs [e/kW]
1 2 2,500 1,23 1,40 0,11 1,250
2 3 6,000 1,85 2,10 0,16 3,000
3 1 10,000 0,62 0,70 0,05 5,000
4 1 17,000 0,62 0,70 0,05 8,500
5 1 30,000 0,62 0,70 0,05 15,000
With respect to the existing level of energy efficiency, it is distributed over classes in
ascending order, meaning that all the existing level belongs to class 1. If the existing
level exceeds the size of a class, the remaining is assigned to the next class. This allows
determining the remaining energy efficiency potential and its costs for each sector in
a region.26 Moreover, we assume that the existing level of energy efficiency does not
depreciate.
3.5 Results
We begin our presentation of results by characterizing the long-run equilibrium of the
European power market under different assumptions of demand response. Next, we
quantify the role that energy efficiency plays in reaching the goals of climate policy. We
end by discussing how the optimal level of energy efficiency (EE) changes under varying
assumptions. For parsimony, we use the term energy efficiency investments to refer to
accumulated additions.
3.5.1 Long-run market equilibrium under responsive demand
Energy efficiency Under responsive demand (i.e., with the default assumptions out-
lined in Section 3.4), the optimal (EU-wide) investments in energy efficiency gradually
increase until 2030, peaks in 2040, and then depreciates to 42 GW in 2050 (see Table 3.3),
resulting in an annual electricity demand reduction of 394 TWh (11%) in 2030 and 429
25Note that the cost assumptions in this table directly feed in the costs from energy efficiency Ceeir (·) in
Section 3.2.
26Note that the already existing level of energy efficiency reduces the remaining energy efficiency poten-
tial.
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TWh (10%) in 2050.27 In relation to the 2015 level of energy efficiency, the 2030 level
represents a further 69% increase in energy efficiency.28 Interestingly, there is a massive
build-up in the first investment period (2020), indicating that the current, EU-wide level
of energy efficiency is below its socially optimal level.
Table 3.3: Initial level of energy efficiency (2015) and investments [GW]
Region 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050
Europe 60.4 32.3 38.7 41.8 44.1 44.2 44.0 42.3
Britain 10.5 0.0 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.4
Eastern Europe-SE 3.6 3.0 4.1 4.1 5.2 5.2 5.2 5.0
Regarding future investments, we observe a heterogeneous spatial distribution. Up to
the (EU-wide) level peak in 2040, the northeast region (Eastern Europe-NE) shows with
5.8 GW (583%) the highest increase of its energy efficiency level, followed by the southeast
region (Eastern Europe-SE, 5.2 GW, 143%), the southwest region (Eastern Europe-SW,
5.5 GW, 281%), and Italy with 4.7 GW (124%). For Scandinavia, Britain, and North
Germany, it is optimal to make only minor or no investment. Table 3.3 shows the detailed
development for Britain (United Kingdom and Ireland) and Eastern Europe-SE (Bulgaria,
Greece, and Romania). The case of Britain can be explained, to a certain extent, by the
already high level of energy efficiency and a high quality of wind resources.29 Our results
indicate that it is optimal to improve energy efficiency mainly in regions that are either on
the border of the European power market or do not have access to high-quality wind (e.g.,
Eastern Europe-SE).30 In Eastern Europe-SE, we observe a catch-up effect in 2020. The
attractiveness of investments in energy efficiency after 2020 is driven by low-quality wind
resources and the absence of links to other regions due to its position on the spatial fringe.
Note that solar irradiation in Eastern Europe-SE is high, but does not influence energy
efficiency investment. In general, the diurnal solar irradiation pattern is not a substitute
for the constant demand reduction from energy efficiency, whereas the seasonal wind
pattern is a substitute.
With respect to sectoral distribution, the industrial sector (28 GW) and the residential
sector (20 GW) have much higher initial levels of energy efficiency than the commercial
27Note that the reduction in electricity demand in 2050 is larger than that in 2030, even though energy
efficiency capacity slightly decreases, due to the exogenous technological progress in energy efficiency
described in Section 3.4.
28 See Table C.1 in Appendix C.1 for regional- and sector-specific figures for the initial level of energy
efficiency, and Table C.2 in Appendix C.2 for the regional-specific development over time.
29The United Kingdom has the highest initial level of energy efficiency, followed by Germany (9.5 GW)
and France (6.2 GW). See Table C.2 in Appendix C.2 for more details.
30 In particular, when looking at Scandinavia and North Germany, it becomes obvious that access to
high-quality wind resources prevents investments in energy efficiency.
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(11 GW) and transport (1 GW) sectors.31 However, the equilibrium energy efficiency
level by demand sector shows that it is chiefly the residential, commercial, and transport
sectors that engage in investments. The transport and commercial sectors have a low
existing level of energy efficiency and thus can still make energy efficiency improvements
at relatively low cost. The residential sector increases its energy efficiency more than the
industrial sector due to lower investment costs (see Table 3.2).
Residual peak load Short-term demand response reduces residual peak load (i.e., the
time segments with the highest electricity demand net of intermittent renewables such
as wind and solar) by 8% in 2015 and by almost 33% in 2050.32 We decompose this
reduction by comparing the outcome with one where there is no investment in energy
efficiency. The contribution of energy efficiency is one-third of the total reduction and
the share of shedding and shifting accumulates to two-thirds. For the residual off-peak
load (i.e., the time segments with the lowest residual load), short-term demand response
contributes to an increase of the residual off-peak load by almost the same amount as the
residual peak load decreases.
Capacity and generation path We now turn to the long-run equilibrium of gener-
ation and capacities. Responsive demand particularly impacts substitution among tech-
nologies on the supply side. The impact of demand response can be found by comparing
market outcomes under a full demand response scenario (i.e., with short-term demand re-
sponse and energy efficiency) to those under a no demand response scenario, which is illus-
trated in Figure 3.3. The figure shows the development of annual generation for relevant
technologies under full demand response (left) and no demand response (right). Under
full demand response, wind power is the major technology, with an annual generation-
share of 24% in 2030 and 40% in 2050. Wind power is accompanied by an increasing
contribution of gas power (6% in 2030, 19% in 2050), and solar PV (3%, 11%). In 2050,
under no demand response, the accumulated share of wind and solar PV decreases from
51% to 35%, whereas the share of gas increases from 19% to 25%. Demand response is a
substitute for flexible generators such as gas turbines. When consumers are able to react
to changing prices, less gas capacity is needed to balance intermittent generation from
renewables. Moreover, the balancing does not come at a higher cost so that the relative
competitiveness of wind and solar PV increases. Furthermore, coal-powered technolo-
gies stay active longer under responsive demand because substituting gas power is less
competitive in the presence of responsive demand.
31 See Section 3.4 and Table C.1 in Appendix C.1.
32Note that no capacity investments take place in 2015, but capacities can be decommissioned and
responsive demand influences (residual) peak and off-peak load.
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Interestingly, in neither scenario is there investments in CCS on the basis of coal and gas.
However, bio power in combination with CCS (BECCS) does not enter the European
power market under responsive demand, whereas under no demand response little BECCS
will be built at the end of the time horizon.33
2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050
0
1000
2000
3000
4000
5000
G
en
er
at
io
n 
[TW
h]
(a) Full demand response
2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050
0
1000
2000
3000
4000
5000
G
en
er
at
io
n 
[TW
h]
(b) No demand response
Base BECCS Nuclear Coal Gas Wind Solar
Figure 3.3: Long-run generation path with and without demand response
The effect of responsive demand is also visible on the capacity investment path. Again,
comparing the outcomes of a full demand response scenario and no demand response sce-
nario (see Figure 3.4) shows that responsive demand not only promotes higher generation
(e.g., due to avoided curtailment) but also the build-up of wind and solar PV in the long
run. The 2050 wind power capacity rises by 5% with responsive demand and the stock
of solar PV capacity experiences an increase of 23%. In analogy to the generation path,
the further capacity build-up of both technologies is compensated for by reduced stocks
of mainly gas power as well as nuclear and BECCS.
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Figure 3.4: Change of generation capacity path with full demand response
(compared to no demand response)
It is important to emphasize that responsive demand leads to higher utilization rates
of generation capacity. For example, wind power capacity is lower under full demand
33 See the Subsection 3.5.2 on decarbonization.
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response up to 2040, although its generation is higher. Moreover, the 2050 capacity
stock across all technologies is 9% lower with responsive demand. Observe that under
responsive demand, more than 70 GW of gas capacity is decommissioned immediately in
2015. Gas capacity decreases further as the share of wind and solar PV generation in the
system increases (compare Figures 3.3 and 3.4). This effect mainly comes from short-
term demand response. The effect of energy efficiency investments on this development
is small (33.5 GW in 2030 and 31 GW in 2050).
Electricity prices and welfare The switch to more capital-intensive renewable en-
ergy technologies and energy efficiency further impacts expenditures on the supply side,
and the equilibrium electricity prices. Whereas until 2050, capital expenditures experi-
ence only a minor decrease with responsive demand, the sum of incurred variable costs
decreases by 22%.
To decompose the effects of short-term demand response and energy efficiency improve-
ments on price levels, we compare the (quantity) weighted average electricity prices over
all regions under four scenarios: no demand response, EE investments only, short-term
response only, and full demand response (see Table 3.4). Intuitively, the price is high-
est under no demand response; we thus chose this scenario as the reference and set the
level to 1. Observe that the average electricity price is decreasing with demand response.
Energy efficiency improvements play a dominant role for prices in 2020 and 2025. The
build-up of energy efficiency capacity (see Table 3.3) leads to a price drop of 13% in 2020,
which is phased out over time. From 2030 on, the impact of short-term demand response
is dominant. In 2050, short-term demand response accounts for almost two-thirds of the
price decrease, whereas energy efficiency delivers only one-third, which is in line with the
impact shares of short- and long-term demand response on residual peak load.
Table 3.4: Change of (EU-weighted average) electricity prices under different levels of
demand response (compared to no demand response)
Scenario 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050
EE investments only 1.00 0.87 0.93 0.93 0.95 0.98 0.97 0.99
Short-term response only 0.99 0.98 0.96 0.95 0.95 0.96 0.95 0.95
Full demand response 0.98 0.87 0.89 0.90 0.92 0.92 0.92 0.92
in Britain 1.00 0.95 0.91 0.90 0.95 0.90 0.91 0.89
in Eastern Europe-SE 1.00 0.65 0.67 0.70 0.78 0.85 0.91 0.91
All regions experience a long-run price decrease, which is in line with Gambardella et al.
(2016). The northern regions experience the strongest impact due to their common
characteristic of high-quality wind resources.34 In the case of Britain, responsive demand
34 See Table C.3 in Appendix C.2 for a regional differentiation of prices under full demand response.
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can reduce the 2030 equilibrium price by 5% and for 2050 by another 6%. The lowest
decrease is in the southwestern region (4% in 2050). For Eastern Europe-SE, prices
drop due to the build-up of energy efficiency (see Table 3.3). However, in the long-run
(relative) prices are increasing again and, finally, are higher than those in Britain because
the higher wind potential in Britain leads to more intra-annual price differences so that
the effect of short-term demand response is higher.
We identify the welfare implications of energy efficiency by again decomposing the effect
of short-term demand response and energy efficiency. Results show that the availability
of short-term demand response (short-term response only scenario) can maintain 90% the
overall discounted European welfare (for the time period 2015–2050) in the power market
under the full demand response scenario. Only 10% of overall European welfare hinge on
the optimal adjustment of energy efficiency. However, it is important to emphasize that
we cannot evaluate the actual welfare effect of short-term demand response. Short-term
demand response comes at no costs (in contrast to energy efficiency) in our framework,
its level is exogenously set, and hence we do not determine its welfare-maximizing level.
Rebound effect As described in Subsection 3.3.2, energy efficiency investment leads
to a rebound effect due to reduced prices.35 Lower prices do not occur only due to energy
efficiency improvements but also due to the dynamic adjustment of capacities. To distill
the rebound effect from energy efficiency investments, we need to determine the change in
electricity demand due to the dynamic adjustment of capacities and short-term demand
response. To do so, we first determine electricity demand under the short-term response
only scenario that fully abstracts from energy efficiency investments.36 The rebound
for this scenario is determined by calculating the expected savings, and subtracting the
observed decrease in electricity demand over time (61 TWh for 2030, see Table 3.5).
Second, we compare this result with the rebound under the full demand response scenario
(103 TWh for 2030). The rebound due to energy efficiency investments is given by the
difference between these two scenarios (42 TWh). To calculate the final rebound effect,
we just need to divide the rebound by expected savings (see Figure 3.2). Table 3.5 shows
a rebound effect from energy efficiency investments of 9% in 2030 as well as in 2050.
In the following, we focus on the rebound effect from energy efficiency investments. Ob-
serve that the rebound effect remains constant over the covered time horizon. The mag-
nitude of this effect is rather small compared to the empirical results of other studies
(e.g., Wang et al., 2016; Chakravarty et al., 2013; Wei and Liu, 2017). The reason for
35Note from Section 3.1 that we cover the direct (or partial equilibrium) rebound effect only and abstract
from the indirect (or general equilibrium) one.
36Note that, under this scenario, there is still the initial level of energy efficiency.
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Table 3.5: Decomposition of rebound effect
Scenario Category 2030 2050
Short-term only Full rebound from lower prices [TWh] 61 99
Full demand response
Full rebound from lower prices [TWh] 103 137
Rebound from EE investments [TWh] 42 38
Rebound effect from EE investments [%] 9 9
the difference is threefold. First, our analysis does not capture the general equilibrium
rebound effect (see Section 3.1). However, Böhringer et al. (2018) suggest that the gen-
eral equilibrium part of the rebound is rather small (16.5% for electricity in the EU)
in comparison to the partial one (57%). Second, empirical studies rely on engineering
projections, which might overestimate the true savings due to, for example, consumer het-
erogeneity (see Fowlie et al., 2018; Allcott and Greenstone, 2017). Third, the size of the
rebound effect is driven by the sensitivity of short-term demand response. For example,
higher price elasticities of demand lead to greater quantity adjustments. In Table 3.6, we
verify this for 2050 by using doubled to fivefold abilities to shed and shift (see Table 3.1
for the default values).37 Doubling the abilities leads to a more than doubled rebound
effect, whereas the fivefold abilities result in a rebound effect of 29%. The qualitative
result—that the rebound effect is larger when gradually increasing the abilities—is not
surprising. More interestingly, even with fivefold abilities to shed and shift, we cannot
confirm that the rebound effect is of much relevance for the long-run equilibrium of the
European power market.
Table 3.6: Sensitivity of rebound effect in 2050
Ability levels s, s,s
′
1× 2× 3× 4× 5×
Rebound from EE investments [TWh] 37 81 104 115 125
Rebound effect from EE investments [%] 9 19 24 27 29
3.5.2 The role of energy efficiency for decarbonization
Abatement channels In Section 3.5.1, we show that energy efficiency investments re-
duce annual electricity demand by 10% in 2050. Now, we want to shed further light on
energy efficiency by analyzing its role for decarbonization. We quantify the contribution
of different abatement channels—intermittent renewables such as wind and solar, energy
efficiency, fuel switching, and nuclear power—to decarbonization of the European power
market. We do so by comparing the market outcomes under a climate policy (80% emis-
sion reduction target in our default version) and under the absence of a climate policy
37 For example, doubling the ability of the industrial sector would lead to s,s = −0.3 and s,ss = −0.03.
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(no reduction target).38 Figure 3.5 shows the shares of different abatement channels.
The uppermost line represents emissions under the absence of a climate policy. Emis-
sions increase from 1,040 MtCO2 in 2015 (by 15%) to 1,200 MtCO2 in 2050. The lowest
line shows emissions under an 80% reduction target, so that emissions reach a level of
290 MtCO2 in 2050. The area in between the uppermost and lowest line represents emis-
sion reductions due to a climate policy. We find that the majority of emission reductions
comes from intermittent renewables (53% in 2050) and fuel switching (36%). Observe
that emissions drop in 2020 due to investments in energy efficiency, even without a cli-
mate policy (see initial drop of emissions in Figure 3.5). Energy efficiency investments
increase even further until they peak in 2040 (see Table 3.3). However, in analogy to the
results in Section 3.5.1, energy efficiency plays a minor role for meeting the reduction
target in the long run (11% in 2050). The reason is that energy efficiency investments are
beneficial even without a climate policy. Hence, in presence of a climate policy, energy
efficiency helps with the total burden of reduction and alleviates the emission target (ob-
serve that until 2030 there is almost no difference between the policy and the no policy
scenario). This allows a technology-mix with higher emission intensity so that coal power
stays longer active (see Figure 3.3).39
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Figure 3.5: Contribution of different abatement channels to climate policy
To distill the effect of short-term demand response on a climate target, we conduct the
same exercise as in the previous paragraph while omitting short-term demand response.
The contribution of intermittent renewables to emission reductions falls to 49% (compared
to 53% with short-term demand response). This is compensated for by an increased role
for fuel switching (49%). Thus, when defining the contribution of short-term demand
response to decarbonization (under a reduction target) as the increased role of renewable
38The absence of a climate policy does not necessarily mean that there will be no investment in energy
efficiency, renewables, or gas power as well as no utilizing of short-term demand response.
39The mechanism is similar to the finding of Böhringer and Rosendahl (2010) that an emission reduction
target in combination with a quota for renewables promotes the dirtiest technology, meaning that coal
stays and gas leaves the market. In our model, we do not have a green quota but, rather, a central
planner investing in energy efficiency.
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energies, it contributes to 4% of emission reductions. The mechanism behind is discussed
in Subsection 3.5.1: the non-existence of a cheap flexibility option (short-term demand
response) reduces the relative competitiveness of intermittent renewables in comparison
to gas power. Without short-term demand response, energy efficiency plays an even
smaller role (2%), either due to energy efficiency investments that are beneficial even
without a climate target or due to substituting effects with gas power.
Marginal abatement costs The impact of a climate policy in economic terms is cap-
tured by the marginal abatement costs, which is the dual variable of the carbon-emission
constraint in our model. As shown in Table 3.7, the marginal abatement costs increase
over time with a tight climate target. This holds for no demand response as well as
for scenarios with demand response. Responsive demand has its merits in reducing the
costs of the technology that abates on the margin. The marginal abatement costs are
significantly lower with full demand response (51 compared to 73 e/tCO2 for no demand
response). However, energy efficiency and short-term demand response are equally im-
portant for lowering the marginal abatement costs. We calculate this by using scenarios
that either abstract from short-term demand response (EE investments only) or from
investments in energy efficiency (short-term response only). The results are shown in
Table 3.7. Interestingly, the interaction of both mechanisms holds potential for reducing
the marginal abatement costs. Gas power serves as base load generator as well as a flex-
ible generator to balance the supply of renewables such as wind and solar. Now, energy
efficiency reduces the need for base load gas power in the EE investments only case but,
still, gas power is needed due to its flexibility. In contrast, with short-term response
only, gas power is less needed as a flexibility option, but is still required as base load
generator. Thus, gas power is still crucial for the marginal abatement technology. This
prevents stronger price drops with regard to energy efficiency investments or short-term
demand response. However, combining both demand side measures has a subadditive
effect because the need for gas power drops tremendously.
Table 3.7: Marginal abatement costs [e/tCO2]
Scenario and climate target 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050
No demand response (80%) 0 0 0 8 14 26 46 73
EE investments only (80%) 0 0 0 2 4 18 34 65
Short-term response only (80%) 0 0 0 3 8 19 36 64
Full demand response (80%) 0 0 0 1 1 12 27 51
No demand response (95%) 0 2 10 17 25 44 76 91
Full demand response (95%) 0 0 0 3 13 25 58 82
When looking at a tighter climate target (i.e., a 95% reduction target), the ability of
responsive demand to reduce the marginal abatement costs diminishes. While demand
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response reduced the carbon price in 2050 by 29% under an 80% reduction target, de-
mand response accounts for a reduction of only 10% under a 95% target (see Table 3.7).
Moreover, the marginal abatement costs increase significantly, for three reasons. First,
the tighter climate policy is pushing almost all coal and a significant share of gas genera-
tion (and capacity) out of the market. More expensive abatement technologies (BECCS,
nuclear) must be used. Second, the tighter climate target has a feedback effect on the
ability to reduce carbon emissions with intermittent renewables. The ability to shed and
shift demand stays constant but less gas capacity reduces the system flexibility and thus
the ability to balance the intermittent supply of wind and solar so that the subadditive
effect from the less stringent climate target above vanishes. Third, more expensive energy
efficiency measures will be used to allow for increased carbon intensity of the remaining
generation-mix.
3.5.3 Robustness of investments in energy efficiency
We now relax assumptions made in Section 3.4 about depreciation rate, initial perfor-
mance factor, and exogenous technological progress of energy efficiency in order to look
into the sensitivity of energy efficiency investments. We identified energy efficiency as
one way of reducing carbon emissions, but its final impact on demand (10% reduction)
and emission reduction (11%) is small compared to that of intermittent renewables and
fuel switching. The assumptions about costs and performance of the latter two are based
on a broad literature (e.g., Schröder et al., 2013), whereas the assumptions of short-term
demand response and energy efficiency are less well established.40 For example, the en-
ergy efficiency supply curve is grounded on Steurer (2016) (for the industrial sector),
whereas reduced costs for other sectors rely on Huntington (2011a,b). Moreover, there is
an ongoing debate about the size of the energy efficiency gap (Gillingham and Palmer,
2014) and the reasons for it (Fowlie et al., 2018; Allcott and Greenstone, 2017).41
Depreciation rate sensitivity Note that the carbon constraint is tightening, espe-
cially, from 2030 to 2050 (see Figure 3.5). However, we see that this has no influence
on energy efficiency investments with almost no new investments in energy efficiency be-
tween 2030 and 2050 (see Table 3.3). We test the robustness of this result by varying
the depreciation rate (δee). Table 3.8 shows the results. Note that the electricity demand
reduction refers to a situation without any (additional) energy efficiency investments.
Increasing or decreasing the default depreciation rate of 10% leads to minor adjustments
40Note that assumptions about short-term demand response have already been tested in Table 3.6.
41We refrain from showing sensitivity on energy efficiency potentials and costs because the effect of
varying the performance factor is analogous. For example, doubling the performance factor has the
same effect as doubling the energy efficiency potential by class while assuming half costs.
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in investment but does not change the overall picture. Energy efficiency constantly leads
to a reduction in electricity demand of around 10%. Also the lack of a build-up between
2030 and 2050 remains.
Table 3.8: Sensitivity regarding depreciation rate
Depreciation rate δee [%] 0 1 5 10 15
EE investments until 2030 [GW] 44.05 43.97 42.47 41.78 39.56
Electricity demand reduction [%] 11.59 11.58 11.22 11.17 10.64
Performance parameter sensitivity In Section 3.1, we discuss the energy efficiency
gap and provide an overview of arguments on this topic. One explanation for the energy
efficiency gap are exaggerated engineering projections. Within the framework of this
chapter, this can be captured through a sensitivity analysis on the delivered impact of
energy efficiency, that is, the performance factor (γ (t); see Equation (3.9)). Values smaller
than 1 represent a reduced performance, for which there is empirical evidence (e.g., Allcott
and Greenstone, 2017; Fowlie et al., 2018). Varying this parameter shows the effect of
the delivered impact of energy efficiency on its equilibrium level (see Table 3.9). For
low performance values, there is no investment in energy efficiency.42 For γ > 0.15, the
central planer starts investing in energy efficiency; however, the results show that a level of
γ ≥ 0.35 is required to achieve any significant investment in energy efficiency. Assuming a
better energy efficiency performance and hence going beyond the default value of 1, leads
to a minor increase in the optimal energy efficiency level. As a consequence, the actual
electricity demand reduction is minor for small values of γ and increases to 19% when
reaching an energy efficiency performance of γ = 1.5. Observe that the robustness of the
economic viability of energy efficiency investments is strongly dependent on their delivered
impact. The results identify a threshold of 0.35 before there will be any significant
investment in energy efficiency, which is close to the calculated value of true savings in
Fowlie et al. (2018).
Table 3.9: Sensitivity regarding performance parameter
Initial performance parameter γ 0.2 0.5 0.7 1.0 1.2 1.5
EE investments until 2030 [GW] 4.71 29.14 33.57 41.8 42.66 47.58
Electricity demand reduction [%] 0 4 6 11 14 19
Technological progress sensitivity As a default assumption, the performance pa-
rameter increases by 5% every five years. The impact of this exogenous technological
42Note that the variation discussed in this paragraph refers to the value of γ in 2015. We still assume
the 5% increase of γ over time due to exogenous technological progress.
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progress is tested by varying the initial performance (γ in 2015) between 0 and 1.5, and
omitting the increase of γ over time or using even higher rates (10% and 15%). The
resulting equilibrium levels of energy efficiency for 2030 are shown in Figure 3.6. Ob-
serve that the level of energy efficiency investments depends very little on the assumed
exogenous technological progress. However, higher progress rates tend to increase energy
efficiency investment. In particular, for values around the threshold of 0.35, that was
identified in the previous paragraph, the assumed progress has an influence, but for our
default assumption of γ = 1 there is almost no difference.
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Figure 3.6: Energy efficiency investments for varying performance and technological
progress in 2030
3.6 Discussion and conclusion
In this chapter, we developed a framework for implementing short-term demand response
and energy efficiency in a multi-region partial equilibrium power market model. We use
this framework to determine the optimal level of energy efficiency investment and its
implications for the transition of the European power market under a climate target.
Some of the extant literature emphasizes that the interaction between short-term demand
response and energy efficiency might lead to much lower energy demand reductions due
to the rebound effect. We calculate a rebound effect from energy efficiency investment
of 9% in 2050, so that electricity demand is finally reduced by only 10%. This outcome
is robust with respect to the depreciation rate, performance, and the assumed rate of
exogenous technological progress in energy efficiency. Higher rebounds are calculated for
more sensitive short-term demand response. Having in mind that the empirical literature
indicates that the short-term sensitivity of electricity demand is rather low (e.g., Laban-
deira et al., 2017), rebounds higher than 30% are extremely unlikely and the future role
of the rebound effect, at least in the power sector, seems to be overplayed.43
43Gillingham et al. (2013) use this wording for the estimated rebound effect in the US car sector.
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We show that the merits of demand response in supply side adjustment also need to
be considered. Short-term demand response and energy efficiency enhance the role of
wind and solar power, and change the composition of the stock of dispatchable technolo-
gies. Energy efficiency reduces demand and thus the need for base load generators so
that nuclear capacity diminishes. Short-term demand response offers flexibility in inte-
grating intermittent renewables and hence diminishes the role of gas power; bio power
with CCS vanishes completely. Coal power stays active even longer because energy effi-
ciency alleviates the emission reduction constraint for the supply side, which allows for
a higher emission intensity across the remaining technologies and hence increases the
relative competitiveness of coal power.
Investments in energy efficiency contribute 11% toward meeting the 80% emission reduc-
tion target of 2050 (compared to 1990). Here, renewables (53%) and fuel switching (36%)
play dominant roles. Energy efficiency investments and short-term demand response re-
duce the carbon price almost equally (reduction of 8 or 9 e/tCO2, respectively). We find
subadditive effects when the measures are combined (reduction of 22 e/tCO2), so that
the final carbon price is at 51 e/tCO2 in 2050. Energy efficiency reduces generation of
gas power, which still remains crucial to the marginal abatement technology because it
offers the necessary flexibility to integrate intermittent renewables. As soon as short-term
demand response is also adding to the ability to deal with intermittency, instead of gas
power playing this role, the carbon price drop is reinforced.
To conclude, the market value44 of energy efficiency drops with high shares of intermittent
renewables. If wind turbines and solar PV generate plenty, prices in the power market are
close to or even zero and a reduction of electricity demand has no additional value to the
market. Thus, energy efficiency (and also the connected rebound effect) plays a minor role
for the long-run equilibrium of the European power market, but it is rather a technology
required for the mid-run between 2020 and 2030. Instead of relying on energy efficiency,
the focus of policy makers should rather turn towards short-term demand response, which
plays a crucial role for the future technology-mix. A first step would be to incentivize
short-term demand response by promoting the installation of smart meters in household,
subsidizing the development of smart devices that communicate with smart meters and
can be controlled remotely, and, even more important, requiring electric utilities to offer
flexible tariffs; otherwise consumers do not benefit from the temporal reallocation of
electricity demand.
The impact of the short-term demand response, which is cautiously estimated in this
chapter, is not small. More than 70 GW of gas power capacity would be decommis-
44 See Lamont (2008) for the definition of the market value of a generation technology.
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sioned immediately. Between 2020 and 2030 almost no additional gas capacity is needed,
whereas not considering the possibility of demand shifting and shedding leads to a mas-
sive build-up of gas capacity already in the mid-run. Moreover, an electricity system
with centrally located gas capacity has substantially different implications with regard
to network topology than a system with decentralized consumers offering flexibility by
means of short-term demand response. This emphasizes the importance of prompt ac-
tion by policy makers to avoid path dependencies, which would lead to a suboptimal
implementation of the transformation path of the European power market and delays in
the required infrastructure adjustment. In particular, policies suitable to promote the
installation of gas power, such as capacity mechanisms, seem to work against the notion
of reaching a socially optimal technology-mix for this path.
This chapter is a first step toward a consistent integration of the impacts of demand
response on the equilibrium outcome of power markets. However, conclusions come with
some caveats. First, the integration of demand shifting requires an approximation to
keep the model numerically tractable. Second, we are able to derive a first estimate for
the energy efficiency supply curve, but its representation is stylistic and its quantification
is based on a scant extant research. Thus, better data quality on potentials and costs of
energy efficiency measures—and also with respect to temporal demand profiles and elas-
ticities by sectors and regions—would lead to more precise results. Third, our framework
captures only the effects of a partial equilibrium setting. Similar research should be con-
ducted with frameworks that cover economy-wide effects (as done in Abrell and Rausch
(2016) for transmission infrastructure). Fourth, we abstract from storage as another—in
addition to gas power, transmission, and short-term demand response—major flexibility
option and from investments in the ability to respond to prices in the short-term.
Chapter 4
The Gap Between Energy Policy
Challenges and Model Capabilities
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4.1 Introduction
The operation of energy systems has become increasingly challenging over the last decades
for multiple reasons. First, the liberalization of energy markets has broken up vertically
integrated structures to strengthen competition and lower supply costs. As a result, a va-
riety of new stakeholders with different interests entered the energy system (Asane-Otoo,
2016). Second, renewable energy sources (RES) have increasingly been used to reduce
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions in the electricity sector, among other aims and benefits.
Due to their intermittent nature, balancing supply and demand as well as preventing grid
bottlenecks will require more short-term coordination between load, generation, and grid.
The trend is set to continue in the future if the climate targets of the Paris Agreement
are translated into legally binding rules and regulations. Meanwhile, energy systems are
subject to developments in different sectors: electricity, heating, cooling, and transporta-
tion. A stronger integration of the sectors is essential to integrate high RES shares into
the energy system and to lower GHG emissions in the heating and transportation sec-
tor (e.g., EC, 2016; Gerbonia et al., 2017). Thus, interdependencies between previously
mainly decoupled subsystems will arise.1
As a consequence, the regulatory framework has to adapt to technological advances. For
example, to handle the rising complexity of energy systems, grid operators are starting
to rely on smart grids to balance load and supply. Moreover, smart markets2 ensure
an efficient allocation according to consumer preferences. Such technological advances
change the system dynamics and require suitable regulations to ensure a level playing
field for all stakeholders (Lo Schiavo et al., 2013).
In the same way, numerical energy system models have become more sophisticated and
diverse with increasing complexity of real-world energy systems (Pfenninger et al., 2014).
Despite their differences, many of the existing numerical models are used to answer
similar questions. Models may provide different results, which lead to contradictory
policy implications and recommendations. For example, some models see Power-to-X
(PtX) technologies, that is, the conversion of electricity into other energy commodities,
as an integral part for achieving national and international climate targets, whereas others
hardly expect PtX in the energy system until 2050 (see Gerbert et al., 2018; Bründlicher
1 This especially holds if policy-making targets at the cost-efficient reduction of total GHG emissions
across sectors, where GHG emission reduction options are chosen according to their marginal abate-
ment costs. This can, for instance, be achieved by integrating the heat and/or transportation sector
into the European Union Emission Trading System (EU ETS).
2 Within smart markets computational intelligence supports market participants by gathering as well
as assessing information. Hereby, an improved (or even autonomous) decision-making within com-
plex market structures, which would otherwise overwhelm the cognitive capacity of humans, can be
facilitated (Ketter, 2014).
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et al., 2017). In general, varying results can be caused by either different assumptions
with respect to the development of technologies, or by differences in the general model
structure. Moreover, due to a lack of transparency and standardization in the field of
energy system modeling (Pfenninger et al., 2018), it is likely that some models might have
been less suitable to answer specific research questions in the first place. We perceive this
lack of transparency as a gap between the modeler’s and the policy maker’s perspective.
Consequently, policy makers should choose models, which capture the characteristics that
are relevant for answering a certain policy question. Our work contributes to solving that
problem by linking current energy policy issues to technical model requirements and thus
closing the gap between modelers and policy makers. The method applied is based on
the review and classification of the salient characteristics of a sample of energy system
models and the clustering of energy policy issues. The considered models cover different
regions of the world to provide a holistic overview.
We seek to increase the transparency between policy makers and modelers, which yields
benefits for both: By linking policy issues with model characteristics, we identify crucial
model components that are required to address specific policy issues. This information
helps policy makers to assess the ability of models to answer specific policy questions
without going into the technical details of models. In addition, the proposed methods
can assist policy makers and modelers in identifying potential research gaps. If a lack of
suitable models regarding an urgent policy issue prevails, policy makers might consider
funding specific model enhancement. Furthermore, the linkage of energy policy issues
with model characteristics will help modelers recognize their model strengths and weak-
nesses in relation to the questions they can answer compared to other state-of-the-art
models. Our findings can also support energy modelers in tailoring their models to the
underlying issue to avoid misspecified models.
This chapter sets a focus on models for power markets in the light of low-carbon policies.
We follow a tripartite analysis, which is organized as follows: First, a classification system
is developed that enables us to compare a large variety of model types while preserving
a high level of detail with respect to model characteristics. To create a classification
system that is capable of reflecting all relevant model specialties, a thorough review of
existing approaches from the literature is conducted in Section 4.2. Building on this,
we propose a novel model classification framework in Section 4.3 and apply it to a large
sample of relevant energy models whose selection was validated by external modeling
experts. Second, we develop a method to cluster the diverse issues with respect to the
decarbonization of energy systems into a multi-level classification system in Section 4.4.
For this purpose, the chapter reviews a range of publications and identifies key policy
questions. Then, we link policy questions with the model characteristics. This is done
4.2. Literature review 103
by identifying the technical minimum requirements of models for a sample of energy
policy questions to create an interface between the policy maker’s and the modeler’s
perspective. Third, we develop a metric to measure the suitability of energy models for
answering particular energy policy questions in Section 4.5. By applying the metric to
our set of models and policy questions, we can reveal strengths and weaknesses of existing
energy models. A second metric distinguishes between model features that are state-of-
the-art and others, which are rather underrepresented in existing energy models. Finally,
the chapter closes with conclusions and policy implications in Section 4.6.
4.2 Literature review
As described in the previous section, the population of models has become more het-
erogeneous with respect to the model specializations. Over the last few decades, the
development of system tools for the modeling of energy issues has been seen as crucial
(Urban et al., 2007; Nakata, 2004). In the following, we review literature on classification
schemes for energy system models, which allows us to derive a classification fitting the
linkage of model features and energy policy questions. The extant model comparison
literature can be divided into four categories:
• Category A Creating an overview of models by describing the model structure and
the conducted studies. (Focus: model description)
• Category B Creating an overview of models by developing a classification scheme
either through the combination of existing schemes or through the introduction of
new ones. (Focus: classification scheme)
• Category C Comparing models based on a classification scheme and identifying
their field of use or rating them for different fields. (Focus: identification of field of
use)
• Category D3 Comparing models based on a classification scheme to identify a set
of suitable models for a given issue. (Focus: identification of suitable models)
Almost none of the reviewed contributions contains elements of just one of these cate-
gories. Hence, a combination of categories is common, ranging from two to three cate-
gories per reference. Parts of the reviewed literature do not aim at the definition of a clas-
sification scheme. Therefore, we do not emphasize the main contribution of these works,
but rather focus on the insights that are relevant to model classification approaches.
3 This category may also be defined as a subcategory to C. Nevertheless, we want to distinguish between
those two categories since the scope of Category C is much wider.
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In summary, both, older and more recent literature, use a combination of criteria that are
related to the structure and the underlying mathematical approach of the models as well
as criteria that are related to the intended purpose and the field of use. We observed that
the selection of these quantitative and qualitative criteria depends on the scope and goals
of each individual work. Hence, older and newer contributions are equally important to
the identification of a suitable model classification scheme. In the following, we present
the literature in a chronological order,4 sorted from the past to the present. Finally,
Table 4.1 summarizes the key aspects of the literature review.
van Beeck (1999) presented a classification of energy models that aimed at local energy
planning in developing countries. The author proposes a classification scheme to provide
insight in the differences and similarities between energy models and thus facilitates the
selection of the suitable energy models. A descriptive review of the (in their view) most
relevant publications in the field of power market modeling is presented by Ventosa et al.
(2005). A total of 36 models are categorized among three major trends: unit commitment
optimization models,5 market equilibrium models, and simulation models. Jebaraj and
Iniyan (2006) published a broad overview of models as of 2005. It covers different types of
models, containing energy planning models, energy supply-demand models, forecasting
models, renewable energy models, emission reduction models, optimization models, as
well as models based on neural networks and fuzzy theory. They identified important
factors that are either incorporated in the objective function or as constraints and linked
them to specific topics.
Möst and Keles (2010) presented a review and classification of stochastic models especially
dealing with price risks in power markets. Moreover, the interaction between energy prices
and technology choice are analyzed. In the same year, Connolly et al. (2010) analyzed
37 models (chosen and categorized based on a survey) according to their suitability to
assess the integration of RES into energy systems. The models were categorized among
their type and other characteristics, aiming to enable decision-makers at picking the
most suitable model based on specific objectives. They distinguish the objectives by
the type and scope of the underlying energy system, ranging from the analysis of a
single generation unit up to the analysis of the whole energy system. It was shown
that depending on the objective in place, different tools are most suited for the analysis.
Bhattacharyya and Timilsina (2010) conducted a systematic comparative approach of
4 The preferred order of sorting the literature would be “type of models analyzed” or “type of classifica-
tions used”. Both sorting approaches are not possible, because no “type” of model can be determined
without a universal classification scheme and the identified classification criteria overlap strongly.
5 Ventosa et al. (2005) use the term “single-firm optimization models”. In the context of other model
classification terminology, this translates to unit commitment models for a single actor in the electricity
sector.
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ten energy system models. The purpose was the identification of suitable models to
evaluate environmental policies of developing countries. They emphasized that most
models are unable to capture certain aspects of developing countries such as non-monetary
transactions.6 Foley et al. (2010) described the changing role of electricity system models
due to the unique requirements of liberalized markets. The trading of emission certificates
and the rising share of RES were also identified as factors, which increase the complexity
of the modeled system. Seven electricity system models are described in detail, providing
information on which model is best-suited to analyze different aspects of the electricity
system. Bazmi and Zahedi (2011), however, focus in their work mainly on the power
sector and optimization techniques. They emphasized the effectiveness of modeling for
policy makers in assessing different policies in the power supply sector. In Deutsch et al.
(2011), several energy system models are compared in the context of energy scenario
analyses. They concluded that further efforts are necessary for the definition of a suitable
classification scheme.
DeCarolis et al. (2012) reviewed twelve models7 with respect to their transparency. Their
findings suggest that in most cases, the replication of model results is currently impossi-
ble. Timmerman et al. (2013) carried out a review to identify energy models suited for
modeling the energy system of an industrial park. The energy model classifications were
screened for adequate model characteristics and accordingly, a confined number of models
was selected, and described. Pfenninger et al. (2014) analyzed models, which are known
to be relevant for energy policy analyses. They identified four key model groups, namely
energy system optimization models, energy system simulation models, power system and
electricity market models, and qualitative and mixed-method scenarios, and categorized
their models accordingly. For each group, key challenges were identified and development
recommendations were proposed. Després et al. (2015) presented a detailed typology
and applied it to compare five models with regard to their representation of power sec-
tor characteristics. Hall and Buckley (2016) proposed a model classification scheme to
facilitate model comparison. Based on the UK model landscape and the appearances of
models in the literature, 22 models were classified exemplary. Mahmud and Town (2016)
did a review of computer tools for modeling electric vehicle energy requirements and their
impact on power distribution networks. They reviewed 67 models to facilitate a selection
of the most suitable tools for specific tasks. Olsthoorn et al. (2016) reviewed 15 models
6 Shukla (1995) discusses the differences between modern western markets and markets of developing
countries. In-kind payments are mentioned as an example for the “informal sector” of developing
countries.
7 DeCarolis et al. (2012) use the term “energy economy optimization (EEO) models”. Subcategories of
EEO models are defined as “computable general equilibrium (CGE) and technology explicit, partial
equilibrium (TE/PE) models”, whereas we would translate the TE models as “energy system models”
in the context of this chapter.
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Table 4.1: Overview of reviewed literature
Reference A B C D Relevant goals or results
van Beeck (1999) X X x X Classifies models to identify the most suitable ones for local
energy planning for regions experiencing rapid development.
Ventosa et al.
(2005)
X X X x Identifies power market modeling trends by classifying and
characterizing the modeling approaches. Also makes quali-
tative statements for the strengths of those approaches.
Jebaraj and Iniyan
(2006)
X x X x Identifies field of use for different types of energy system
models.
Möst and Keles
(2010)
X X X x Overview and classification of stochastic models for price
risks in power markets.
Connolly et al.
(2010)
X x x x Guideline on how to find the ideal energy tool for RES in-
tegration. Concludes that classifying by field of use is the
most promising approach.
Bhattacharyya and
Timilsina (2010)
X X x X Reviews energy system models regarding their suitability for
policy analysis in developing countries. Makes qualitative
statements.
Foley et al. (2010) X x X x Identifies suitable model approaches for the new challenges
to liberalized markets.
Bazmi and Zahedi
(2011)
X x x x Summarizes literature regarding energy system modeling.
Deutsch et al.
(2011)
X X X x Compares models for scenario analyses and discusses the
strengths of the models.
DeCarolis et al.
(2012)
X x X x Enhances transparency of energy economy optimization
model results based on their modeling approaches.
Timmerman et al.
(2013)
X x x X Uses an existing classification scheme to identify the best
suitable model for low carbon business parks.
Pfenninger et al.
(2014)
X X X x Identifies four key classification criteria out of the numerous
existing classification schemes. Also rates the modeling ap-
proaches in regard to their suitability for current and future
issues.
Després et al.
(2015)
X X X x Develops a new classification scheme applicable to both
power sector models and long-term energy system models.
Hall and Buckley
(2016)
X X X x Systematic review of literature and policy papers since 2008.
Compares all available energy system models with an appro-
priate classification scheme.
Mahmud and Town
(2016)
X x X x Analyzes and identifies modeling tools for the integration of
electric vehicles into the electricity grid.
Olsthoorn et al.
(2016)
X X x x Compares existing computer tools for RES and storage in-
tegration and defines categories for the different models.
to integrate storage and RES into district heating systems.8 Current modeling methods
are further compared with respect to computational limitations, level of precision, and
implementation of uncertainty.
This literature review serves as a basis for the development of a suitable model classifica-
tion scheme for the purpose of creating the linkage between modelers and policy makers.
A list including a summary of the reviewed literature and their respective allocation
across categories is presented in Table 4.1. The model classification scheme, presented
8 Although heating is not in the focus of our work, the models analyzed by the mentioned study mostly
include energy system models, which are also used for analyses on the electricity sector.
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in Section 4.3 is based on information from the literature belonging to both, Category A
and B.
In Categories C and D, models are classified according to their field of use and/or to their
specific issue. Thereby, they are regarded as static tools which are not subject to change.
In contrast to these categories, the method we propose acknowledges that models evolve
and can be used for different purposes. Similar to literature from Category A and B,
we created a classification scheme, which can describe the model landscape transparently
and based on their structure and most specific characteristics: the model features. Hence,
the applicability of the models is based on the individual model features and not on the
model as a whole, static entity. This makes our approach much more flexible since all
models, which can be broken down to the set of criteria, we define in Section 4.3, can be
easily included into our comparison.
4.3 Model comparison method
Within this chapter, a classification scheme for energy system models is developed. The
aim of this framework is to provide a structured evaluation tool to facilitate the selection of
suitable models for investigating specific research questions. The set of model comparison
criteria is presented in the subsequent Section 4.3.1. The selection of models is described
in Section 4.3.2. The evaluation is then applied in Section 4.3.3 within a two-step process,
which comprises a first evaluation followed by a review to limit the human error.
4.3.1 Set of model comparison criteria
The extant literature offers several different sets of criteria to classify and compare energy
system models (see Section 4.2). The criteria used range from technical descriptions
of the model type to detailed model characteristics like the representation of specific
power generating technologies. Nevertheless, to meet the challenges, which are present
in current and future energy markets and to cover several issues connected to the future
development, an adapted classification scheme is needed. We base our criteria catalog on
the work of Hall and Buckley (2016) since this framework already contains most aspects
that are relevant to capture the general structure of models. Yet, in contrast to Hall and
Buckley (2016), the selection of criteria was expanded by a number of aspects to account
for important issues with respect to future energy markets. The complete list of criteria
is presented in Figure 4.1.
In this context, Pfenninger et al. (2014) formulated four structural changes for energy
system modeling, including responsive demand, intermittent supply, distributed energy
generation, and spatially varying potential of RES. These changes lead to the following
4.3. Model comparison method 108
challenges to energy system modeling: (1) resolving details in time and space, (2) bal-
ancing uncertainty, transparency and reproducibility, (3) developing methods to address
the growing complexity of the energy system, and (4) integrating human behavior, social
risks, and opportunities.
We grouped criteria into the main categories model-theoretic specifications, detail of mod-
eling, market representation, and general information. Regarding the first one, model-
theoretic specifications, we include three additional criteria compared to Hall and Buckley:
“key endogenous features” of the model, the “representation of uncertainty and risk”, and
the “representation of acceptance”. The set of endogenous variables mainly characterizes
the adjustment paths resulting from a model since it is crucial to differentiate, which
elements of the energy system are in its (partial) equilibrium state for a given model.9
Hall and Buckley (2016) cover the aspect of uncertainty in a criterion describing the
underlying methodology, for example, whether the model follows a stochastic approach.
Nevertheless, representation of uncertainty and risk is included as an explicit criterion,
which emphasizes its importance in line with challenges formulated by Pfenninger et al.
(2014). A similar approach was applied by Cao et al. (2016), who introduced “uncertainty
considerations” as an issue of their catalog. As of the representation of acceptance, it
addresses the last challenge that Pfenninger et al. (2014) mentioned regarding the inte-
gration of human behavior, social risks, and opportunities.
Concerning the detail of modeling, an important issue addressed by Pfenninger et al.
(2014) is the high penetration of electricity from intermittent RES, which results in the
further need for energy system models with a high spatial and temporal resolution and
an extended representation of flexibility options. Therefore, we describe the spatial prop-
erties not only by the spatial coverage of the modeled region, but also through the spatial
resolution, which represents the granularity of the model. Moreover, different models
might represent technologies and their respective costs at varying levels of detail. We
captured these differences with the criteria “included costs” and “included technologies”.
In contrast to Hall and Buckley (2016), thermal generation technologies are mentioned
explicitly, besides RES technologies and storage technologies. Since for many research
questions a very detailed representation of those generation technologies is necessary, we
further introduce the “details of thermal generation” and “details of storage modeling”
as criteria. Examples for the former are partial efficiencies, cross-time-step restrictions or
time-dependent availabilities, whereas the latter include the power capacity, the reservoir
capacity, additional inflows, and storage losses. The necessity for analyzing single models
with respect to these two criteria follows directly from the increasing market penetra-
9 Partial equilibrium models are understood as models that cover only a strict subset of all sectors of
an economy.
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Programming technique
Analytical method
Representation of uncertainty and risk Representation of acceptance
Endogenous features
Model perspective
Model-Theoretic Specifications
Thermal generation technologies Details of thermal generation
Costs included Renewable generation technologies
Representation of time Time horizon
Spatial coverage* Spatial resolution
Detail of Modeling
Storage technologies Details of storage modeling
Detail of grid modeling
Energy sectoral coverage Demand representation
Represented markets Policy constraints
Market Representation
General purpose Specific purpose* Transparency
Model name* Institution* Release date*
General Information
Model specialties*
Figure 4.1: Model criteria grouped into the four main categories
Note: The criteria followed by an asterisk (*) correspond to open questions.
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tion of intermittent RES, addressed above. The respective uncertain generation patterns
result in increased flexibility requirements for dispatchable generation technologies. An-
other criterion in this section is the “represented detail of grid”, as also applied by Després
et al. (2015). Whereas stylized energy market models might not incorporate the grid at
all, for other approaches, as dispatch models or congestion modeling, a high resolution of
the grid with differentiation between DC and AC load flows might be necessary. Addi-
tionally, this aspect is also relevant for representing the growing complexity of the energy
system (Pfenninger et al., 2014).
For the market representation, besides energy “sectoral coverage” and “demand” repre-
sentation (Hall and Buckley, 2016), we include “policy constraints” to analyze whether
the models are able to include policy instruments like emission constraints or quota
for RES. A similar approach was applied by Bhattacharyya and Timilsina (2010), who
grouped models with regard to their capability to analyze price-induced (e.g., feed-in
tariffs) or volume-induced policies (e.g., technology quotas). Furthermore, we evaluate
models according to the “represented markets”: spot markets, future markets, balancing
markets, and capacity markets. On the one hand, this is again motivated by the in-
creasing relevance of auxiliary services to facilitate the integration of RES. On the other
hand, the well-known missing money problem in power markets induces the importance
of additional revenue sources for generation assets (Hogan, 2017).
Finally, we also collect the general information on models within this analysis. Compared
to Hall and Buckley (2016), we added two criteria, namely “transparency” and “model
specialties”. The transparency of a model is defined as the availability of the model to
the public with respect to the source code, the used data, as well as the description of
all equations. Yet, due to limited transparency of models and, in addition, the difficult
interpretation of publicly available information in the context of the rising complexity of
models, information on the validation of models might be more useful in the end. Simi-
larly, Pfenninger et al. (2014) address the “issue of validation” of energy system models,
due to a widespread lack of transparency and/or accessibility. A comparable criterion
was implemented by Connolly et al. (2010). Moreover, the importance of transparency
was further emphasized by Cao et al. (2016), who developed an extensive “transparency
checklist” to guide authors of energy scenarios to a higher level of transparency.
The “model specialties” are an uncommon criterion in the literature so far. It is intended
to describe properties and applications of the model, which are unique or distinguish
it from other, similar models, and thus helping to identify suitable models for specific
research questions. Yet, the criteria that belong to this category are not considered in the
comparison of model capabilities that is conducted within this chapter. The information
on general properties is rather collected for reasons of transparency and documentation.
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4.3.2 Sample of analyzed models
For the purpose of this chapter, a sample of 40 energy system models was chosen.10
The aim was to find a suitable set, covering a high diversity of different regions11 and
applications (e.g., simulation or optimization models), and including a large fraction
of the most popular models applied in the literature. This analysis looks exclusively
at large-scale (i.e., great number of constraints), numerical, partial equilibrium models.
Hence, we neglect analytical models that allow for deriving equilibrium conditions or
even closed-form solutions without the quantification of parameter values. Yet, the high
number of applied energy system models and varying availability of model characteristics
hardly allow for an objective selection of models. Hence, we selected models by means of a
sequential process. At first, we compiled a list of around 50 well-known and applied energy
system models. In a second step, a group of external experts12 provided feedback on this
list, which was then used to define the final sample of models that is shown in Table D.1
in Appendix D.1. The models were analyzed with respect to their characteristics based
on the information available as of March 31, 2017.
4.3.3 Evaluation and results
The set of criteria presented in Section 4.3.1 are based on either multiple-choice ques-
tions (if the number of possible answers is below ten) or open questions. Among the
multiple-choice questions, some are by definition binary, whereas others have several
possible answers (the different options for multiple choice questions can be found in Ap-
pendix D.2). Thus, the criteria can be regarded as subcategories including one or several
model features. To improve the processing of information, the different options in the
case of multiple-choice questions are listed separately and a binary evaluation is applied
to them. A “yes” means that the model or the modeling framework has the feature (or
is able to include it if it is provided in the data), whereas a “no” means that the feature
cannot be included without extending the model. All criteria are analyzed by means of
10 For model frameworks, an existing model was chosen to make the comparison possible.
11Twenty-five models and model frameworks (62.5%) focus on regions within Europe only. Of the
remaining, at least twelve (30%) have been used for developing countries. There are six models (15%)
with a global coverage.
12We want to thank Paul Deane, Steven Gabriel, Rolf Golombek, Josiah Johnson, and Katrin Schaber
for providing us with very valuable feedback on the list of models. More precisely, we asked the experts
the following two questions with respect to the initial sample of models: “Are there models missing
that play an important role in energy-system modeling at the moment?” and “Does the list contain
models that are outdated and do not represent the current state-of-the-art methodology?”. The expert
opinions only led to additions to the list of models.
4.4. Energy policy issues cluster 112
the publicly available information on the respective model (see references in Table D.1 in
Appendix D.1).13
Results indicate that among the 40 analyzed models, it appears that all of them are able
to model the most common conventional and RES power plants, consider pumped-hydro
electric storage, model the transmission grid at least as a transportation problem, and are
able to provide the dispatch of the generators and the storage as key endogenous features.
Apart from some exceptions, most of the models have a spatial resolution higher than ten
regions/nodes and a temporal resolution of at least one hour. Models vary with respect
to the range of unconventional technologies they model (CCS, tidal/waves, battery and
hydrogen storage, etc.), the details of thermal generation modeling, the sector-coupling
capabilities, the policy constraints they can include, and the markets they can represent.
These aspects, in addition to the key endogenous features, reflect the specialties of the
models. Almost none of the models considered here were able to model public acceptance,
nor are they usually used to depict the distribution grid.
This section introduced our approach for analyzing a sample of models with respect to
the criteria presented. The subsequent section aims at the policy side of this chapter
and hence translates a selection of energy policy questions into subsets of our model
comparison criteria.
4.4 Energy policy issues cluster
This section aims at highlighting the policy maker’s side of the gap introduced in Sec-
tion 4.1. The previous section described the methodology for analyzing energy system
models. To characterize the policy maker’s side, an analogous method has to be adopted
for energy policy issues. Hence, this section designs a framework for the categorization of
energy policy issue, which captures the broad variety of current energy policy. It will be
applied to select energy policy issues of different categories that will be then used for a
model assessment. Our approach for this section comprises three steps. First, we describe
the method for the categorization of issues and their terminology. Then, we highlight
some of the identified categories (a complete description of all categories can be found in
Appendix D.4). At the end, we link exemplary policy issues to model requirements.
The common focus of all reviewed energy system models is the electricity sector. Thus,
in this chapter, only a subset of energy policy issues is taken into account for the descrip-
tion of the policy maker’s side. The approach for defining the scope of issues includes
the review of existing publications that analyze paths for the decarbonization of energy
13 See Appendix D.3 for an example of a model analysis.
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markets. A variation of the scope either on the modeler’s or the policy maker’s side is of
course possible.
4.4.1 Method and terminology of the energy policy issues cat-
egorization
The process of characterizing current major energy policy issues consists of three steps.
First, a literature review is conducted to gather keywords related to energy policy is-
sues. Therefore, existing model-based analyses on energy policy questions have been
reviewed.14 The review includes the extraction of keywords describing the energy policy
issues addressed by a publication. Second, similar keywords from the first step are clus-
tered together in such a way that they can be easily connected to model features. This
model-oriented clustering approach leads to the Energy Policy Issues Cluster (EPIC) de-
picted in Figure 4.2. This novel approach allows us to bridge the existing gap between
modelers and policy makers. Last, we formulated twelve research questions which are pre-
sented in Table 4.2 that capture one or multiple energy policy issues.15 The assessment
of models (see Section 4.5) is based on their capability of answering those questions.
The EPIC consists of different components, which are described in more detail in Sec-
tion 4.4.2. A research question addresses one or multiple energy policy issues, where
issues have three dimensions: the object dimension (gray columns in Figure 4.2), the
evaluation perspective dimension (dark gray rows) and the framework conditions (light
gray background). The first dimension refers to the possible model extensions, whereas
the second dimension can be interpreted as the observed outcomes. Moreover, the object
dimension can be further split into instruments and energy system design. The individual
columns and rows in the cluster are the issue categories. A specific policy issue is located
at the intersection of two categories.
4.4.2 Description of the cluster
The EPIC is developed to derive model requirements from energy policy issues. Modelers
can derive model requirements for specific research questions, but this information is not
generic enough to transfer it to other research questions. The cluster is designed in such
14More precisely, we reviewed 97 publications of public and private research institutes with a technical
and/or economic focus. Publication dates start from 2009 on to capture the most recent energy policy
issues. All publications include a model-based analysis with energy system or energy market models,
which at least comprise the electricity sector.
15The research questions are exemplary questions selected to represent the variety of issues captured
by the EPIC. They do not necessarily describe research question actually tackled in the reviewed
publications. However, because they are derived from keywords of recent publications, they still
represent the current issues.
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a way that policy makers and modelers can easily identify the core components of any
given research question. This allows both sides to identify suitable model configurations
for any research question. The following paragraphs will describe the EPIC, which is
depicted in Figure 4.2.
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Figure 4.2: Energy policy issues cluster (EPIC)
Object dimension The object of an issue is the element being analyzed. We identified
two major types of objects: instruments and energy system design. On the one hand,
energy system design describes the structure of the analyzed energy system at fixed points
in time. Instruments on the other hand, describe the regulatory options that affect the
development of energy systems. We will first describe the instruments and then the
energy system design in the following.
The categorization of instruments is based on a structure used by Fais (2015) and Beester-
möller (2017). Although various other categorization schemes exist in the literature, some
of them do not cover all the relevant instruments (see Batlle et al., 2012) or utilize a
structure that is less compatible to the one of energy system models (see Mickwitz, 2003;
Böcher, 2012).
The main concept of our model-oriented clustering approach can be explained by means of
the following example with the keywords tax incentives for RES and volume-controlling
instruments (e.g., EU ETS). Both belong to the instruments of the object dimension,
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but are assigned to different categories. Similarly to Beestermöller (2017), we assigned
tax incentives for RES into the category promotion of investments because those in-
struments are modeled as reduced investment costs and therefore influence the economic
attractiveness of certain technologies. The EU ETS is a market-based instrument and is
treated in a different way by models. One way for modeling the EU ETS market in linear
bottom-up models would be the introduction of an additional CO2 constraint. Thus, the
inclusion of this type of feature aims not at the input side of the model, but rather on the
set of its constraints, which clearly distinguishes it from tax incentives. The presented
categorization scheme is designed to fit different model types.
The second type of object categories is the energy system design. This group focuses on
the technical aspects of the energy system. Research questions such as “Can the integra-
tion of the heat sector provide the flexibility, which is needed in a highly decarbonized
energy system?” can be assigned to this type of objects. Our literature review resulted in
the following object categories: “Electricity sector configuration”, “Sectoral integration”,
and “Regional integration”. Similarly to the instruments, these categories are chosen
while having the structure of energy system models in mind. Additional sectors and the
regional perspective require a different set of equations and adjustments to the resolution
(e.g., the number of regions). Those categories are easily identifiable in research ques-
tions as well as in the model structure. Therefore, topics regarding the electricity sector
configuration, further energy sectors, and the regional integration can be grouped into
one of these three categories.
Evaluation perspective The upper horizontal rows of the cluster (see Figure 4.2)
describe the evaluation perspective. We use the same understanding for the terminology
of “evaluation perspective” as in PSC (2008):
The subject of an evaluation [...] may be [...] a system [or a] policy [...].
Evaluation perspectives point to the main focuses of an evaluation.
The majority of models comprised in our sample minimizes the total system cost of the
modeled electricity system and thus usually provide results affiliated to the evaluation
perspective “system costs”.16 These kind of models are not limited to this category and
hence can be used for other evaluation perspectives as well.
Framework conditions The framework conditions can be interpreted as a third di-
mension intersecting with each energy policy issue. For simplicity, they are depicted as
a light gray background in Figure 4.2, which is present at every intersection. We found
16Note that the objectives of cost minimization or welfare maximization lead to different objective
functions, yet, in the case of inelastic demand, the outcomes are equivalent.
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that framework conditions have a high impact on the number of required model runs,
but little connection to the model requirements. An exemplary issue assigned to the
group framework conditions could be the analysis of different price scenarios. A modeler
would interpret this problem as an input parameter variation, hence it has no partic-
ular model requirements. Nevertheless, the analysis of different price scenarios is, for
instance, a common keyword found in the reviewed literature. We conclude that energy
policy issues containing additional framework conditions do not impose additional model
requirements.
Table 4.2: Overview of analyzed research questions
Research Question Issues
Q1 Which cost-optimal charging strategies guarantee a safe
operation of the electricity grid?
ES.SC; ES.SR; SI.SC;
SI.SR
Q2 What is the cost-efficient technology-mix (e.g. investment
in energy efficiency, sector coupling, renewable-based heat
supply) for decarbonizing the heat sector?
SI.SC; SI.SR; SI.EI
Q3 Can heat storage units provide large-scale bulk electric
storage in the future?
SI.SR; SI.SC; ES.SR;
ES.SC
Q4 What are the impacts of smart grids on the conventional
market structure?
MI.SC; RI.SC; SI.SC;
MI.SR; RI.SR; SI.SR
Q5 How should sector-specific CO2 targets be defined to min-
imize CO2 abatement costs?
CC.SC; SI.CC
Q6 How much can distributed RES generators (especially
wind and PV) contribute to firm energy in energy sys-
tems with high shares of RES?
RI.SR; RI.EI; ES.SR;
ES.EI
Q7 What is the effect of zonal pricing on the location of new
power plants and re-dispatch costs?
MI.DE; MI.SC; ES.SC
Q8 What are the consequences of an increasing share of pro-
sumers on the different levels of the grid infrastructure?
RI.SC; RI.SR
Q9 Which lock-in effects can result from investment incen-
tives in specific technologies in the heating sector?
PI.PD; SI.PD
Q10 How does the share of self-consumption, support scheme
and technology costs impact new investments into decen-
tralized technologies?
PI.PD; PI.DE; SI.PD;
MI.DE; MI.PD; ES.PD
Q11 What is the long-term effect of an incomplete utilization
of the energy efficiency potential due to overestimated
effects of voluntary obligations and information policy?
SO.PD; ES.SC; RI.SR
Q12 How does the cost-optimal grid expansion deviate if ac-
ceptance is taken into account?
ES.SC; ES.AC; ES.SR
The analyzed research questions and their location in the EPIC can be found in Table 4.2.
We validated the completeness of the cluster through a literature review and expert
opinions.17 As an example, the work of Fischer et al. (2016) has been used to test the
cluster. They identified the five most pressing energy-transition-related issues of Germany
by analyzing stakeholder workshops, surveys and keyword searches of academic literature.
17We want to thank Alexander Zerrahn (DIW Berlin, research associate, energy and environmental
economics) and Philipp Kuhn (Technical University of Munich, lecturer, energy system modeling) for
their expert opinion on the energy policy questions introduced in this section.
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Four of them, which required quantitative analyses of electricity system models, can be
located within the EPIC.
4.4.3 Policy questions analysis
Finally, the same criteria as in Figure 4.1 are now combined with the research questions
listed in Table 4.2 to determine the importance of a particular model feature for answering
each of these questions. For that purpose a two-step process involving a first evaluation
and a review was adopted. Furthermore, the evaluation of features distinguishes between
three levels of importance:18
• Mandatory features are the model features required in a minimalistic model that
can provide an acceptable answer to the policy question.
• Complementary features are the model features that can complement the model,
but whose absence does not alter the results too much in regard to the given policy
question.
• Facultative features are the model features that do not affect the results in regard
to the given policy question (or only affect them marginally), and can therefore be
ignored.
For most of the policy questions listed in Table 4.2, the evaluation showed that the gen-
eration and storage dispatch (endogenous features), the storage characteristics (charg-
ing/discharging capacity and storage capacity), RES generation technologies (photo-
voltaics, wind, biomass), batteries, and costs (investment, fixed, variable, fuel) are usually
mandatory features. This is not surprising, as many policy questions address the chal-
lenges to integrating variable RES generation while maintaining some flexibility.
The set of facultative features comprises some endogenous features (technological learn-
ing, market prices, emission rates and prices), some represented markets (capacity mar-
kets, futures), some policy constraints (CO2 budget, RES quota), details of storage mod-
eling (additional hydro inflow), and two renewable generation technologies, namely wave
and tidal. There are several reasons why these features were usually considered optional.
First, the endogenous features, the represented markets, and the policy constraints are
“special” features that are only needed in particular case studies. This correlates with
the observation made in Section 4.3. Only a few models have implemented them, thus
they reflect the specialties of the models. Second, a shift of interest from conventional
energy storage technologies (hydro) to batteries might be the reason behind the lack of
interest in modeling the additional hydro inflow. Third, technologies that currently have
18 See Appendix D.3 for an example of a policy question analysis.
4.5. Closing and quantifying the gap 118
a negligible contribution to the power system such as wave and tidal can be ignored in
most policy studies, unless they are the focus of these studies.
All in all, most features tended to one of the three levels of importance (mandatory,
complementary, facultative), and only a few features were evenly split between them.
This highlights the need for a variety of models to answer a wide range of policy questions
with different requirements. Whether the models are able to cover the whole range will
be discussed in the following section.
4.5 Closing and quantifying the gap
After presenting the model comparison method in Section 4.3 and the EPIC in Section 4.4,
the next step is to link the models and the energy policy issues with each other. With the
creation of this linkage, we close the gap between the modelers and the policy makers.
Two metrics are introduced to quantify the gap between models and policy questions. The
results are then discussed and discrepancies between the models and the policy questions
are identified.
Since only a small set of policy questions and a limited number of models is analyzed, the
conclusions from this section cannot be generalized. However, the underlying method for
creating the linkage and quantifying the gap can be applied to a wider range of models
and questions. The main purpose of this section is therefore to illustrate this method,
which can be applied by policy makers and modelers.
4.5.1 Linkage and gap quantification
Section 4.3.3 analyzed the capabilities of the models, whereas Section 4.4.3 gave an insight
on which features are required to answer certain policy questions. The purpose of this
section is to link the models to the policy questions and determine whether they fulfill
the requirements for answering them. Therefore, a metric is introduced to quantify the
gap between each model m and each policy question q. The model-question gap dm,q is
defined as follows:
dm,q = 1− 2 · |S
q
++ ∩ Sm|+ |Sq+ ∩ Sm| − 2 · |Sq++ ∩ Sm|
2 · |Sq++|+ |Sq+|
(4.1)
where Sq++ denotes the set of mandatory features for a question q, Sq+ the set of comple-
mentary features for a question q, Sm the set of implemented features in model m, and
Sm the features that are not available in model m.
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There is no gap if the model has all mandatory and complementary features (dm,q =
0). The gap widens greatly if mandatory features are missing (hence the term −2 ·
|Sq++ ∩ Sm|), and to a lower extent if complementary features are not implemented.
The largest possible model-question gap (dm,q = 2) occurs when neither mandatory nor
complementary features are available in the model. Note that a sophisticated model
with a great number of features has no advantage over a simple model, which fulfills the
requirements for addressing the policy issue, since both of them have a model-question
gap close to zero.19
Besides the model-question gap dm,q that can be used to assess the suitability of a model
for answering a policy question, another metric can be applied to the data to find out the
key features that are not widely implemented. This feature gap can be defined as follows:
dM,Qf =
∑
q∈Q |Sq++(f)|
|Q| −
∑
m∈M |Sm(f)|
|M | (4.2)
where dM,Qf is the feature gap for a given set of models M and policy questions Q. The
first term in the subtraction can be interpreted as the average importance of feature f
for answering the policy questions, whereas the second term is the average occurrence
of feature f in the models. The gap is zero if there are enough models that include the
feature f given its importance for the policy questions. If it is negative (−1 ≤ dM,Qf < 0),
then the share of models implementing f is higher than the share of policy questions that
consider it as important. The last case, where 0 < dM,Qf ≤ 1, is the most relevant for
this study. It highlights the discrepancy between the significance of a feature for a set of
policy questions and the limited number of models including it.20
4.5.2 Results and discussion
Equation (4.1) was first applied on the set of models from Table D.1 (see Appendix D.1)
and policy questions from Table 4.2. The performance of the models varies widely for
the given set of questions, with the most suitable models achieving gaps as low as 0.02,
whereas the worst-case featuring a gap value of 1.18 (see Figure 4.3). Looking at each
model separately for the whole set of policy questions, it appears that some models are
well-suited for all questions with an average gap of 0.09, whereas others, with an average
gap of 0.92, are not suitable for answering any question. These results are a clear reminder
that modelers should be very cautious when choosing an existing model to answer a policy
question. Likewise, policy makers should not take the suitability of models for granted.
19 See Appendix D.3 for an example of the model-question gap quantification.
20 See Appendix D.3 for an example of the feature gap quantification.
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Figure 4.3: Model-question gap for sample of models
Note: The model-question gaps dm,q are displayed for all analyzed models and policy questions,
so that there are twelve gray crosses aligned vertically for each model ID in the horizontal axis.
The models are anonymized and sorted by their average model-question gap for the given
sample of questions. The gap is low (close to zero) if the model contains most mandatory and
complementary features, and is high (up to two) if these features are missing. For the sake of
illustration, the model-question gaps are shown for the question Q12 (black line) as well.
It should be noted that the best-performing models might not be suitable for answering
questions outside of the set in Table 4.2, and that the worst-performing ones might have
been designed for other purposes.
Nevertheless, the set of policy questions covers a wide range of issues, and the results
reveal the strengths and weaknesses of the models. The difference between the smallest
and the largest gap for a given model m could be as high as 0.62, and is on average 0.37.
This could be explained by the existence of highly specialized models that have a small
gap for only one or two questions and which tend to perform badly for the rest. Assuming
that the policy questions are representative for the policy issues they belong to, the link
between the models and the issues they specialize in can be established.
The feature gaps for the same sets of models and policy questions show that there are at
least four groups of features that are under-served in the chosen models. The complete
results are available in Figures D.5 and D.6 (see Appendix D.5). An excerpt is reported
in Figures 4.4 and 4.5.
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The largest discrepancies are related to the modeling of (electric) distribution grids
(dM,Qf = 0.28) and, more broadly, of the load flows (d
M,Q
f = 0.23) (see Figure 4.4).
Especially the former is missing in most models, with only two models capable of in-
corporating distribution grids. One possible solution would be to encourage modelers
to implement these features (i.e., through targeted project funding). However, limited
computational capacities and lack of reliable data on the distribution level might be the
reason behind the absence of the features in the first place. The alternative, which is
probably applied by modelers who attempt to answer policy questions requiring these two
features, is to couple their models with detailed load flow models with both the transmis-
sion and the distribution grid. Thus, to alleviate this discrepancy, data on distribution
grids needs to be made available or to be created generically, and methods to increase
the computational performance of complex models and to couple them with load flow
models need to be explored.
The second group of features where discrepancies have been observed is related to the
modeling of the demand as an endogenous key feature (dM,Qf = 0.03) and, more im-
portantly, to the long-term demand flexibility modeling (dM,Qf = 0.14) (see Figure 4.4).
These features are of paramount importance when modeling future scenarios with sector-
coupling, yet most analyzed models are still lagging behind in this regard.
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Figure 4.4: Average implementation rate and average necessity rate for the features
related to grid and demand representation
Note: The bars are superposed, so that the black bars are only visible if the implementation rate exceeds
the necessity rate. Otherwise, critical discrepancies exist and are colored in light gray.
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The third group of features concerns the technical flexibility of the energy system (see
Figure 4.5). Only 45% of the analyzed models include batteries as a storage technology,
even though 67% of the chosen policy questions require this feature. There is also a high
demand for models that include the heat sector and that are capable of investigating the
power-to-heat potential. Moreover, the flexibility of conventional power plants needs to
be assessed more accurately through the modeling of operational costs such as ramping
costs and start-up costs (dM,Qf = 0.10). Here again, the computational performance is
probably the reason behind the lack of these features. While this is expected to improve
over time, one possible solution in the short term would be to rely on specialized models
(for the heat sector, or for the unit commitment) and couple them with more general
models.
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Figure 4.5: Average implementation rate and average necessity rate for the features
related to costs, storage, sector coupling, and policy constraints
Note: The bars are superposed, so that the black bars are only visible if the implementation rate exceeds
the necessity rate. Otherwise, critical discrepancies exist and are colored in light gray.
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Models not only need to include more flexibility features, they also have to imple-
ment more policy constraints such as market design (dM,Qf = 0.09) and RES subsidies
(dM,Qf = 0.05). The demand for these features reflects the evolution of policy concerns
and the trends in the energy systems where more market participants are expected, where
conventional market structures are disrupted, and where policy makers make use of sub-
sidies to reach certain emission targets. While the RES subsidy is comparatively easy to
implement, the market design constraint might lead to a rethinking of how the markets
are modeled in the first place.
The feature gap should not disguise the fact that there are always models capable of using
any of the identified features. The metric is based on the simple idea that if there are
more policy questions requiring a feature, there should be also more models implementing
it. However, this quantitative approach does not guarantee that the features are well
implemented in the models. Besides, a couple of suitable models might be enough to
compare the results and make robust policy decisions. Nevertheless, we believe that the
existence of a high number of models implementing a feature will lead over time to the
emergence of qualitatively good model assessments.
4.6 Conclusion and policy implications
The transition towards a low-carbon and efficient energy system requires a regulatory
framework, which sets the right incentives for stakeholders to align their behavior with
the desired energy system. Due to the liberalization of energy markets and the coupling
of energy sectors, the number of stakeholders and system operation constraints has in-
creased, leading to an increasingly complex system. To support policy makers, a wide
range of numerical models have been developed over the last decades.
The primary goal of this chapter is to provide policy makers and energy modelers with
a method on how to identify suitable energy system models for their policy research
questions. Besides, our approach can be used to quantify the research gap, that is, the
model extensions required to gain adequate insights for a given research question. One
further goal is to help modelers benchmark their energy system models with other state-
of-the-art modeling approaches and adapt them to the research question requirements.
Starting from an extensive overview of studies on energy system model comparisons, we
derived the conclusion that the existing studies use different terminologies and classifi-
cation schemes that can be restricted to certain model types. Building on the existing
studies, we identified model characteristics, which are relevant for both, modelers and
policy makers. Then, we applied the comparison scheme on a set of 40 wide-ranging
models. All in all, the model characteristics were sufficient to distinguish the models and
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to highlight their key features. However, the comparison scheme does not include any
weighting between the criteria nor any qualitative ones (features are equally weighted).
So-called model frameworks or model generators can only be compared if an actual model
is considered, otherwise the results will be skewed in their favor due to their expandabil-
ity. Most of the difficulties faced during the comparison process are caused by a lack
of transparency in the model descriptions. To ensure the comparability of the models,
which is a necessary condition for the comparability of model results, we recommend that
policy makers and funding institutions include the model transparency as a condition for
project funding. Documentation standards are also necessary and should comprise the
model capabilities, in a single model run, objectively.
In a second step, we looked into energy policy classification studies. To the best of our
knowledge only a few such studies exist, and they sometimes used a terminology specific
to their field, which limits their usefulness for energy system modelers. Therefore, we
developed a novel, model-oriented clustering method for energy policy issues. Our method
decomposes complex policy research questions into several, distinct energy policy issues.
The object of the research question and its perspective are defined with a model-oriented
approach that establishes connections to inputs, constraints, and outputs. Then, this
clustering method was applied to derive twelve exemplary policy questions. However, the
set of questions presented in this chapter is only related to power market models, with a
focus on decarbonization-related challenges. Based on a wider range of policy questions,
the proposed cluster can be expanded to include additional environmental aspects, issues
related to resource limitations, and effects from global warming, just to name a few.
Besides, the method can be applied to other energy system models (other than power
markets).
To link model features with policy questions, we introduced two simple metrics, which
quantify the model-question gap and the feature gap. The analysis of the model-question
gaps highlighted the importance of choosing suitable models for each question, because
some models lacked the critical features for answering certain policy research questions,
which might lead to inaccurate results and unsubstantiated policy recommendations. The
results could also be used to identify the model specialties in terms of policy questions.
Looking at the individual features separately, it appears that critical features for policy
questions are usually implemented in most models. However, feature gaps exist in these
four areas: distribution grid modeling, endogenous demand modeling, technical flexibility
of the energy system, and policy constraints. Despite the useful insights obtained through
the two metrics, some limitations exist. In fact, the method is purely quantitative and
does not include any qualitative aspects. It is also subjective, because the results are
based on the opinion of modelers, even though this aspect has been minimized through
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internal review processes. The conclusions are restricted to the sets of models and policy
questions and should not be generalized. General assertions can only be achieved through
a wider range of models and policy questions.
The major contribution of the chapter, besides the linkage between policy issues and
model features, is guidance with respect to the choice of appropriate models. We rec-
ommend applying this method in a selection process, where a variety of models are at
the disposal of modelers or policy makers. In this case, the model-question gap metric
(see Section 4.5.1) could be applied to either define a threshold value or evaluate the gap
between a model and the particular policy questions. Moreover, we are able to identify
some need for action with respect to future model developments. Either funding enti-
ties or research institutes should use our insights to initiate new tenders or revise their
research agenda, respectively. The feature gap, as it was introduced in Section 4.5.1,
allowed to identify four model properties that should be subject to future research efforts
(see above). Overcoming these weaknesses would help to provide adequate model results
that are suitable for addressing the future challenges to energy policy.
Apart from the need for further research, we also recommend policy makers to encourage
the sharing of modeling expertise within a broader knowledge management strategy. In
fact, for each policy research question analyzed in this chapter, we were able to find at
least one model capable of adequately addressing the respective question. Yet, at the
same time, other models with a high model-question gap exist and are likely to profit
from a better dissemination of skills within the modeling community. We believe that
an essential part of future research funding should be allocated for knowledge sharing
via model documentation (tutorials, user guides, etc.), workshops, and online platforms.
Networks such as the Energy Modeling Forum, the Energy Modelling Platform for Europe,
or the Research Network for Power System Analysis in Germany can be used to coordinate
future knowledge management to reduce the overall feature gap.
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A.1 Nomenclature of numerical implementation
Table A.1: Nomenclature of model description
Symbol Explanation
Sets
s ∈ S Load segments
t ∈ T Time periods
r ∈ R Regions
i ∈ I Generation technologies
j ∈ J Storage technologies
v ∈ V Vintages
f ∈ F Fuel types
n ∈ N Natural gas supply classes
b ∈ B Biomass supply classes
Variables
ctot Total system costs
cgcr,t Investment costs for generation capacity
ctcr,t Investment costs for transmission capacity
cscr,t Investment costs for storage capacity
cvcr,t Operational costs for generation
cfomr,t Maintenance costs for generation
ctvor,t Operation costs for transmission
ctfmr,t Maintenance costs for transmission
tft Investment tax factor
gcnewi,r,t New generation capacity
tcnewr,rr,t New transmission capacity
scnewj,r,t New storage capacity
mci,r,t Variable operational costs
gs,i,v,r,t Generation
bsb,r,t Biomass supply
es,r,rr,t Electricity exchange
gci,v,r,t Accumulated generation capacity
tcr,rr,t Accumulated transmission capacity
sds,j,r,t Storage discharge
ss,j,r,t Storage charge
tgi,v,r,t Total generation
csr,t Stored carbon
nbct Amount of net banked carbon credits
cbct Cumulative banked credits
Parameters
TK Investment tax rate
YRt Number of years since last time period
DFt Discount factor
ICgci,t Investment costs
LFi,v,r,t Life-time factor
ICtcr,rr Investment costs for transmission capacity
ICscj Investment costs of storage
Hs Number of represented hours
OCbiob,r Operational costs for biomass supply
OCvomi,v,r Operational costs
FCi,f Fuel costs
HRi,v,f,r Heat rate
FTf,t Time period-specific heat rate adjustment factor
FRf,r Region-specific heat rate adjustment factor
EMi,v,r Emission intensity
PCt Carbon permit price
Continued on next page
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Table A.1 – Continued from previous page
Symbol Explanation
OCfomi,r Fixed operational costs
OCtvor,rr Operational costs for transmission
OCtfmr,rr,t Maintenance costs for transmission
PSs,r Self-consumption of hydro pump storage
Ds,r,t Demand
 Loss from storage discharge
δ Loss from intra-regional distribution
PENtrr,rr Loss from transmission
Eints,r Export to outside regions
AFs,i,r Availability factor
CFs,i,r Capacity factor
DFs Minimum dispatch factor for nuclear power plants
CAPgci,r,t Capacity limit
CAPgeui,t Accumulated capacity limit
Li,v,r,t Expected life-time
RFi Retrofit factor
CRi Conversion factor
CAPreti,r Capacity limit on CCS conversions
GColdi,v,r Existing generation capacity
SHj Fixed storage size
CAPtcr,rr,t Capacity limit on transmission capacity additions
CAPteut Capacity limit on accumulated transmission capacity additions
TLr,rr Average transmission length
CRi Carbon capture rate
FCi Fuel coefficient
CCf Carbon content
CAPccsr Geologic storage limit
QCi,r Share of initial capacity
CAPwindi,r Wind power capacity limit
CAPsolari,r Wind power capacity limit
BSb,r,t Biomass supply
GSg,r,t Gas supply
CAPco2t Limit on accumulated carbon emissions
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A.2 Model resolution
Table A.2: Composition of model regions
Region Countries
Britain United Kingdom, Ireland (UK, IE)
France France (FR)
Benelux Belgium, Luxembourg, Netherlands (BE, LU, NL)
Germany-N Northern Germany (GER)
Germany-S Southern Germany (GER)
Scandinavia Denmark, Finland, Norway, Sweden (DK, FI, NO, SE)
Iberia Portugal, Spain (PT, ES)
Alpine Austria, Switzerland (AT, CH)
Italy Italy (IT)
Eastern Europe-NW Czech Republic, Poland, Slovak Republic (CZ, PL, SK)
Eastern Europe-NE Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania (EE, LV, LT)
Eastern Europe-SW Croatia, Hungary, Slovenia (HR, HU, SI)
Eastern Europe-SE Bulgaria, Greece, Romania (BG, EL, RO)
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Table A.3: Overview of types of generation technologies
Technology type Technology name
lign Lignite
lbcf Lignite-biomass conversion
lgcs Lignite with CCS
hdcl Hard Coal
cbcl Coal-biomass conversion
clcs Coal with CCS
igcc Coal with CC
ngcc Natural gas combined-cycle
ngst Natural gas stream turbine
nggt Natural gas gas turbine
ngcs Natural gas with CCS
ptsg Petroleum steam/gas turbine
chp-g Combined-heat-power with natural gas
chp-p Combined-heat-power with petroleum
biow Biomass Waste
bioe Dedicated bioenergy
becs Dedicated bioenergy with CCS
geot Geothermal
nuc Nuclear
hydro Hydro
wind-on Wind onshore
wind-os Wind offshore
pv stationary photovoltaic
pv-tk Tracking photovoltaic
csp Concentrated solar
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A.3 Resource classes
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Figure A.1: Solar resource data-base
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A.4 Nomenclature of wind power representation
Table A.4: Nomenclature of wind power
Symbol Explanation
Sets
s ∈ S Time segments
l ∈ L Location
h ∈ H Hub height
G ∈ G Wind turbine types
q ∈ Q Site quality classes
r ∈ R Region
c ∈ Cwind Wind resource quality class
Parameters
sv50s,l Northward wind speed 50 meter above ground
su50s,l Eastward wind speed 50 meter above ground
HEh Hub height value
Rs,l Surface roughness length
Ag Constant from power curve interpolation
λ1g − λ6g Coefficients from power curve interpolation
supq Upper wind speed limit
slowq Lower wind speed limit
Wwcl,r Existing capacity distribution
Wwth,g,q,r Existing technology-mix
W hubh,q,r Assumed hub height mix
W qh,r Assumed quality class mix
σu General wind turbine loss factor
σps Seasonal wind turbine loss factor
Variables
s50s,l Wind speed vector 50 meter above ground
ss,l,h Extrapolated wind speed
wptrbs,l,h,g Normalized wind power output
wphubs,h,q,r Weighted normalized onshore wind power output
wpons,r Final existing onshore wind power output
wphub-oss,h,r Weighted normalized offshore wind power output
wposs,r Final existing offshore wind power output
wpregs,r,c,h,g Wind power output for quality classes
wps,r,c Final new wind power output
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A.5 Model for wind power output
In this appendix, we explain the translation of the two-dimensional wind speed vector to
normalized wind power output. The estimation of wind power output uses wind speed,
displacement height, and surface roughness as input parameters. We combine the wind
speed at each location l and time segment s from two directions (sv50s,l and su50s,l ) to a single
one s50s,l by Equation (A.1):
s50s,l =
√
sv50s,l + su50s,l ∀s ∈ S, l ∈ L (A.1)
In the following, we use a portfolio-approach for a better approximation of observed
generation profiles. Based on the Monin-Obukhov specification, we extrapolate wind
speeds at each location to different hub heights h, with the value of each hub height HEh
and the surface roughness length Rs,l, as depicted in Equation (A.2):
ss,l,h = s50s,l ·
 log(HEhRs,l )
log( 50Rs,l )
 ∀s ∈ S, l ∈ L, h ∈ H (A.2)
Then, wind speeds at hub heights are translated to normalized wind power output wptrbs,l,h,g
for different wind turbines g by means of their respective power curves, which are shown
in Figure A.2. The relationship between wind speed and power curve-specific output can
be approximated by the function shown in Equation (A.3), which is an interpolation of
the piecewise-defined power curve. The value of the parameters Ag, λ1g,...,λ6g are derived
from this interpolation:
wptrbs,l,h,g = Ag + λ1g · ss,l,h + (λ2g · ss,l,h)2 + (λ3g · ss,l,h)3 + (λ4g · ss,l,h)4
+ (λ5g · ss,l,h)5 + (λ6g · ss,l,h)6 ∀s ∈ S, l ∈ L, h ∈ H, g ∈ G
(A.3)
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Figure A.2: Turbine power curves
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A.6 Nomenclature of solar power representation
Table A.5: Nomenclature of solar power
Symbol Explanation
Sets
s ∈ S Time segments
l ∈ L Location
r ∈ R Region
o ∈ O Panel orientations
p ∈ P Panel tilts
c ∈ Csolar Solar resource quality class
Parameters
Esc Solar constant
Vs Day number of the year
LONl Longitude
LATl Latitude
LSTs,l Local solar time
GHIs,l Global horizontal irradiation
α2o Panel orientation value
β2l,p Panel tilt value
ρ Reflection coefficient
T r Rated module temperature
Ts,l Ambient temperature
ηr Rated module efficiency
P r Rated power output
W scl,r Existing capacity distribution
W sto,p Assumed orientation and panel tilt mix
Csolarr,l,c Resource class allocation
Variables
e0s,l Apparent extraterrestrial solar irradiation
β1s,l Altitude angle
δs Declination angle
ωs,l Hour angle
ASTs,l Apparent solar time
LSTMl Local longitude of standard time meridian
EOTs Equation of time
DVs Daily correction value
ks,l Clearness index
ds,l Share of diffuse irradiation
difs,l Diffuse irradiation
dnis,l Direct normal irradiation
α1s,l Azimuth angle
θs,l Collector angle
rtots,l,o,p Solar irradiation at module
rds,l,o,p Direct component of solar irradiation at module
rdifs,l,p Diffuse-scattered component of solar irradiation at module
rrefs,l,p Reflected component of solar irradiation at module
tpvs,l,o,p Actual module temperature
ηs,l,o,p Panel efficiency
sppvs,l,o,p Actual module output
ηinvs,l,o,p Inverter efficiency
sps,l,o,p Normalized solar power output by location
spregs,r,o,p Normalized solar power output by region
sppvs,r Final existing pv power output
sppvs,i,r Final new pv power output
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A.7 Separation of solar irradiation
In this appendix, we describe how the solar irradiation data from NASA (2010) can be
separated into its direct and diffuse component. Modeling the output from solar power
technologies requires, among others, a time-series on the direct and diffuse irradiance.
Most publicly available data, including MERRA, provides only GHI as a variable. There-
fore, GHI has to be separated into the direct and diffuse part. For that purpose, as done
in Juruš et al. (2013), we adopt the Boland-Ridley-Lauret model (Ridley et al., 2010),
that estimates the share of diffuse irradiation from the clearness index. The methodology
is based on the following main steps:
First, the seasonal variation of the apparent extraterrestrial solar irradiation1 has to be
estimated according to Equation (A.4) (Lunde, 1980):
e0s,l = Esc ·
(
1 + 0.033 · cos( Vs|S| · 360ř)
)
· cos(β1s,l) ∀s ∈ S, l ∈ L (A.4)
with the solar constant Esc = 1, 3672, the number of time segment Vs, the total number
of time segments |S|, and the altitude angle β1s,l.3 The calculation of β1s,l is based on
Equations (A.5)–(A.11) and are explained in more detail in Masters (2004):
β1s,l = sin−1 (sin(δs) · sin(LONl) + cos(δh) · cos(LATl) · cos(ωs,l)) ∀s ∈ S, l ∈ L
(A.5)
With longitude LONl, latitude LATl, and declination angle δs for the northern hemisphere
being defined as:
δs = 23.45◦ · sin
(
Vs + 6816
|S| · 360
◦
)
∀s ∈ S (A.6)
an hour angle ωs,l comprising:
ωs,l = 15◦ · (ASTs,l − 12) ∀s ∈ S, l ∈ L. (A.7)
Furthermore, the following equations have to be considered to approximate the apparent
solar time ASTs,l by the local solar time LSTs,l, local longitude of standard time meridian
1 Seasonal variations result from the varying distance between the earth and the sun.
2 The solar constant Esc is the solar irradiation at a plane normal to the sun at the top of the atmosphere.
3 The altitude angle β1s,l is the vertical angle between the sun’s rays and the horizon.
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LSTMl, longitude LONl, and equation of time EOTs.
ASTs,l = LSTs,l + 4 · (LSTMl − LONl) + EOTs ∀s ∈ S, l ∈ L (A.8)
LSTMl = 15◦ · LONl15◦ ∀l ∈ L (A.9)
EOTs = 9.87 · sin(2 ·DVs)− 7.53 · cos(DVs)− 1.5 · sin(DVs) ∀s ∈ S (A.10)
DVs = 360◦ · Vs + 1944|S| ∀s ∈ S (A.11)
Then, based on e0s,l, we can calculate the clearness index ks,l4 as the share of global
horizontal irradiation GHIs,l in e0s,l (Equation (A.12)) (Boilley and Wald, 2015):
ks,l =
GHIs,l
e0s,l
∀s ∈ S, l ∈ L (A.12)
which is then used in Equation (A.12) to estimate the share of diffuse irradiation ds,l in
GHIs,l (Ridley et al., 2010):
ds,l =
1
1 + e−5.0033+8.605·ks,l ∀s ∈ S, l ∈ L (A.13)
In a last step, we calculate diffuse irradiation (DIF) difs,l (Equation (A.14)) and direct
normal irradiation (DNI) dnis,l (Equation (A.15)). With difs,l as the product of GHIs,l
and ds,l:
difs,l = ds,l ·GHIs,l ∀s ∈ S, l ∈ L (A.14)
and dnis,l being additionally adjusted for the altitude angle:5
dnis,l =
(1− ds,l) ·GHIs,l
sin(β1s,l)
∀s ∈ S, l ∈ L (A.15)
4 The clearness index ks,l is a measures for the clearness of the atmosphere. A value of 0.7 indicates a
clear sky (Boilley and Wald, 2015).
5 GHI measures only the horizontal, i.e., perpendicular to the earth’s surface, irradiation. To additionally
account for the non-horizontal irradiation in DNI, we adjust for the altitude angle.
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A.8 Model for photovoltaic power output
In this appendix, we depict the translation of solar irradiation into normalized solar power
output. With the separation of GHI into the DIF and DNI component in Appendix A.7,
irradiation data can be converted into generation profiles for PV, PV-TK, and CSP
technologies (Masters, 2004). We start off by calculating the azimuth angle α1s,l according
to Equation (A.16):6
α1s,l = cos−1
(
sin(δs) · cos(LATl)− cos(δs) · sin(LATl) · cos(ωs,l)
cos(β1s,l)
)
∀s ∈ S, l ∈ L
(A.16)
This feeds into the calculation of the collector angle θs,l in (Equation (A.17)).7 In analogy
to wind power, we apply a portfolio approach and calculate output values for different
panel orientations o with the parameter α2o and tilts p represented by β2l,p:8
θs,l,o,p = cos(β1s,l)·sin(β2l,p)·cos(α1s,l−α2l )+sin(β1s,l)·cos(β2l,p) ∀s ∈ S, l ∈ L, o ∈ O, p ∈ P
(A.17)
This allows for calculating the solar irradiation at the module rtots,l,o,p (Equation (A.18)),
that is composed of the direct component rds,l,o,p, diffuse-scattered component r
dif
s,l,p, and
reflected component rrefs,l,p.
rtots,l,o,p = rds,l,o,p + r
dif
s,l,p + r
ref
s,l,p ∀s ∈ S, l ∈ L, o ∈ O, p ∈ P (A.18)
rds,l,o,p = dnis,l · θs,l,o,p ∀s ∈ S, l ∈ L, o ∈ O, p ∈ P (A.19)
rdifs,l,p = difs,l ·
1 + cos(β2l,p)
2 ∀s ∈ S, l ∈ L, p ∈ P (A.20)
rrefs,l,p = dnis,l · ρ ·
(
difs,l
dnis,l
+ sin(β1s,l)
)
· 1− cos(β
2
l,p)
2 ∀s ∈ S, l ∈ L, p ∈ P (A.21)
The reflection coefficient ρ has a default value of 0.2 for an ordinary ground (Masters,
2004), which is understood as area not covered with snow and, hence, has a lower reflec-
tion.
To get the actual feed-in profile, the solar irradiation at the module has to be adjusted
for the panel efficiency, at first, and the inverter efficiency, in a second step. The panel
6 The azimuth angle α1s,l is the horizontal angle of the sun’s rays relative to geographic north.
7 The collector angle θs,l is the horizontal angle of the sun’s rays to the panel.
8 The panel orientation α2o indicates the facing relative to the north with α2o = 180◦ implying a south-
facing panel.
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efficiency is a function of the module’s rated temperature T r and the actual module
temperature tpvs,l,o,p, which can be estimated from the ambient temperature Ts,l and the
irradiation at the module as shown in Equations (A.22) and (A.23). The rated temper-
ature, which is understood as the temperature at which the nominal power output is
reached, is set to T r = 25◦ (Kalogirou, 2009). Higher module temperatures lead to a
reduction in its output:
ηs,l,o,p = 1− γ · (tpvs,l,o,p − T r) ∀s ∈ S, l ∈ L, o ∈ O, p ∈ P (A.22)
tpvs,l,o,p = 30+0.0175·(rtots,l,o,p−300)+1.14·(Ts,l−25) ∀s ∈ S, l ∈ L, o ∈ O, p ∈ P (A.23)
Then, we can calculate the actual module output sppvs,l,o,p (Equation (A.24)) by combining
ηs,l,o,p, the rated module efficiency ηr, and the irradiation at the module rtots,l,o,p
sppvs,l,o,p = ηs,l,o,p · ηr · rtots,l,o,p ∀s ∈ S, l ∈ L, o ∈ O, p ∈ P (A.24)
and estimate the inverter efficiency ηinvs,l,o,p. The efficiency of the conversion from direct
current (DC) to alternating current (AC) is dynamic and increases concave downward
with the module output sppvs,l,o,p. Due to a lack of functional formulation of the inverter
efficiency, we estimate it with the function shown in Equation (A.25):
ηinvs,l,o,p =
(
0.5
sppvs,l,o,p
) 1
10
∀s ∈ S, l ∈ L, o ∈ O, p ∈ P (A.25)
Finally, we can estimate the normalized solar power output sps,l,o,p (normalized to the
rated power output P r) in Equation (A.26):
sps,l,o,p =
ηinvs,l,o,p · sppvs,l,o,p
P r
∀s ∈ S, l ∈ L, o ∈ O, p ∈ P (A.26)
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A.9 Nomenclature of concentrated solar power rep-
resentation
Table A.6: Nomenclature of CSP
Symbol Explanation
Sets
s ∈ S Time segments
r ∈ R Region
i ∈ I Generation technologies
Parameters
Ps,r Exogenous market prices
dnis,i,r Incoming direct solar irradiation
SM Solar multiple
SHcsp Storage capacity
csp Loss factor
Variables
rev Revenue
gs,i,r CSP disptach
scsps,i,r CSP storage charge
sdcsps,i,r CSP storage discharge
sbcsps,i,r Accumulated CSP storage
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A.10 Input data
Table A.7: Overview of lifetime, fixed, and variable O&M costs
Technology Life-time Fixed O&M costs Variable O&M costs
[Years] [e/kW] [e/MWh]
lign 60 30 7
lbcf 60 - -
lgcs 60 - -
hdcl 30 6 -
cbcl 60 - -
clcs 60 100 13
igcc 60 60 6
ngcc 40 20 4
ngst 60 20 4
nggt 40 15 3
ngcs 40 30 12
ptsg 60 20 3
chp-g 100 - -
chp-p 100 - -
biow 100 30 20
bioe 40 80 7
becs 40 120 14
geot 80 80 9
nuc 60 100 10
hydro 100 - -
wind-on 30 35 0
wind-os 20 80 0
pv 20 25 0
pv-tk 20 30 0
csp 30 30 0
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Table A.8: Overview of investment costs [e/kW]
2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050
hdcl 1,300 1,300 1,300 1,300 1,300 1,300 1,300
clcs 2,924 2,888 2,852 2,818 2,784 2,752 2,720
igcc 1,800 1,800 1,800 1,800 1,800 1,800 1,800
ngcc 800 800 800 800 800 800 800
nggt 400 400 400 400 400 400 400
ngcs 1,367 1,352 1,337 1,322 1,308 1,294 1,280
bioe 2,350 2,278 2,209 2,141 2,076 2,013 1,951
becs 4,000 3,800 3,600 3,400 3,300 3,200 3,100
geot 3,775 3,578 3,392 3,216 3,049 2,890 2,740
nuc 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000
wind-on 1,240 1,210 1,182 1,154 1,127 1,101 1,075
wind-os 2,742 2,621 2,506 2,396 2,290 2,189 2,093
pv 1,100 1,000 950 900 850 800 750
pv-tk 1,375 1,260 1,188 1,125 1,063 1,000 938
csp 4,500 4,050 3,645 3,463 3,290 3,125 2,969
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Table A.9: Overview of final electricity demand projection [TWh]
Region 2015 2050 Growth rate
Austria 60 84 40%
Belgium 87 121 39%
Bulgaria 28 34 21%
Croatia 20 24 19%
Czech Republic 64 71 11%
Denmark 35 43 23%
Estonia 7 12 71%
Finland 89 84 -6%
France 459 657 43%
Germany 553 661 20%
Greece 60 67 12%
Hungary 36 60 67%
Ireland 28 42 50%
Italy 324 527 63%
Latvia 7 27 286%
Lithuania 9 37 311%
Luxembourg 8 8 0%
Netherlands 114 170 49%
Norway 150 112 -25%
Poland 126 160 27%
Portugal 49 75 53%
Romania 46 64 39%
Slovakia 29 28 -3%
Slovenia 14 14 0%
Spain 275 529 92%
Sweden 136 127 -7%
Switzerland 55 97 78%
United Kingdom 356 389 9%
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Table A.10: Overview of existing transfer capacities between regions [GW]
Britain France Benelux Ger-
N
Ger-
S
Scanda Iberia Alpine Italy EE-
NW
EE-
NE
EE-
SW
EE-
SE
Britain - 2 1 - - - - - - - - - -
France 2 - 3.4 - 2.7 - 1.3 3.2 2.58 - - - -
Benelux 1 2.3 - 3 - 0.7 - - - - - - -
Ger-N - - 3.85 - 16 2.15 - - - 1.2 - - -
Ger-S - - 0.98 16 - - - 3.7 - 0.8 - - -
Scanda - - 0.7 2.70 - - - - - 0.6 0.35 - -
Iberia - 0.5 - - - - - - - - - - -
Alpine - 1.1 - - 5.5 - - - 4.39 0.6 - 1.7 -
Italy - 1 - - - - - 2.1 - - - 0.16 0.5
EE-NW - - - 1.1 2.3 - - 1 - - - 1.3 -
EE-NE - - - - - 0.35 - - - - - - -
EE-SW - - - - - - - 1.7 0.58 0.6 - - 0.7
EE-SE - - - - - - - - 0.5 - - 0.7 -
Table A.11: Overview of limits for investment in transfer capacities in 2030 [GW]
Britain France Benelux Ger-
N
Ger-
S
Scanda Iberia Alpine Italy EE-
NW
EE-
NE
EE-
SW
EE-
SE
Britain - - 0.16 - - 0.7 - - - - - - -
France - - - - - - 0.7 - - - - - -
Benelux 0.16 - - - - 0.15 - - - - - - -
Ger-N - - - - 1 0.68 - - - 0.35 - - -
Ger-S - - - 1 - - - 0.49 - 0.35 - - -
Scanda 0.7 - 0.45 0.39 - - - - - - 1 - -
Iberia - 1.5 - - - - - - - - - - -
Alpine - 0.5 - - - - - - - 0.7 - - -
Italy - 0.3 - - - - - 0.86 - - - 1.42 -
EE-NW - - - 0.4 - - - 0.75 - - 0.5 0.2 -
EE-NE - - - - - 1 - - - 0.5 - - -
EE-SW - - - - - - - - 0.99 0.45 - - -
EE-SE - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Table A.12: Overview of limits for investment in transfer capacities in 2050 [GW]
Britain France Benelux Ger-
N
Ger-
S
Scanda Iberia Alpine Italy EE-
NW
EE-
NE
EE-
SW
EE-
SE
Britain - 0.67 0.44 - - 0.47 - - - - - - -
France 0.67 - 0.2 - 0.1 - 0.9 - 0.54 - - - -
Benelux 0.44 0.27 - 0.83 - 0.33 - - - - - - -
Ger-N - - 0.83 - 1 1.17 - - - 0.63 - - -
Ger-S - - - 1 - - - 1.56 - 0.5 - - -
Scanda 0.47 - 0.53 1.16 - - - - - - 0.78 - -
Iberia - 1.17 - - - - - - - - - - -
Alpine - 0.4 - - 1.63 - - - 1.45 0.67 - 0.33 -
Italy - 0.53 - - - - - 1.27 - - - 1 0.17
EE-NW - - - 0.63 0.5 - - 0.83 - - 0.33 0.57 -
EE-NE - - - - - 0.78 - - - 0.33 - - -
EE-SW - - - - - - - 0.23 0.86 0.5 - - -
EE-SE - - - - - - - - 0.17 - - - -
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A.11 Capacity investment paths
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(b) 95% CO2 emission target
Hydro CHP Bio BECCS Nuclear Lignite Hard Coal Gas Wind PV CSP
Figure A.3: Long-run capacity path with 80% and 95% CO2 emission reduction target
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B.1 Implementation of the nucleolus
The nucleolus can be found by a sequence of linear programs. The first program of this
sequence tries to find the optimal pre-imputation xNUCi , which maximizes the excess ε
across all coalitions S. Conditions (B.2) and (B.3) ensure that ε equals the minimum
excess and that the efficiency condition is met.
max
xNUCi
ε (B.1)
subject to:
ε+
∑
i∈S
xNUCi ≤
∑
i∈S
xˆi(S) ∀S ⊂ N, S 6= ∅ (B.2)
∑
i∈N
xNUCi =
∑
i∈N
xˆi(N) (B.3)
xNUCi ≥ 0 (B.4)
Yet, the solution to this problem is not necessarily unique. As shown in Fromen (1997),
only the sequence of k = 2n − 2 linear programs finds the unique solution to the gain-
sharing problem. The program above represents the first program with k = 1 in this
sequence. The subsequent programs (k > 1) are formulated by means of the following
conditions:
max
xNUCi
εk (B.5)
subject to:
εk +
∑
i∈S
xNUCi ≤
∑
i∈S
xˆi(S) ∀S ⊂ N, S /∈ Fk (B.6)
εl +
∑
i∈S
xNUCi =
∑
i∈S
xˆi(S) ∀S ∈ Fl, l ∈ {1, ..., k − 1} (B.7)
∑
i∈N
xNUCi =
∑
i∈N
xˆi(N) (B.8)
xNUCi ≥ 0 (B.9)
As in the case of k = 1, Constraints (B.6) and (B.9) secure that εk is minimized and
the program’s efficiency holds. Condition (B.7) additionally ensures that the excess
of all coalitions, comprised in the set Fl, must equal the excess of the lth program.
The set Fl is determined for each program k and contains all coalitions fulfilling the
condition ∑i∈S xNUCi + εk−1 = ∑i∈S xˆi(S). Furthermore, set Fk is determined iteratively
by Fk = ∪l<kFl.
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If the (N, v) game exhibits an empty core, the linear program additionally requires the
individual rationality constraint (Guajardo and Jörnsten, 2015):
xNUCi ≤ ci({i}). (B.10)
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B.2 Cost-sharing game results
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Figure B.1: Coalition value by coalition cardinality
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B.3 Market outcomes
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Figure B.2: Long-run regional generation paths under grand coalition (part I)
Note: The generation path in Figure B.2d comprises both German model regions.
AppendixB 150
2020 2030 2040 2050
Years
0
100
200
300
400
500
G
en
er
at
io
n 
in
 [T
W
h]
(a) Benelux
2020 2030 2040 2050
Years
0
100
200
300
400
500
G
en
er
at
io
n 
in
 [T
W
h]
(b) Alpine
2020 2030 2040 2050
Years
0
100
200
300
400
500
G
en
er
at
io
n 
in
 [T
W
h]
(c) North-West Eastern Europe
2020 2030 2040 2050
Years
0
100
200
300
400
500
G
en
er
at
io
n 
in
 [T
W
h]
(d) North-East Eastern Europe
2020 2030 2040 2050
Years
0
100
200
300
400
500
G
en
er
at
io
n 
in
 [T
W
h]
(e) South-West Eastern Europe
2020 2030 2040 2050
Years
0
100
200
300
400
500
G
en
er
at
io
n 
in
 [T
W
h]
(f) South-East Eastern Europe
Hydro CHP Bio BECCS Nuclear Lignite Hard Coal Gas Wind PV CSP
Figure B.3: Long-run regional generation paths under grand coalition (part II)
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Figure B.4: Long-run regional generation paths under singleton coalitions (part I)
Note: The generation path in Figure B.4d comprises both German model regions.
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Figure B.5: Long-run regional generation paths under singleton coalitions (part II)
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Table B.1: Regional relative energy-only prices under grand coalition
(compared to 2015)
2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050
Britain 0.90 0.99 0.98 1.01 1.08 1.12 1.13
France 1.03 1.18 1.15 1.21 1.29 1.33 1.35
Benelux 1.04 1.11 1.14 1.19 1.31 1.36 1.40
Germany-N 1.11 1.20 1.22 1.26 1.35 1.39 1.41
Germany-S 1.13 1.21 1.23 1.29 1.42 1.47 1.47
Scandinavia 1.06 1.10 1.10 1.19 1.30 1.36 1.36
Iberia 1.06 1.11 1.13 1.15 1.22 1.26 1.26
Alpine 1.08 1.14 1.17 1.21 1.31 1.33 1.32
Italy 1.05 1.12 1.12 1.14 1.21 1.24 1.27
Eastern Europe-NW 1.03 1.07 1.07 1.11 1.12 1.12 1.13
Eastern Europe-NE 1.07 1.07 1.02 0.98 1.07 1.09 1.08
Eastern Europe-SW 1.01 1.06 1.08 1.09 1.13 1.15 1.16
Eastern Europe-SE 1.32 1.37 1.38 1.40 1.42 1.43 1.44
Table B.2: Regional relative energy-only prices under singleton coalitions
(compared to 2015)
2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050
Britain 0.87 0.88 0.86 0.89 1.01 1.06 1.07
France 1.00 1.11 1.06 1.20 1.23 1.25 1.25
Benelux 0.98 1.05 1.11 1.23 1.27 1.35 1.37
Germany-N 1.04 1.15 1.18 1.25 1.31 1.35 1.37
Germany-S 1.06 1.17 1.21 1.29 1.36 1.38 1.39
Scandinavia 1.01 1.03 0.99 1.10 1.20 1.25 1.28
Iberia 1.20 1.27 1.17 1.18 1.18 1.18 1.17
Alpine 1.03 1.09 1.11 1.15 1.20 1.22 1.22
Italy 1.05 1.11 1.11 1.13 1.16 1.18 1.19
Eastern Europe-NW 0.99 1.03 1.00 1.04 1.07 1.10 1.12
Eastern Europe-NE 0.96 0.97 0.94 0.97 1.05 1.08 1.06
Eastern Europe-SW 1.00 1.03 1.04 1.06 1.10 1.12 1.11
Eastern Europe-SE 1.47 1.35 1.37 1.38 1.39 1.40 1.42
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C.1 Electricity demand assumptions
Table C.1: Existing energy efficiency level and energy service demand projection
EE indicator 2015 EE capacity [GW] Demand [TWh]
Ind Res Com Tra Ind Res Com Tra 1990 2015 2050
AT 0.16 0.32 0.30 0.09 0.32 0.42 0.34 0.03 42 60 84
BE 0.35 0.30 0.06 0.16 1.18 0.45 0.08 0.02 57 87 121
BG 0.56 0.21 0.19 0.12 1.31 0.25 0.11 0.02 37 28 34
CH 0.15 0.25 0.29 0.15 0.18 0.47 0.47 0.04 44 55 97
CZ 0.37 0.21 0.20 0.02 1.12 0.23 0.15 0.01 46 64 71
DE 0.13 0.31 0.16 0.17 3.02 4.12 2.03 0.27 453 553 661
DK 0.25 0.23 0.08 0.12 0.24 0.26 0.10 0.00 28 35 43
EE 0.52 0.23 0.09 0.16 0.16 0.02 0.02 0.01 6 7 12
EL 0.29 0.28 0.07 0.41 0.41 0.29 0.06 0.01 28 60 67
ES 0.22 0.26 0.28 0.14 1.60 0.89 0.92 0.06 126 275 529
FI 0.11 0.09 0.05 0.06 0.41 0.21 0.06 0.00 44 89 84
FR 0.17 0.28 0.11 0.11 2.20 3.13 0.80 0.11 286 459 661
HR 0.29 0.18 0.13 0.11 0.20 0.09 0.04 0.00 13 20 24
HU 0.34 0.13 0.33 0.23 0.54 0.13 0.28 0.03 32 36 60
IE 0.40 0.37 0.32 0.15 0.20 0.18 0.12 0.00 12 28 41
IT 0.23 0.10 0.03 0.13 2.93 0.60 0.16 0.10 215 324 527
LT 0.63 0.16 0.10 0.21 0.39 0.03 0.05 0.01 12 9 37
LU 0.28 0.19 0.44 0.09 0.09 0.01 0.06 0.00 5 8 8
LV 0.47 0.34 0.08 0.29 0.17 0.05 0.06 0.01 11 7 27
NL 0.33 0.37 0.17 0.12 1.21 0.67 0.40 0.02 71 114 170
NO 0.21 0.29 0.14 0.13 1.08 1.00 0.33 0.01 96 150 112
PL 0.52 0.18 0.00 0.25 2.51 0.42 0.00 0.15 96 126 160
PT 0.25 0.37 0.22 0.29 0.31 0.25 0.15 0.01 23 49 75
RO 0.40 0.39 0.00 0.42 0.80 0.27 0.00 0.10 35 46 64
SE 0.17 0.41 0.40 0.13 1.04 1.79 1.18 0.04 120 136 127
SI 0.26 0.23 0.43 0.11 0.18 0.06 0.04 0.00 9 14 14
SK 0.47 0.36 0.52 0.15 0.81 0.15 0.28 0.02 25 29 28
UK 0.31 0.34 0.33 0.14 3.54 3.60 2.82 0.08 274 356 389
Total 28.15 20.04 11.11 1.16 2247 3224 4327
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C.2 Market outcomes
Table C.2: Regional energy efficiency capacities [GW]
Level Accumulated investments
Region 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050
Britain 10.5 0.0 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.4
France 6.2 3.6 3.6 3.6 3.6 3.6 3.6 3.4
Benelux 4.2 2.4 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.2
Germany-N 5.2 0.6 1.0 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.0 1.8
Germany-S 4.3 0.8 1.2 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.0 1.8
Scandinavia 7.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.3
Iberia 4.2 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.2
Alpine 2.3 3.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.2
Italy 3.8 4.7 4.7 4.7 4.7 4.7 4.7 4.6
Eastern Europe-NW 5.9 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.4
Eastern Europe-NE 1.0 2.2 3.6 4.7 5.6 5.8 5.8 5.3
Eastern Europe-SW 1.6 3.6 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.4
Eastern Europe-SE 3.6 3.0 4.1 4.1 5.2 5.2 5.2 5.0
Note: The 2015 value is the initial level of energy efficiency based on the approxima-
tion described in Section 3.4. The values for the years 2020–2050 show the accumulated
investments. Note that the latter values already account for depreciation.
Table C.3: Change of relative regional equilibrium prices with responsive
demand (compared to 2015)
2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050
Britain 1.00 0.95 0.91 0.90 0.95 0.90 0.91 0.89
France 0.97 0.85 0.89 1.00 0.94 0.94 0.91 0.93
Benelux 1.00 0.90 0.96 0.96 0.94 0.95 0.92 0.93
Germany-N 1.00 1.00 0.96 0.95 0.94 0.93 0.93 0.92
Germany-S 1.00 1.00 0.95 0.96 0.93 0.93 0.92 0.91
Scandinavia 1.00 0.92 0.91 0.88 0.87 0.93 0.91 0.91
Iberia 1.00 0.98 0.94 0.97 0.94 0.93 0.93 0.92
Alpine 1.00 0.83 0.89 1.00 0.93 0.96 0.93 0.90
Italy 1.00 1.00 0.92 0.97 0.96 0.94 0.93 0.93
Eastern Europe-NW 1.00 1.00 0.93 0.88 0.92 0.92 0.91 0.91
Eastern Europe-NE 0.93 0.76 0.65 0.77 0.83 0.88 0.90 0.90
Eastern Europe-SW 1.00 0.81 1.00 1.00 0.83 0.88 0.94 0.96
Eastern Europe-SE 1.00 0.65 0.67 0.70 0.78 0.85 0.91 0.91
Note: The change in relative prices in 2015 for some regions is caused solely by adjustment
due to short-term demand response and only leads to price changes in France and Eastern
Europe-NE.
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D.1 Sample of models
Table D.1: Overview of sample of models
Acronym Model Full Name Host Institution Reference
Balmorel A Model for Analyses of the
Electricity and CHP Markets
in the Baltic Sea Region
Elkraft System Ravn et al. (2001)
DESSTINEE Demand for Energy Services,
Supply and Transmission in
Europe
Imperial College London Boßmann and
Staffell (2015)
DIETER Dispatch and Investment Eval-
uation Tool with Endogenous
Renewables
German Institute for Economic Research,
Berlin
Zerrahn and Schill
(2017)
DIMENSION A Dispatch and Investment
Model for European Electricity
Markets
ewi Energy Research & Scenarios Richter (2011)
Dispa-SET
2.0
Unit commitment and power
dispatch model
Institute for Energy and Transport, Joint
Research Centre
Hidalgo González
et al. (2014)
E2M2s European Electricity Market
Model
Institute of Energy Economics and Ra-
tional Energy Use (IER), University of
Stuttgart
IER (2013)
ELMOD Spatial Optimization Model of
the Electricity Sector
DIW Berlin Egerer et al. (2014)
Eltramod Electricity Transshipment
Model
Chair of Business Management, esp. En-
ergy Economics, TU Dresden
Chair of Business,
ESP Energy Eco-
nomics (2012)
EMCAS Electricity Market Complex
Adaptive System
Argonne National Laboratory Conzelmann et al.
(2005)
EMLab Energy Modelling Laboratory TU Delft Richstein et al.
(2014); Chappin
(2011)
EMMA European Electricity Market
Model
Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Re-
search / Neon Neue Energieökonomik
Hirth (2016)
EMPIRE European Model for Power
System Investment with Re-
newable Energy
Norwegian University of Science and Tech-
nology
Skar et al. (2016)
EnergyPLAN Aalborg University Lund (2015)
EU-REGEN EU Regional Economy, Green-
house Gas, and Energy Model
ifo Institute see Chapter 1
evrys – Chair of Renewable and Sustainable En-
ergy Systems, Technical University of Mu-
nich
Huber (2017)
GENESYS Genetic Optimization of a Eu-
ropean Energy Supply System
RWTH Aachen University Bussar et al. (2017)
Haiku Electricity Market Model Resources for the Future Paul et al. (2009)
HECTOR Hourly Electricity, CCS and
Transmission Optimizer
Institute for Future Energy Consumer
Needs and Behavior, RWTH Aachen Uni-
versity
Lohwasser and
Madlener (2009)
IKARUS Institute of Energy Research at Research
Centre Juelich
Markewitz et al.
(1996)
LEAP Long-range Energy Alterna-
tives Planning System
Stockholm Environment Institute Heaps (2012)
LIBEMOD Liberalisation Model for the
European Energy Markets
CREE Frisch Centre Aune et al. (2015)
LIMES-EU Long Term Investment Model
for the Electricity Sector of Eu-
rope
Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Re-
search
Nahmmacher et al.
(2014)
MARKAL/
TIMES
Market Allocation Model/The
Integrated MARKAL-EFOM
System
Energy Technology Systems Analysis Pro-
gram, International Energy Agency
Loulou et al. (2005)
Continued on next page
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Table D.1 – Continued from previous page
Acronym Model Full Name Host Institution Reference
MESSAGE Model for Energy Supply
Strategy Alternatives and
their General Environmental
Impact
International Institute for Applied Systems
Analysis
IAEA (2016); Mess-
ner and Strubegger
(1995)
METIS Modeling the European Power
System
Directorate-General for Energy of the Eu-
ropean Commission
Chammas et al.
(2017)
MultiMod German Institute for Economic Research,
Berlin
Huppmann and
Egging (2014)
NEMO National Electricity Market
Optimiser
Centre for Energy and Environmental Mar-
kets, University of New South Wales
Elliston et al. (2013)
NEMS National Energy Modeling
System
U.S. Energy Information Agency EIA (2014)
OSeMOSYS Open Source Energy Modeling
System
KTH Royal Institute of Technology Howells et al. (2011)
PERSEUS Program Package for Emission
Reduction Strategies in En-
ergy Use and Supply
Institute for Industrial Production, Karl-
sruhe Institute of Technology (KIT)
Eßer-Frey (2012);
Möst and Fichtner
(2010)
PLEXOS Integrated Energy Model Energy Exemplar Edmunds (2014)
POLES Prospective Outlook on Long-
term Energy Systems
EDDEN laboratory, University of
Grenoble-CNRS
Kitous et al. (2010);
Criqui et al. (2015)
PRIMES Price-Induced Market Equilib-
rium System
Energy-Economy-Environment Modelling
Laboratory (E3MLab), National Technical
University of Athens
E3MLab (2017)
PyPSA Python for Power System
Analysis
Frankfurt Institute for Advanced Studies Brown et al. (2018)
REMix Renewable Energy Mix Institute of Engineering Thermodynamics,
German Aerospace Centre
Scholz (2012); Gils
et al. (2017)
REMod-D Renewable Energy Model -
Deutschland
Fraunhofer Institute for Solar Energy Sys-
tem
Henning and Palzer
(2014)
stELMOD Stochastic ELMOD German Institute for Economic Research,
Berlin
Abrell and Kunz
(2015)
Swissmod Model of the Swiss Electricity
Market
Research Center for Sustainable Energy
and Water Supply, University of Basel
Schlecht and Weigt
(2014, 2015)
SWITCH Solar and Wind energy Inte-
grated with Transmission and
Conventional sources
Renewable and Appropriate Energy Labo-
ratory, UC Berkeley
Fripp (2008)
urbs – Chair of Renewable and Sustainable En-
ergy Systems, Technical University of Mu-
nich
Schaber et al. (2012);
Huber et al. (2012)
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D.2 Model criteria and features
Programming technique
linear/mixed-integer/dynamic/
fuzzy-logic/other non-linear
Analytical method
input-output/spreadsheet/
simulation/optimization/
economic equilibrium/econometric/
agent-based/multi-criteria/other
Representation of uncertainty and risk
yes/no
Representation of acceptance
yes/no
Endogenous features
generation capacity investment/
storage capacity investment/
transmission capacity inverstment/
generation dispatch/storage dispatch/
load flows/trade flows/
demand/technological learning/
market prices/emission rates and prices
Model perspective
top-down/bottom-up/hybrid
Model-Theoretic Specifications
Figure D.1: Model criteria and features within the category “Model-Theoretic
Specifications”
Energy sectoral coverage
heat/power-to-X/
transportation, mobility
Demand representation
short-term/long-term
Represented markets
spot market/balancing market/
capacity market/futures market
Policy constraints
CO2 emissions constraints/taxes/
technology restrictions/RES quota/
RES subsidy/CO2 trading/market design*
Market Representation
*Market design refers to organizational structures ranging from widely ex-
isting models discussed in Barroso et al. (2005) to new types like capacity
markets.
Figure D.2: Model criteria and features within the category “Market Representation”
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Spatial coverage*
Representation of time
continuity of time steps/
high temporal resolution
Costs included
investment costs/fixed O&M costs/
fuel costs/other variable costs/
carbon tax
Thermal generation technologies
gas/lignite/coal/
CHP/nuclear/CCS
Details of thermal generation
partial efficiencies/
cross-time-step restrictions/
time-dependent availabilities
Renewable generation technologies
solar thermal/photovoltaic/
wind onshore/wind offshore/
biomass/hydro/wave/tidal
Time horizon
yes/no
Spatial resolution
yes (≥ 10 regions)/no (otherwise)
Detail of Modeling
Storage technologies
pumped hydro/battery/hydrogen/
compressed air/others
Details of storage modeling
charging and discharging capacity/
storage capacity/
additional inflow/storage losses
Detail of grid modeling
transmission grid/distribution grid
Figure D.3: Model criteria and features within the category “Detail of Modeling”
General purpose
forecasting/backcasting/
exploring
Model name* Institution* Release date*
Transparency
open-source code/
open data/
description of all equations
Specific purpose*
General Information
Model specialties*
Figure D.4: Model criteria and features within the category “General Information”
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D.3 Examples of analysis steps
How-To (1): Model analysis
Consider a generic model Mx. Analyzing the model using a subset of criteria is done in the
following way:
• Representation of acceptance: Model Mx does not take into account the acceptance
of the stakeholders. Since this is a binary criterion, the answer is simply “no”.
• Detail of grid modeling: This is a multiple-choice criterion. Model Mx has a simple
depiction of the transmission grid (“yes”), but no representation of the distribution
grid (“no”).
• Thermal generation technologies: This is also a multiple-choice criterion. Model Mx
is capable of including gas, coal, lignite, combined heat and power generators, and
nuclear power plants (“yes”) but no carbon capture and storage plants (“no”).
How-To (2): Policy questions analysis
Consider the question Q12: “How does the cost-optimal grid expansion deviate if acceptance
is taken into account?”. Analyzing the policy question using a subset of criteria is done in
the following way:
• Representation of acceptance: This model feature is required to answer the policy
question Q12, so it belongs to the set of mandatory features.
• Detail of grid modeling: Usually, the lack of acceptance hinders or delays the con-
struction of new overhead transmission lines. The distribution grid being mostly
underground, its expansion is usually not affected by the acceptance. Thus, the de-
piction of the transmission grid is a mandatory feature, whereas the representation
of the distribution grid is a facultative feature.
• Thermal generation technologies: Conventional power plants should be included to
obtain a realistic power flow, yet this is not the main goal of the study. Besides, no
single technology is particularly crucial: the modeling of two or three technologies
among gas, coal, lignite, combined heat and power generators, and nuclear power
plants should be sufficient. Hence, they belong to the complementary features. The
CO2 emissions are probably not relevant for Q12, so the modeling of carbon capture
and storage plants is rather a facultative feature.
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How-To (3): Model-question gap quantification
Consider the generic model Mx, the policy question Q12, and the three criteria used before
(representation of acceptance, detail of grid modeling, and thermal generation technolo-
gies). The model-question gap dMx,Q12 is calculated in the following way:
• The set of mandatory features has only two elements (representation of acceptance
and of the transmission grid), so |SQ12++ | = 2. Among them, only the latter is modeled
in Mx, hence |SQ12++ ∩ SMx | = 1 and |SQ12++ ∩ SMx | = 1.
• The set of complementary features has five elements (modeling of gas, coal, lignite,
combined heat and power generators, and nuclear power plants), so |SQ12+ | = 5. All
of them are modeled in Mx, hence |SQ12+ ∩ SMx | = 5.
• There are two facultative features (representation of the distribution grid and the
modeling of carbon capture and storage plants). None of them are available in the
model Mx. This set has no impact on the model-question gap anyway.
All in all, we obtain: dMx,Q12 = 1−
2 · 1 + 5− 2 · 1
2 · 2 + 5 ≈ 0.44.
How-To (4): Feature gap quantification
The feature gap should be used for large sets of models and policy questions. However, we
can still apply the formula in Equation (4.2) to the model features used before for M =
{Mx} and Q = {Q12}.
• For f = representation of acceptance, the feature gap is critical:
dM,Qf =
|SQ12++ (f)|
|Q| −
|SMx(f)|
|M | =
1
1 −
0
1 = 1.
• Detail of grid modeling: dM,Qtransmission = d
M,Q
distribution = 0 for different reasons. The
first feature is both mandatory and included in Mx, the second is neither mandatory
nor implemented.
• Thermal generation technologies: For the features gas, coal, lignite, combined heat
and power generators, and nuclear power plants, dM,Qf = −1 because all are imple-
mented but not mandatory. For the modeling of carbon capture and storage plants,
dM,QCCS = 0.
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D.4 Description of the energy policy issues cluster
This section contains detailed information on the model-oriented categories of the EPIC.
Object dimension - instruments
• Market-based instruments: are instruments targeting at the price or quantity of an
externality or element of the energy system. Examples comprise volume-controlling
instruments as the EU ETS or national CO2 taxes.1
• Promotion of investments: are instruments aiming at the direct promotion of invest-
ments. This can range from loan subsidies and R&D funding to technology-specific
tariffs, for example, feed-in tariffs for RES.
• Command-and-control instruments: are instruments that enforce measures like
technology bans (i.e., nuclear phase-out) or emission standards.
• Soft instruments: are instruments that are non-binding and have no direct impact
on the market outcome. They can comprise, for example, voluntary obligations
(e.g., green pricing) and information policies (e.g. energy label).
Object dimension - energy system design
• Electricity sector configuration: aims at identifying the optimal technology-mix
with respect to a specific decarbonization target.
• Sectoral integration: comprises the optimal level of integrating the electricity sector
with other energy sectors like heat, mobility, and industry.
• Regional integration: captures the preferable degree of (geographic) market cou-
pling. This can comprise whether interconnectivity between regions is more prefer-
able than an autonomous and highly decentralized energy systems.
Evaluation perspective
• System costs: the sole objective of finding the cost-efficient market outcome.
• Distributional effects: the equality of welfare or costs distribution among heteroge-
neous regions or agents is considered in the evaluation of a transformation path.
• Energy independence: the degree to which a region depends on electricity or com-
modity imports is explicitly considered.
1 In the context of RES, this category also captures RES quotas and green certificates.
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• Supply security and resilience: consequences from irregularities in terms of electric-
ity or commodity supply and the intermittent nature of RES are taken into account
when analyzing different market outcomes.
• Acceptance: the acceptance of individual technologies or entire transformation paths
is considered for identifying the equilibrium market outcome.
• Path dependencies: the costs of locking an energy system into a subset of tech-
nologies due to, for instance, the underlying infrastructure, are considered in the
evaluation of a transformation path.
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D.5 Feature gap results
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Figure D.5: Average implementation rate and average necessity rate for space and time
representation, costs, conventional and renewable technologies, and storage
modeling features
Note: The bars are superposed, so that the black bars are only visible if the implementation rate exceeds
the necessity rate. Otherwise, critical discrepancies exist and are colored in light gray.
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Figure D.6: Average implementation rate and average necessity rate for sector
coupling, grid representation, demand, markets, policy constraints and key
endogenous features
Note: The bars are superposed, so that the black bars are only visible if the implementation rate exceeds
the necessity rate. Otherwise, critical discrepancies exist and are colored in light gray.
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